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PREFACE 
 
This thesis builds on five pieces of earlier work. My dissertation for the degree of Bachelor of Science 
from the University of York, United Kingdom (Heikkilä 1999) provided a good starting point. In 
addition, one refereed book chapter, two refereed research articles and one poster written in 
collaboration with Dr. Jukka Peltola (Heikkilä and Peltola forthcoming; 2004; 2003; 2002) provided the 
basis for the theoretical and empirical analysis conducted in this thesis. The analysis presented in these 
papers provides the core of this thesis, but this forum allows me to extend the discussion in two 
important ways. First, it is possible to elaborate on the results and discuss the relevant factors in greater 
detail than is possible in research articles. Second, it is possible to relate the discussion to the wider 
background – the global challenge of dealing with invasive alien species. 
 
Parts of this thesis provide a component for the work done in a collaborative research project of the 
University of Jyväskylä, University of Helsinki and MTT Agrifood Research Finland. The three-year 
research project, funded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, was finished in 2006. Its main 
economic objective was to determine the economically most sensible control policy for the Colorado 
potato beetle and to participate in producing a pest risk analysis for the plant protection authorities. 
Thanks are due to Professor Johanna Mappes at the University of Jyväskylä for directing that project. 
With gratitude I would also like to acknowledge funding for my studies from Emil Aaltonen 
Foundation and Aino and August Johannes Tiura Foundation. 
 
This thesis has been in preparation for about four years. To my satisfaction, I can note that it has been 
outdated in two respects. First, the new Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira started its work on 1 May 
2006. It is a merger of the National Veterinary and Food Research Institute, the National Food Agency, 
the Plant Production Inspection Centre and certain sections of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry. The new authority may – hopefully – be able to look at the issue of biosecurity in a more 
holistic fashion than earlier separate institutions. Second, a national strategy for invasive alien species is 
under preparation. This is also likely to help in approaching the issue in a comprehensive manner. 
These two recent changes are not accounted for in the discussion and analysis within this thesis. 
 
A thesis nominally introduces the work of one person. In reality, many others have contributed to its 
making in various ways. When I first started working on the Colorado potato beetle in York back in 
1998, I had little idea that the small bug would a few years later get me a job and another degree. In 
2002 I began to work on the topic again. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Jyrki 
Aakkula and Dr. Jukka Peltola who had enough trust in me to employ me at MTT Economic Research. 
I would like to thank the Director of Economic Research, Docent Kyösti Pietola for encouragement, 
support and flexibility in letting me work on this thesis. I would also like to extend my thanks to other 
staff at MTT Economic Research for making it such a cosy place – both at worktime and at sparetime. 
Very special thanks naturally go to my collaborator Dr. Jukka Peltola (currently at the Prime Minister’s 
Office). His enthusiasm, insight, (plentiful!) ideas, comments, humour and support have done much 
good to understanding and dealing with the issues discussed in this thesis, as well as to understanding 
how research and work is conducted in general. 
 
At the University of Helsinki, Department of Economics and Management, I would like to thank my 
supervisor Professor Markku Ollikainen for his valuable insight and comments. Thanks are also due to 
participants at the environmental economics research seminars, and especially to Dr. Marko Lindroos, 
Dr. Chiara Lombardini-Riipinen, M.Sc. Piia Aatola, M.Sc. Antti Iho, M.Sc. Anna-Kaisa Kosenius, M.Sc. 
Antti Miettinen, M.Sc. Kimmo Ollikka and M.Sc. Jarno Virtanen who read through and commented on 
parts of the thesis. Thanks are extended also to participants at the FRONTIS workshop on economics 
of plant health in Wageningen, the Netherlands, who provided comments on the research conducted 
for this thesis. I would also like to thank the examiners for their constructive comments. Finally, I 
would like to thank my parents as well as my friends and relatives, without whom many things, 
including this thesis, would have little meaning. 
 
Helsinki, 7 December 2006      
Jaakko Heikkilä   3(162)
ABSTRACT 
 
The expanding global economy presents various challenges to production and environmental systems 
worldwide. Biosecurity provides a framework for managing the risks presented by different types of 
diseases and species spread by globalisation. One element of biosecurity is protection against invasive 
alien species (IAS). These are species spread by human actions outside their natural zones of dispersal. 
IAS present a threat to biological diversity at all levels and may have a negative impact on the goods 
and services provided by ecosystems. IAS may result in non-production and production costs. The first 
category includes physical impacts materialising as environmental, health and cultural costs, whereas the 
second category includes the subsequent economic impacts, such as production losses, domestic 
market effects and trade effects. In addition, IAS may impose control costs either on the society or a 
specific sector, depending on the type of species and the chosen policy. Management of IAS is a public 
good and remains under-provided by the free market, which partly explains the involvement of the 
state in IAS control.  
 
A broad division of IAS management is between what is here called pre-emptive and reactive control. 
Pre-emptive control refers to actions taken to totally eradicate the IAS when found. Such actions 
reduce the probability of entry and/or establishment of IAS. Reactive control refers to letting a 
possible invasion to take place and be followed by application of reactive control measures, reducing 
the extent and magnitude of damages in the event of an invasion. Preventative actions are generally 
advocated as the preferred strategy to deal with IAS, but it is possible that the costs incurred due to an 
invasion are less than the costs incurred in continued preventative actions. In such a case, continued 
efforts to prevent the species from invading consume the limited resources and may lead to other, 
more dangerous, species not being targeted with sufficient resources. These two policies are in this 
study considered in the context of the Colorado potato beetle (CPB). The CPB is a destructive plant 
pest, whose main host plant in Finland is the cultivated potato. The potential for the beetle’s range 
expansion to Finland has been shown by both genetic and climatologic studies, and it provides a 
convenient case for studying the effects of invasions, uncertainty and local change. Given the life 
history characteristics of the CPB, there are five important factors from an economic point of view. 
First, the beetle has spread very rapidly across the continent, although its spread has slowed down as it 
has approached its ecological limits. Second, in propitious environmental conditions its population size 
can increase extremely rapidly. Third, it is capable of causing significant damage to potato plants. 
Fourth, cold summers and winters hinder its establishment, but it is most likely capable of establishing 
in at least some parts of Finland. Finally, lack of natural predators and ability to develop resistance to 
chemical control substances make the beetle difficult and expensive to control. 
 
This thesis seeks answers to four specific issues: i) review and evaluate the scale, type and magnitude of 
impacts IAS are capable of causing; ii) specify the policy problem in IAS management and review how 
the institutional framework in Finland addresses the issue; iii) review existing cost-benefit studies on 
agricultural IAS and determine the components that such studies should include; and iv) undertake an 
economic risk assessment of the CPB in Finland and evaluate the conditions under which it is optimal 
to prevent the species from establishing. On basis of a literature review undertaken, we suggest ten 
points to be taken into account when conducting economic policy evaluations of IAS: i) choose at least 
two realistic policy options to evaluate; ii) consider all possible direct and indirect impacts, monetise the 
ones you can and take the others into account qualitatively; iii) describe which costs and whose costs 
are included in the analysis and how they are derived; iv) formalise the basis of the analysis; v) 
undertake an ex-ante analysis to supplement an optional ex-post analysis; vi) carry out sensitivity and 
uncertainty analysis; vii) consider how the impacts excluded from the quantitative analysis affect the 
results; viii) discuss to whom the costs and benefits accrue; ix) make a (conditional) policy 
recommendation; and x) relate the findings to the wider framework of biosecurity measures. 
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The empirical analysis uses a cost-benefit framework to assess the policy response, comparing the costs 
of prevention with the costs that would ensue if the species is allowed into the country. The primary 
focus is on ex-ante analysis, although an ex-post assessment of past seven years is also conducted. The 
framework presented estimates expected aggregate costs over time, using Monte Carlo simulation and 
allowing stochastic variation in the key variables. In addition, linear temporal change in certain key 
variables is included in the analysis. The main lesson from the ex-post cost-benefit analysis carried out 
in this study is that it is not sufficient to look at the costs over only a short period of time. Protection 
against IAS is to a large extent an investment that may produce potentially very high revenues in terms 
of avoided costs in the future. The results of the ex-ante cost-benefit analysis indicate that the current 
policy based on a protection system is economically viable, provided that there will be some future 
change and a non-insignificant level of pest winter survival. Considered the other way round, we can 
give up protection if we are certain that there is no future change, pest winter survival stays 
permanently below about 20%, or potato crop losses will not exceed 5% of the yield. If we cannot be 
certain that one of these three conditions materialises, we should be cautious regarding the possibility 
of abandoning protection because the risk associated with giving up protection is at the extreme nearly 
thirty times greater than that associated with protection. Results also indicate that the fact that invasions 
come very seldom is not a valid argument for abandoning protection, and that it is the variable costs of 
the protection system rather than the fixed costs that are important in determining policy profitability. 
The sensitivity analysis suggests that winter survival, logistic spread rate and variable cost of protection 
are the most important variables in determining economic profitability. The aggregate results suggest 
that the current policy of CPB exclusion should be continued. 
 
The future challenge lies in considering the issue of IAS and diseases in a holistic biosecurity 
framework. Within this framework, the issue would be managed in an integrated fashion from the point 
of view of multiple threats, multiple pathways, multiple parties involved and multiple methods and 
stages of control. Many challenges lie ahead in planning a functioning framework to deal with the issue 
of biosecurity. 
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Bursaphelenchus xylophilus    Pinewood nematode  
Castor canadensis    Canadian beaver  
Castor fiber    European beaver 
Centaurea solstitialis    Yellow starthistle  
Cercopagis pengoi     Spiny water flea  
Chrysomya bezziana    Screwworm fly  
Clavibacter michiganensis sepedonicus  [bacterium] 
Clupea harengus membras Baltic  herring 
Coleomegilla maculate  Pink spotted lady beetle 
Convolvulus arvensis    Field bindweed  
Cygnus cygnus    Whooper swan  
Cygnus olor    Mute swan 
Dama dama    Fallow deer 
Diabrotica virgifera virgifera     Western corn rootworm  
Doryphorophaga doryphorae   [parasitic fly] 
Dreissena polymorpha    Zebra mussel 
Engraulis encrasicolus    Anchovy  
Erwinia amylovora   [bacterium] 
Eucalyptus   [tree] 
Euphorbia esula    Leafy spurge  
Edovum puttleri    [parasitic wasp] 
Frankliniella occidentalis    Western flower thrips  
Galium album    Upright bedstraw  
Galium verum     Lady's bedstraw  
Gleditsia triacanthos    Honeylocust 
Globodera pallida    Pale cyst nematode 
Haliaeetus albicilla    White-tailed sea eagle 
Halicoerus grypus    Grey seal 
Heracleum spp.   Hogweeds 
Homo sapiens    Human  
Hordeum vulgare    Barley  
Hystrix brachyura   Himalayan  porcupine 
Impatiens glandulifera    Himalayan balsam  
Lates nilotica    Nile perch  
Lebia grandis    [ground beetle] 
Leptinotarsa decemlineata    Colorado potato beetle  
Loxodonta africana    African elephant  
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LIST OF SPECIES CONTINUED… 
 
Latin name  Common name (if available) 
Lupinus spp.   Lupin  
Lythrum salicaria  European purple loosestrife  
Matsucoccus feytaudi  Maritime pine bast scale  
Meligethes aeneus  Pollen beetle  
Mnemiopsis leidyi  Leidy’s comb jelly 
Morella faya, previously Myrica faya  Fire tree  
Mustela lutreola  European mink  
Mustela vison  Mink 
Nyctereutes procyonoides  Raccoon dog 
Odocoileus virginianus  White-tailed deer 
Ondatra zibethicus  Muskrat 
Oryctolagus cuniculus  European rabbit  
Ostrinia nubilalis  European corn borer  
Pacifastacus leniusculus  Signal crayfish 
Panthera leo  Lion  
Phalangium opilio  Daddy longlegs  
Phasianus colchicus  Pheasant  
Plasmodium spp.  [parasitic protozoa] 
Podisus maculiventris  Spined soldier bug  
Pomacea canaliculata  Golden apple snail  
Populus spp. [tree] 
Puccinia graminis  Black rust  
Pusa hispida  Ringed seal 
Ralstonia solanacearum  [bacterial  pathogen] 
Rastrococcus invadens  Mango mealybug  
Rattus exulans  Pacific rat 
Rosa rugosa  Rugosa rose 
Schistocerca gregaria  Desert locust  
Sciurus carolinensis   Grey squirrel  
Sciurus vulgaris  Red squirrel  
Secale cereale  Rye  
Solanum tuberosum  Potato, cultivated 
Solenopsis invicta  Red imported fire ant  
Tamarisk spp.  Saltcedar  
Thrips palmi  Melon thrips  
Tilletia indica  [fungus] 
Trichosurus vulpecula  Possum  
Triticum aestivum  Wheat  
Xylella fastidiosa   [bacterium] 
 
 
LIST OF DISEASES  
 
Avian influenza 
Beet necrotic yellow vein furovirus 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy  
Citrus canker  
Classical swine fever 
Dengue fever 
Eastern equine encephalitis 
Fireblight 
Pierce's disease 
Tomato spotted wilt tospovirus   12(162)
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
 
AINITt Invasion  magnitude  (from outside) (ha) 
AINITtrend  Trend variable in invasion magnitude (slow/rapid) 
At  Annual area controlled (ha) 
at  Spread area in linear spread (ha) 
ATOT  Total production area (ha) 
C  Total costs of pre-emptive control (e) 
CF  Fixed costs of pre-emptive control (e) 
CVt  Variable costs of pre-emptive control (e) 
Dt  Crop damage caused by the pest (%), 0 ≤ Dt ≤ 1 
F  Fixed costs, bought services and miscellaneous costs (e) 
g  Inspection area multiplier 
h  Production area of representative producer (ha) 
It  Annual variable inspection visits (visits) 
K  Carrying capacity of the system 
loc Location 
N0i  Number of pest individuals invading the ith hectare 
Nt  (Post-control) population size at time t 
pB  Pre-invasion (base) producer price (e) 
pS  State-dependent producer price (e) 
pt  Modified potato producer price (e) 
px  The per unit price of non-control inputs (e) 
pz  The per unit price of control (e) 
pzztrend  Trend variable in zt (slow/rapid) 
q  Base production quantity per hectare (kg) 
R Reproductive  rate 
r Discount  rate  (%) 
sINITt  Spread multiplier in first year 
st  Spread multiplier in nonlinear spread 
T  Terminal time period 
t Time  period 
v  Reduction in pest numbers due to control 
V1  Variable costs, bought services per visit (e) 
V2  Variable costs, control substances per ha (e) 
V2trend  Trend variable in V2 (slow/rapid) 
V3  Variable costs, eradication and compensation per ha (e) 
wt  Failure area of pre-emptive control (%), 0 ≤ wt ≤ 1 
wtrend  Trend variable in failure area of pre-emptive control 
xt  Quantity of non-control inputs 
zt  Quantity of control inputs per hectare (reactive control) 
γt  Invasion probability (%), 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1 
γtrend  Trend variable in invasion probability (slow/rapid) 
∆ Change 
∆pt  Invasion induced price change (e) 
ε  Yield effect on price 
η  Effectiveness of control inputs 
ξ  Size of the invasion 
πi  Producer profit (e) 
Πt  Aggregate producer profit (e) 
θt  Proportion of population that survives winter (%), 0 ≤ θt ≤ 1 
θtrend  Trend variable in winter survival (slow/rapid) 
φ  Number of pest individuals eradicated by the producer 
ωt  Failure probability of pre-emptive control (%), 0 ≤ ωt ≤ 1 
ωtrend  Trend variable in failure probability 
* Optimum  value 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The challenge of invasive alien species 
 
The expanding global economy presents various challenges to both production and environmental 
systems worldwide. Biosecurity provides a framework for managing the risks presented by different 
types of diseases and species spread by globalisation. One element of biosecurity is protection against 
invasive alien species (IAS). These are species that are spread by human actions outside their natural 
zones of dispersal. The increasing scale of international commerce and travel together with the 
expansion of free trade areas, intensifying production practices and climatic changes increase the risk of 
IAS spreading also to more distant geographic locations, including Finland. For the purposes of this 
study, IAS are defined as follows (after Clinton 1999). 
 
DEFINITION 1 – INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES 
Invasive alien species is with respect to a particular ecosystem, any species, including its seeds, eggs, spores, or other 
biological material capable of propagating that species, that is not native to that ecosystem and whose introduction does or 
is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health.  
 
IAS can be introduced outside their natural habitats either intentionally or unintentionally. In the new 
habitats they can establish, outcompete native species and take over the new environments. IAS are 
found in most geographic locations, in most categories of living organisms and in most ecosystem 
types. They thus present a threat to biological diversity at all levels and may have a negative impact on 
the goods and services provided by ecosystems (Vitousek et al. 1996). 
 
IAS may result in either non-production or production costs, or both. The first category includes 
physical impacts materialising as environmental, health and cultural costs, whereas the second category 
includes the subsequent economic impacts, such as production losses, domestic market effects and 
trade effects. In addition, species in both categories may impose control costs either on the society or a 
specific sector, depending on the type of species and the chosen policy. In the United States about a 
quarter of all agricultural gross national product is lost annually due to damages imposed by invasive 
pests or costs of their control (Schmitz and Simberloff 1997; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment 1993). Globally, agricultural losses to introduced species could be between US$ 55-248 
billion annually (Bright 1999).  
 
Invasions take place on a global scale and will continue rapid increase in this century due to interplay 
with other global changes such as increasing globalisation of markets and rapid increases in global 
trade, travel and tourism (Di Castri 1989). Especially in the northern regions, climatic changes and 
global warming are predicted to increase invasion attempts of alien species, including invertebrate pests, 
fungi, bacteria and viral diseases (Jeffree and Jeffree 1996; MAF 2005; Walker and Steffen 1997). 
Threats to animal and plant health by invading organisms are thus on the increase. This means that also 
the environment, natural resources and resource-based production in Finland are prone to attacks by 
invasive species. Examples of such species in Finland are provided by pinewood nematode 
(Bursaphelenchus xylophilus), Colorado potato beetle (Leptinotarsa decemlineata) and hogweeds (Heracleum 
spp.). 
 
Changes in local climatic conditions and agricultural policies as well as uncertainty related to stochastic 
environmental fluctuations make invasive species policy relatively challenging to design and implement. 
These changes are often exacerbated by dynamic changes in the species characteristics. Management of 
IAS is nonetheless a public good – a good that is non-excludable in production (anybody can enjoy the 
benefits) and non-rival in consumption (usage does not diminish the good). Due to these characteristics 
consumption exceeds supply, and invasive species control remains under-provided by the free market. 
This partly explains the involvement of the state in IAS control measures.  
 
The European Community has recognised IAS as an emerging issue, but so far relatively little work has 
been done on economic evaluation of IAS impacts. At ministerial level, the Council of the European   14(162)
Union “stresses the importance of capacity building in relation to invasive alien species” (Council of the 
European Union 2002a). In Finland very little economic policy analysis of IAS has been carried out. 
Different pests and pathogens have naturally been studied, but it is only recently that the issue has been 
viewed in the larger framework of IAS. In a recent publication regarding the future development of the 
Finnish agrifood sector to year 2030 (MAF 2002a) IAS are indirectly mentioned in several parts. For 
instance, climatic changes and free movement within the expanding European Union are seen to 




1.2 Pre-emptive and reactive control 
 
The broadest division of IAS management is between what is here called pre-emptive and reactive 
control. In other words, whether there should be a system (institution or instrument) that ex-ante aims 
to reduce the likelihood of entry and/or establishment of IAS, or whether resources should be devoted 
to ex-post reactive control if and when the IAS invades in order to reduce the impact of the entry 
and/or establishment (Perrings 2005). 
 
DEFINITION 2 – PRE-EMPTIVE CONTROL 
Pre-emptive control refers to actions taken to provide the appropriate infrastructure and to maintain vigilance regarding 
possible invasion events and, if and when found, totally eradicate the invasive species using the available resources. Pre-
emptive control reduces the probability of entry and/or establishment of an invasive alien species. 
 
DEFINITION 3 – REACTIVE CONTROL 
Reactive control refers to letting a possible invasion to take place and be followed by application of reactive control 
measures such as chemical control, in order to control the damages that the invasive species may impose. Reactive control 
reduces the extent and magnitude of damages in the event of an invasion by an invasive alien species. 
 
The division made here is just one of many possible categorisations. For instance, Filbey et al. (2002) 
divide the United States state-level legislative tools to five categories: i) prevention; ii) regulation; iii) 
control and management; iv) enforcement and implementation; and v) co-ordination. For the purposes 
of this study, the two-fold division above is, however, sufficient. 
 
Preventative actions are generally advocated as the preferred strategy to deal with IAS (e.g. Perrault and 
Carroll Muffett 2001), but it is nonetheless possible – at least for certain species – that the costs 
incurred due to an invasion are less than the costs incurred in continued preventative actions. In such a 
case, continued efforts to prevent the species from invading consume the limited resources and may 
possibly lead to other, more dangerous, species not being targeted with sufficient resources. 
Furthermore, many species are imported for use in recreation (e.g. pheasant) or production (e.g. mink) 
or for other beneficial purposes (e.g. canaries and parrots). The optimal policy should allow imports of 
species that result in greater aggregate benefits than costs, but prohibit species that cause more costs 
than benefits. In other words, the policy should allow actions that produce positive net benefits for the 
society. 
 
An example of the pre-emptive approach is the European Union system of protected zones (ZP, zone 
protégée) which aims to prevent the introduction and spread of organisms harmful to agricultural 
production.
1 Protected zones are a regional tool that can be used to account for differences in 
ecological conditions. They are defined as follows (after EC 2000). 
 
DEFINITION 4 - PROTECTED ZONE  
Protected zones are zones “in which one or more harmful organisms referred to in [the] Directive, which are established in 
one or more parts of the Community, are not endemic or established despite favourable conditions for them to establish 
themselves there [or] in which there is a danger that certain harmful organisms will establish, given propitious ecological 
conditions, for particular crops, despite the fact that these organisms are not endemic or established in the Community.” 
 
                                                           
1 For a brief review of the European plant health framework, see Pfeilstetter (2005) or Unger (2005).   15(162)
Under the protected zone system it is permissible to import agricultural products associated with the 
harmful organism into a protected zone only from another protected zone or from a designated buffer 
zone. The system also requires eradication of quarantine pests if they are found within the protected 
zone. Pre-emptive control in this paper deals mainly with reducing the likelihood of establishment 
through eradication. 
 
The EU legislation is incorporated into Finnish national legislation through the Act on the Protection 
of Plant Health of 2003. It aims at eradicating quarantine organisms if encountered in Finland by 
obligating individual farmers within Finland to inform the authorities of any quarantine pest 
observations and to follow any orders from the plant protection authorities regarding eradication of 
those species. It also specifies penalties for not following orders and obligations and sets out the rights 
of producers to compensation (Government of Finland 2003). 
 
The six quarantine organisms for which Finland has a European Union protected zone – and which 
thus have to be eradicated if encountered – are presented in Table 1 (after KTTK 1998; MAF website; 
MAF 2003d; MAF 2004a,b). 
 
Invasive species  Type and status  Economic 
analysis 
Beet necrotic yellow vein 
furovirus 
Disease of the goosefoot family, in Finland mainly sugar beet is at risk. Spreads easily 
and is difficult to eradicate from soil. Has not been encountered in Finland.  
None to our 
knowledge 
Colorado potato beetle 
(Leptinotarsa decemlineata) 
Important insect defoliator of potato. Has not established permanently in Finland.  Current study 
Fireblight (caused by 
Erwinia amylovora) 
Bacterial disease of ornamental shrubs and fruit trees. Has not been encountered in 
Finland. Control is very difficult.  
None to our 
knowledge 
Pale cyst nematode  
(Globodera pallida) 
Worldwide one of the worst pests of potato. Control is difficult. Has not established 
permanently in Finland.  
Qualitative 
(MAF 2004a) 
Tobacco whitefly  
(Bemisia tabaci) 
Pest that has multiple hosts, transmits viruses and is resistant to several pesticides. In 
Finland can only live in greenhouses and has not established permanently. 
None to our 
knowledge 
Tomato spotted wilt 
tospovirus 
Important disease of vegetable and ornamental plants. Encountered sporadically in 
Finland.  
MAF (2003d) 
Table 1. Quarantine plant pests with a protected zone in Finland.  
 
In addition to giving protection against invasive organisms, protection systems may also act as technical 
barriers to trade and as such potentially give the areas concerned an artificial trade advantage. Concern 
regarding this issue has been voiced by for instance Australia in the COP-6 meeting of the parties to the 
Biodiversity Convention (ICTSD 2002). The issue is indeed problematic due to the difficulties present 
in differentiating legitimate sanitary and phytosanitary measures from disguised protectionism (Margolis 
et al. 2005). 
 
Actions involved in preventing a pest from invading and establishing are costly, comprising for 
example surveillance, labelling, import restrictions, eradication, compensation payments and post-
monitoring. Often the benefits of not having the pest around outweigh these costs, but this is by no 
means inevitable (Mumford 2002). Several countries have voluntarily renounced their EU protected 
zone, including the UK (except for Northern Ireland) for beet necrotic yellow vein virus, France for 
maritime pine bast scale (Matsucoccus feytaudi) and Denmark for tomato spotted wilt tospovirus and 
tobacco whitefly (Bemisia tabaci) (European Commission 2000, EC 2000). Economic factors are likely to 
have influenced these decisions. Furthermore, on at least one occasion cost-benefit analysis has been in 
favour of denouncing the protection system (MacLeod et al. 2005).  
 
In pre-emptive control the economic cost can be divided into fixed and variable costs of the protection 
system. The fixed costs consist of maintaining the appropriate infrastructure and undertaking regular 
checks to monitor the pest status.
2 The variable costs depend on the invasion frequency and magnitude 
and consist of authority driven eradication of the pest and financial compensation for the producers. 
The protection system may also impose costs through trade effects, as the exports of infected countries 
                                                           
2 It is perhaps worth clarifying that by fixed costs we mean costs that are independent of the presence or the absence of the 
pest. The exact amount of fixed costs can still vary over time, for instance depending on technology. In the empirical 
analysis carried out in this study, the level of fixed costs is assumed to remain unaltered.   16(162)
are restricted or banned. In the case of reactive control two types of costs materialise. First, there are 
changes in producer surplus due to price changes, pest control costs and the value of the lost 
production, caused by imperfect control or interim damage occurring before control application.
3 
Second, there may be changes in consumer surplus if product prices increase due to reduced supply. 
Also possible environmental, health or cultural impacts may reflect on consumer welfare. 
 
Even in this simple pre-emptive versus reactive control framework there are various outcomes that may 
occur. Our framework consists of two pure strategies. The first is to invest resources to prevent the 
pest from invading and establishing in the first place. The second strategy alternative is to ignore pre-
emptive actions, let the pest invade if it so happens and let the producers adapt to the pest’s presence. 
In principle also a spatially or temporally combined case is possible. In the spatially combined strategy 
pre-emptive actions would be carried out in certain areas, whereas reactive control would be applied in 
other areas. In temporal combination pre-emptive control would be carried out first, followed by 
reactive control. However, neither of these combinations is analysed in this study.  
 
It should be noted that the two strategies as defined here cannot be taking place at the same time in the 
same place.
4 Pre-emptive control consists of (authority driven) eradication in the case of an invasion 
and of maintaining the appropriate organisation in the non-invasion times. Hence it is either the plant 
protection authority eradicating any outbreaks, or the management is left entirely to producers thus 
giving up the goal of eradication. The same conclusion in the case of the Colorado potato beetle in the 
United Kingdom is reached by Mumford et al. (2000), who note that “there are few alternatives to the 
two policy options of: i) exclusion (with eradication of outbreaks) [and] ii) abandoning exclusion and 
relying on grower routine management and control”. 
 
In addition to aggregate costs of the policies, the policy choice also affects the distribution of costs and 
income. This effect takes place through funding of the policy as well as through the price of the 
affected (agricultural) product. The prices may be affected by the demand side factors (which in this 
study are assumed to remain unchanged), the production costs, the total quantity produced and the 
effect of the total amount produced on price. Production costs may increase due to additional inputs 
being required to control the invasive pest. The total quantity on the other hand may be affected by 
crop damage done by the pest. Depending on the market structure, these translate into changes in the 
consumer price.  
 
Such domestic price changes are likely if the aggregate output changes sufficiently and international 
price transfers are imperfect (i.e. imports are not a perfect substitute for domestic production or world 
price with transportation is above the domestic price). Hence, aggregate producer profit after an 
invasion may turn out to be higher than before the invasion, if the price increase is sufficient to 
compensate for the increased costs of production and any crop losses. Basically two types of changes in 
the division of income can be considered. First, some producers may be affected by the invasion more 
than others, resulting in a redistributed division of profits among the producers. Second, the price 
increases may increase producer profits, but at the same time reduce consumers’ surplus. 
 
To whom the policy costs and benefits accrue depends largely on which policy is chosen and how it is 
financed. It is naturally possible to construct different types of transfer mechanisms, and hence the 
costs and benefits can in theory be targeted at any desired group within the society. Because in this 
study an equal weight is given to both producers and consumers, to whom the costs and benefits 
accrue does not impact on the aggregate economic performance of the two policies. Hence the equity 
discussion can be to a large extent separated from the efficiency discussion. Issues dealing with to 
whom the costs and benefits accrue are discussed in more detail at the end of this study. 
 
                                                           
3 In addition there may be demand-side factors that affect producer surplus, for instance through potentially unfounded 
fears people have regarding diseases related to the product in question. These impacts are beyond the scope of this study, 
but it should be noted that in some cases such impacts may be sizable. 
4 Note, however, that what is termed pre-emptive and what reactive depends on what is chosen as the decision point, for 
instance whether preventing invasion or establishment is the primary target (see for instance Perrings 2005).   17(162)
Throughout this study it is assumed that the producers will only have to encounter the costs of lost 
production and the costs of control in the case of reactive control, whereas the consumers
5 end up 
paying the costs of the protection system as well as suffer possible invasion induced changes in 
consumer surplus. This is consistent with reality in that Community and national legislation allow the 
producers to get compensation for the lost production and eradication costs associated with the 
protection system. The policy choice thus has economic and distributional implications. These costs 
and their effects on different parties (as assumed in this study) are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Policy Choice  Expected costs  Who bears the costs 
INVASION  Variable costs of the protection system, fixed costs 
of the protection system  Consumers/taxpayers  Pre-emptive 
control 
NO INVASION  Fixed costs of the protection system  Consumers/taxpayers 
INVASION  Consumer surplus changes, producer surplus 
changes 
Consumers/taxpayers, (affected) 
producers  Reactive control 
NO INVASION  None  None 
Table 2. The costs associated with the two policies. 
 
 
1.3 The case study: Colorado potato beetle 
 
The Colorado potato beetle (Leptinotarsa decemlineata) (CPB) is a destructive plant pest, whose main host 
plant in Finland is the cultivated potato (Solanum tuberosum). The CPB is established in North America, 
some Central American countries, many Asian countries and most European countries (EPPO 2005; 
EC 2000). It was introduced from the United States to France in 1922, from where it rapidly spread 
throughout Europe (EPPO 2005). In addition to Finland, other areas in Europe that remain free of the 
beetle include Ireland, United Kingdom, Sweden and certain Spanish and Portuguese islands.  
 
The beetle’s primary mode of transport to Finland seems to be wind-borne long-distance migration. 
The first invasion by the CPB in Finland took place in 1983, but was localised and short-lived. The two 
main recent invasions were in 1998 and 2002, with the first confirmed case of winter survival observed 
in 2004. Most of the plots affected in both 1998 and 2002 were situated in the south-eastern Finland, 
suggesting that the beetles had spread from either Russia or Estonia. The potential for the beetle’s 
range expansion to Finland has been shown by both genetic (Boman et al. 2006a) and climatologic 
(Baker et al. 1998; Jeffree and Jeffree 1996) studies. 
 
About 30-40% of the total potato production in Finland is in the CPB protected zone, which covers 
the regions of Satakunta, Turku, Pirkanmaa, Uusimaa, Häme, Kymi and the Åland Islands. The actions 
and eradication measures within the protected zone are determined by national and Community 
legislation (EC 2000; KTTK 1998; MAF 2004b). Although the protected zone is only for the given 
areas, national actions are applied in the entire country and hence the beetle is to be eradicated 
wherever encountered.  
 
The protected zones are a voluntary black-list instrument that member countries may use to protect 
their production environment against specified invasive plant pests. This protection comes at a cost, 
which should be compared to costs that would ensue given alternative policy strategies. The studies 
carried out on policy effectiveness in the case of the CPB have indicated that the costs of exclusion 
measures have been less than the costs that would ensue would it be introduced (Mumford et al. 2000; 
Aitkenhead 1981 cited in EPPO 2005). The specific aim of this study is to evaluate the desirability of 
continuing this policy of exclusion in Finland in relation to Colorado potato beetle.  
 
However, invasions are not a stagnant and certain process. Hence uncertainty and change are important 
to account for when choosing to design and implement various policies. In the case of the CPB in 
Finland these are integral to the problem. Existing uncertainty can be divided into three categories 
                                                           
5 Consumers are in this study equated with taxpayers, as potato is such a widely used product in Finland that it is consumed 
by practically everyone.   18(162)
according to Heal and Kriström (2002). First, we are uncertain of the CPB invasion process and its pre-
determinants in the points of origin in Russia. This can be seen as scientific uncertainty, which arises 
when a certain physical relationship is not known. Secondly, it is unknown how the continued invasions 
would affect the production patterns in Finland. This can be seen as impact uncertainty, where the 
impacts of natural phenomena on the various components of human societies are uncertain, even if the 
physical science behind them is known. Finally, there is a third type of uncertainty, which can be 
categorised as policy uncertainty. For instance, there is uncertainty related to which policies are needed 
to address the problems, how those policies impact on the issue in question and what are the costs of 
undertaking the policy. 
 
Further, local changes are likely. First, Finland’s membership in the European Union has opened 
borders and increased trade and movement of goods and people. Secondly, potential warming of 
temperatures may be changing environmental conditions in Finland. With the changing weather, the 
threat from both increasing invasion pressure and permanent establishment of the CPB in Finland 
increase. Finally, agricultural practices and modifications in those practices in surrounding countries as 
well as in Finland may also increase the invasion pressure. Resulting from all this, the CPB invasion 
pressure is increasing in Finland.  
 
These factors prompt interest in finding efficient protection policies that would also function under 
uncertain and changing conditions. This study deals with ex-ante assessment of possible costs of an 
invasion by the CPB into the Finnish agricultural system. To account for uncertainty, invasions are 
modelled as temporally random events and stochasticity in key variables is built into the analysis. In 
addition, an extensive sensitivity analysis is carried out. To account for change, the analysis includes 
three trends that represent changes in climatic conditions and pest traits. In other words, uncertainty 
and local change are integral factors in the analysis.  
 
 
1.4 The aims, methods and structure of the study 
 
As the discussion above suggests, economic analyses of IAS are important because of the significant 
economic impacts they may impose and the public good properties involved in their management. This 
thesis considers the economic impact of IAS and assesses two alternative policies available for 
controlling their dispersal.  
 
The general aim of this thesis is to discuss under which conditions it would be economically sensible 
from the society’s point of view to prevent an invasive plant pest from invading Finland, and what 
would be the likely consequences if preventative actions were not taken. The specific aim is to evaluate 
the economic desirability of continuing the CPB protected zone policy in Finland, explicitly accounting 
for uncertainty and local change in the policy analysis.  
 
The thesis provides grounds for policy assessment and produces practical information to aid decision-
making related to CPB in specific and IAS in general. Four specific issues to which answers are sought 
are to:  
i)  review and evaluate the scale, type and magnitude of impacts IAS are capable of causing; 
ii)  specify the policy problem in IAS management and review how the institutional framework 
in Finland addresses the issue; 
iii)  review existing cost-benefit studies on agricultural IAS and determine the components that 
such studies should include; 
iv)  undertake an economic risk assessment of the Colorado potato beetle in Finland and 
evaluate the conditions under which it is optimal to prevent a species from establishing in 
this particular case. 
 
The study uses a basic cost-benefit framework to assess the policy response. The framework used in 
this study compares the costs of prevention with the costs that would ensue in an alternative policy 
strategy in which the species is allowed into the country. The primary focus is on ex-ante analysis,   19(162)
although an ex-post assessment of past seven years is also conducted. The framework presented 
estimates expected aggregate costs over time, using Monte Carlo simulation and allowing stochastic 
variation in the key variables. In addition, linear temporal change in certain key variables is included in 
the analysis. 
 
The issue can be approached from several points of view. In this thesis, the approach is multi-
dimensional: to highlight the pervasive nature of IAS, several dimensions and approaches to the issue 
are presented. The thesis is a combination of three basic methods: i) prescriptive discussion of 
economic damages and the institutional framework; ii) theoretical analysis of the cost structure of pre-
emptive and reactive policies; and iii) empirical cost-benefit analysis of the two policies using Monte 
Carlo simulation.  
 
The discussion on IAS is divided into two sections. The first section provides basic physical 
information on IAS and the second section introduces economics to the discussion. The thesis 
addresses in part a multidisciplinary audience involved in plant health research and in governmental 
policy-making process. The aim in terms of this audience is to review the challenge presented by IAS 
and to conceptualise an economic response to the challenge, i.e. how to protect – in general terms – the 
environment, production systems and human health from the associated risks. The other half of the 
thesis narrows down the problem considerably, dealing in a temporal framework with one type of a 
pest – one that causes damage to agricultural production.  
 
Zoonotic and animal diseases as well as environmentally harmful species are discussed whenever 
relevant, but the emphasis of the discussion is on plant health. The three main omissions from the 
scope of this study are that a thorough and complete discussion on ecology and management of IAS is 
left out, discussion of IAS impacts on foreign commerce is limited to certain basic observations, and 
genetically modified organisms are not accounted for. The chapters following the present one are 
organised as follows.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a brief history of IAS and a literature review of their physical impacts. It also 
discusses the institutional context in which IAS are considered both internationally and in the 
European Union. The section reviews the situation in Finland and concludes by presenting the species 
discussed in the empirical section of the thesis – Colorado potato beetle. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the economic dimension of the IAS. The discussion begins with the type of 
economic benefits and costs that IAS may impose, including production losses, control costs, 
secondary market impacts and environmental, health and cultural effects. The chapter proceeds by 
presenting the IAS management problem and its public good properties, followed by a discussion of 
economic studies on IAS, concentrating on three themes: i) prediction and screening; ii) vulnerability of 
the ecological-economic system; and iii) optimal control. The chapter concludes by presenting several 
case studies where pre-emptive and reactive control are assessed in terms of economics. 
 
Chapter 4 begins by discussing the preliminaries of the analytical model. It then constructs the 
equations used in the empirical section to evaluate the effects of the CPB under the two policies (pre-
emptive control and reactive control). The appropriate comparative statics of the models are also 
discussed. The chapter provides the analytical structure of the thesis. However, it is noteworthy that 
also the theory here is driven to an extent by the setup of the empirical case. 
 
Chapter 5 applies the model of Chapter 4 to a specific case study. A numerical application is made to 
empirically assess the threat posed by the Colorado potato beetle in Finland. This ex-ante cost-benefit 
analysis provides the main contribution of the study to scientific literature and to decision making. The 
basic results and the results of an extensive sensitivity analysis are presented and discussed. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the overall implications of the literature review and the case study analysis. It 
concludes by discussing certain further issues and possible extensions to the analysis.   20(162)
2. INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES – ECOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
2.1 Definition and a brief history 
 
The terms alien species and invasive species have been defined in a United States Executive Order 
13112 signed by President Clinton. The definition that was already given in the introduction can be 
broken down as follows. 
 
DEFINITION 5 – NATIVE SPECIES 
‘Native species’ means, with respect to a particular ecosystem, a species that, other than as a result of an introduction, 
historically occurred or currently occurs in that ecosystem. (Clinton 1999) 
 
DEFINITION 6 – ALIEN SPECIES 
‘Alien species’ means, with respect to a particular ecosystem, any species, including its seeds, eggs, spores, or other biological 
material capable of propagating that species, that is not native to that ecosystem. (Clinton 1999) 
 
DEFINITION 7 – INVASIVE SPECIES 
‘Invasive species’ means an alien species whose introduction does or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or 
harm to human health. (Clinton 1999) 
 
The definition of an invasive species is analogous to the definition of an externality by economists: 
someone has to be affected by the action (introduction) before it can be defined as an externality 
(invasive species). A species that invades an empty niche in an ecosystem and causes no harm to 
anything is thus an alien species, but not an invasive species. Despite the distinction made in the 
Executive Order and elsewhere, the terms alien, exotic, foreign, introduced, invasive, non-indigenous 
and non-native species have often been used interchangeably in the literature (see e.g. Colautti and 
MacIsaac 2004). We prefer to promote the convention of calling those species that are not native to the 
ecosystem concerned and cause harm to some process invasive alien species (IAS)
6. 
 
The biological diversity of the world results in part from geographical barriers that have restricted 
natural movement of organisms. For instance, there are gorillas in Africa, orangutans in Indonesia, 
monkeys but no apes in South America and no primates in Australia (McNeely 2001). When it comes 
to species that rapidly invade large areas, our own species, Homo sapiens, is probably one of the best 
examples. Furthermore, humans have always carried other species with them.  
 
In some sense one could argue that all species are alien species in a place such as Finland that was 
covered by ice in the last glacial period. Standard ecological succession involves changes in species 
interactions and some early-succession species are negatively affected by the late-succession species. It 
is important to note that succession and range expansion are natural phenomena. Dealing with 
historical invasions thus presents some difficulties in terms of definitions. However, there is no need to 
go into a philosophical debate here. For the purposes of the present study it is sufficient to note that 
human-related factors have greatly increased the rate of invasions in recent times, and it is these 
modern invasions that are the focus of this study. 
 
Di Castri (1989) suggests that there have been three phases in the history of species introductions. The 
first phase involves “fixing the pattern of ‘man-invader’ –relationship”. This took place in the early 
Neolithic times – some 10,000 years ago – when man abandoned hunter-gathering and began 
agricultural production with domesticated species. In Di Castri’s (1989) second phase the biogeographic 
enclosures were unlocked, beginning at the time of the great discoveries in around 1500s. Trade routes 
to other continents opened up whole new opportunities for both accidental and intentional 
introductions. This is when many classical and pervasive introductions – for instance goats, pigs, cats 
                                                           
6 The definition is similar to the definition given in the Convention on Biological Diversity and differs from the purely 
biological definition which does not account for the impacts of the species (Born et al. 2005). Some authors (e.g. Richardson 
et al. 2000), suggest that the term invasive should have nothing to do with economic or environmental impact. In addition, 
Carlton (1996) discusses what he calls cryptogenic species, referring to species that are demonstratively neither native nor 
introduced. We abstract from such complexities and adopt the definition provided in the Executive Order.   21(162)
and rats – took place. In addition to discoverers and traders, armies have for a long time been (and still 
are) an important pathway for species to move around. One of the notorious examples is the spread of 
the cattle disease rinderpest to Africa by the Italian army in the late 1880s (McNeely 2001). Finally in Di 
Castri’s (1989) third phase the “rules and rhythm of natural evolutionary game” have been changed. 
This is the situation we are at this moment, having modified nearly all available habitats and genetically 
altered many species. Due to the ever growing globalisation there are nowadays many pathways for 
species to be transported quickly from one place to another, including tourists, aeroplanes, ship ballast 
and cargo containers.  
 
For instance, in Finland alone there were 66,583 landings on Finnish airports by non-domestic civil 
aircraft in 2004. These aircraft carried 8,925,510 passengers and 120,819 tonnes of cargo and mail 
(Finnish Civil Aviation Administration website). International trains between Russia and Finland 
carried 252,000 passengers and 15,300,000 tonnes of cargo (VR-Group website). Harbours received 
directly from abroad 33,181 vessels carrying 53,169,635 tonnes of imported international cargo and 
8,120,825 passengers (Finnish Maritime Administration website). Add to these figures for instance the 
North American nursery catalogues that offer about 60,000 plant species and varieties to a global 
market through the internet (McNeely 2001). It does not require much to see the huge potential for 
species to be spread rapidly around the globe. 
 
Despite the potential, it is worth noting that only a tiny fraction of invasions are successful. The so-
called Williamson’s Tens Rule
7 states that only about 10% of species imported escape to the wild, only 
about 10% of those species that invade become established and only about 10% of those that get 
established become pests (Williamson and Fitter 1996). The main point is that not all species can 
establish in all habitats, and even if they can, they may not be able to reach a viable population size to 
become pests. If they do, they are likely to impact on the receiving system. 
 
 
2.2 Physical effects 
 
This section discusses in general terms the direct impacts that invasive alien species may impose. The 
discussion of economic impacts that these physical impacts may lead to is postponed until Chapter 3. 
The biological methods available for studying the invasion events include for instance GIS-based gap 
analysis or pathway analysis (Andersen et al. 2004a). The establishment phase can be studied using for 
instance population viability analysis, in which case establishment is seen as the opposite of extinction, 
which has been studied extensively (Andersen et al. 2004a; Drake 2004). The likelihood, nature and 
extent of physical impacts of IAS are generally affected by three factors: the characteristics of the 
invading species, the characteristics of the receiving ecosystem and the external conditions present at 
the time of the invasion.  
 
Kolar and Lodge (2001) undertake a meta-analysis of eight published studies and discuss the 
characteristics that determine establishment and spread of plant and bird species. They find that the 
region of origin of the species is in all studies significant in determining whether establishment takes 
place or not. The authors conclude that the strongest result of their analysis is that successful 
establishment is positively related to propagule pressure. Cannas et al. (2003), using a general cellular 
automaton model to predict and control invasions of honeylocust (Gleditsia triacanthos), find that the 
invasion speed is mainly influenced by mean seed dispersal distance and minimum reproductive age, 
whereas seed production had only a minor impact on the invasion speed.  
 
In all plant studies analysed by Kolar and Lodge (2001) the transition from establishment to 
invasiveness was seen to be significantly influenced by history of invasions, vegetative reproduction, 
low variability in seed crops and uneven phylogenetic distribution. No characteristic has been found 
that is consistently unrelated to bird invasiveness. Plant invasiveness on the other hand is not related to 
length of flowering period and whether the plant is annual or perennial.  
                                                           
7 Note that this is only a rule of thumb applying in some situations but not in others. For instance, in deliberate game 
introductions in the Nordic countries a success rate of about 80% has been encountered (Nummi 2000).   22(162)
 
The issue is difficult to assess in general terms, since species characteristics that favour invasiveness 
may hinder establishment, and vice versa (Kolar and Lodge 2001). Furthermore, it seems that generally 
it is very difficult to find species characteristics that consistently make them good invaders. For instance 
species with rapid population growth (so-called r-selected species) are often said to be good invaders, 
but significant counter-examples have been found, because the success depends on the interaction with 
the receiving system (Newman 1993). 
 
The effects of the invasion depend also on the type of ecosystem and the type of niche the species 
occupies. For instance, introductions are more likely to have significant impacts when there are no 
competitors or predators of the invading species, and it is hence able to reach large population levels 
(Pimm 1991). Persistence, resistance and resilience of the receiving ecosystem are important factors in 
determining whether the invasion succeeds and to what extent it affects the particular ecosystem. 
Persistence measures how long the system can last until it is changed by the invasion (Pimm 1991). 
Resistance measures the impacts of one variable on other variables. For instance, if an invasion takes 
place, the level of resistance of the system determines how large the consequences elsewhere in the 
ecosystem are (Pimm 1991). Finally, resilience measures how well the system can return to equilibrium 
after it has been disturbed (Pimm 1991) or alternatively how large a change the system can withstand 
and still return to equilibrium (Holling 1996).  
 
Considering the issue from the point of view of agriculture (or any other simplified ecosystem), it is 
easy to see the problem. Biological diversity of the system is generally seen to contribute towards better 
ability to withstand invasions. Agricultural systems are often simplified versions of natural ecosystems, 
and due to reduced genetic variability their ability to withstand invasions by pests and diseases is often 
lower than that of natural systems.  
 
In theory alien species can also increase biological diversity – addition of a species after all increases 
diversity (at least when measured by species richness). However, invasive alien species usually have the 
opposite effect, because of the various biotic or abiotic interactions with native species. There are four 
types of direct effects on native flora and fauna (Nummi 2000). These are predation and herbivory, 
competition, parasites and diseases, and interbreeding. Each will be shortly reviewed below. The 
discussion is fairly general, and can be applied to any species, not just invasive ones. However, the links 
to invasions are explained. 
 
2.2.1  Predation and herbivory  
 
Invasion may impact on the target system through predation or herbivory. The first point to note is 
that biological interactions almost always function in both directions.
8 It is thus important to account 
for the interactions between the species. This interaction is positive if one species enhances the survival 
of the other (symbiosis, commensalism) and negative if one species is weakened by the interaction 
(competition, predation, amensalism). This is the case also with predation. It is not only the prey 
population that is affected: the abundance of prey can effectively regulate the invasive predator 
population. It is thus more convenient to consider predator-prey interactions than simply predation, 
using for instance the Lotka-Volterra equations (Begon et al. 1996b). 
 
The impact of an invasive predator depends on the strength of interaction between the species, which 
is in part caused by whether the predator is polyphagous or not (Pimm 1991). At the extreme, 
predation, parasitism and herbivory may result in a removal of a native species from the ecosystem 
(local or global extinction). Such effects are demonstrated in the context of simple food-chains below 
(all figures after Pimm 1991). The boxes represent species at three trophic levels (primary producer, 
herbivore and predator). The shaded box represents the species that is removed from the food-chain 
due to presence of the invasive species and the arrow shows how the system changes as a result. Note 
                                                           
8 At theoretical level, the exceptions to this are commensalism (one species benefits from the presence of the other, while 
the other is not affected in any way) and amensalism (one species suffers from the presence of the other, while the other is 
not affected in any way) (Begon et al. 1996b).    23(162)















igure 1. Potential impact of a removal of an organism at the bottom of the food chain  F
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, if the organism that is removed as the consequence of an invasion is at the 
bottom of the food chain (i.e. a primary producer) the result may have important consequences for the 
entire food chain, if the extinct species is the only supply of food for an upper organism. It could occur 
when for example an introduced herbivore species ends up consuming all the plants of a certain type 
￿￿being able to do so as it consumes a variety of species itself (i.e. it is polyphagous). On the other 
hand, if there are several primary producers in the food-chain in question, a removal of any one of 
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Figure 2. Potential impact of a removal of an organism at the bottom of the food chain 
 
If the removed species is at the top of the food chain, the results could be as illustrated below. If a 
predator of a monophagous herbivore is removed, it is likely to reduce the density of the primary 
producer, but the primary producer is unlikely to go extinct provided that the herbivore relies solely on 


















Figure 3. Potential impact of a removal of an organism at the top of the food chain 
 
d in Figure 4, the emoval of the 
ng all but the most resistant 
However, if the herbivore has more than one food source, as illustrate
redator may result in the herbivore increasing in numbers and exterminati
 r
p
plant species. This species then becomes the factor limiting the abundance of the herbivore. It is also 
possible that a previous invasion by an exotic herbivore aids future invasions of exotic plants that are   24(162)
better evolved to withstand the herbivore than native plants in the new regions. Further discussion on 
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Figure 4. Potential impact of a removal of an organism at the top of the food chain 
 
A similar effect may occur also higher in the food chain. Good examples of this are provided by the 
brown tree snake (Boiga irregularis) in Guam, where it reduced the number of native bird species (Pimm 
1991), or the Nile perch (Lates nilotica) in Lake Victoria, where it reduced the number of native fish 
(Primack 1993). The result of such interactions is, of course, an overall reduction in the biodiversity of 
e ecosystem. However, unless the impacts are substantial, it may not be easy to show what the effects 
cific, depending on 
haracteristics of both species as well as on the external environment. Competition may be divided into 
 of the defensive actions.  
a tion between species, as they have not coevolved to differentiate their 
iches. In the longer term, either niche separation or extinction of one of the species takes place. 
instance less food is available, the individuals may not be as resistant to diseases and natural enemies or 
may be killed due to malnutrition. 
 
th
of predation are (Nummi 2000). The main point nonetheless is that the characteristics of the system 
and of the species involved determine the outcome of the invasion by a predator or an herbivore. 
 
2.2.2  Competition 
 
IAS may compete with native species for biotic (e.g. nutrients) or abiotic (e.g. space, light, minerals) 
resources. Again, the strength of the interaction is likely to be case-spe
c
exploitation and interference competition (Begon et al.1996a,b). In exploitation competition an 
individual is prevented from consuming a resource, because another individual has already consumed it. 
There does not have to be direct contact between the two individuals, it is enough that they are in 
approximately same area in space and time. Note that for there to be competition, the resource in 
question has to be in limited supply. Interference competition on the other hand involves one 
individual actively defending a resource from exploitation by the others. In this case the resource may 
be, for example, shelter, mate or territory. The resource does not have to be in limited supply, as it 
effectively becomes scarce because
 
Interspecific competition (competition between species) mostly takes the form of exploitation 
competition: an invasive species for instance consumes a food item before the native species 
encounters it. Usually the species specialise in such a way that they are not dependent on exactly similar 
resources – in other words no two species occupy the same niche in the ecosystem. The Competitive 
Exclusion Principle (also known as Gause’s principle) states that if two competing species coexist in a 
stable environment they do so by differentiation of their realised niches. If there is no such 
differentiation, then one species will outcompete the other (Begon et al.1996a,b).  
 
An inv sion can result in competi
n
Finally, it is worth emphasising that competition as such is not harmful to the growth of any 
population. It is the resulting decrease in fecundity that is important. A species that is not successful in 
competing will have less resources available because i) someone else has already consumed most of 
them (exploitation) or ii) someone stronger is preventing access to the resource (interference). If for   25(162)
An example of an invasive alien species that competes with other species is the common wild oat 
(Avena fatua). Common wild oat is a weed that was introduced to Finland in 1920s in imported grain 
eed and feed grain. It competes with oat (A. sativa), wheat (Triticum aestivum), rye (Secale cereale) and 
AS may act as vectors for either human, plant or animal diseases, or the diseases themselves may be 
ecks 
 disease spread, but that does not mean that diseases would not impact on the receiving systems. 
 infection which is often fatal to people. In addition, 
any pathogens themselves can be categorised as invaders, one of the most devastating ones being the 
there is a constant threat to native 
rayfish wherever the two coexist (Nummi 2000).  
ed likelihood to be 
illed by predators when weakened by parasites, or to not being able to acquire a mate. In some species 
uced which, according to one theory, signal that the individual is free of disease 
nd thus has enough energy to produce those traits (Petrie et al. 1991). Parasites thus facilitate 
urthermore, there may be more organisms than just the parasite and the host present. One of the 
s
barley (Hordeum vulgare) – all ancient alien species. It competes with them by occupying the same space 
and consuming a share of nutrients, water and sunlight (Jalli and Paju 2002). Thus the impacts of IAS 
are not limited to native species, but also (beneficial) alien species may be affected. For further 
examples of competition between IAS and other species in Finland, see Nummi (2000). 
 




9 Given a sufficiently large viable population, it is unlikely that the entire 
population can be exterminated even by a very fatal disease. There is always a compromise between 
how virulent a disease is and to what extent it can spread. The faster it kills the less time there is for 
infected individuals to spread the disease to others (Newman 1993). Thus there are some natural ch
to
 
Spread of diseases that may infect humans (zoonoses) can be exemplified by the Asian tiger mosquito 
(Aedes albopictus) in the United States (Vitousek et al. 1996). The larvae of the species spread to the US 
in used car tires. In its native areas the species spreads for instance the dengue fever, whereas in the US 
it is a vector of eastern equine encephalitis – a viral
m
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Another topical and potentially devastating example is the 
recent spread of the avian influenza in Asia and Europe.  
 
In addition to zoonotic diseases, IAS may also transmit plant and animal diseases. Native animals are 
often not adapted to diseases carried by IAS. These diseases may be completely harmless to the 
invasive species who carry them, but devastating for the native species. This is especially the case in 
island populations that have been very much isolated from any other population (Primack 1993).  
 
In Finland spreading of diseases can be exemplified by the invasive signal crayfish (Pacifastacus 
leniusculus) that spreads crayfish plague caused by fungus Aphanomyces astaci – another invasive species. 
Through the disease signal crayfish thus has a negative impact on the population of native crayfish 
(Astacus astacus). As the plague is not fatal to the signal crayfish, 
c
 
As for parasites, they are estimated to present over 50% of all the species, and can be divided into 
macroparasites (e.g fleas or ticks) and microparasites (e.g. Plasmodium species that causes malaria). A 
parasite is defined as “an organism that obtains its nutrients from one or a very few host individuals 
causing harm but not causing death immediately” (Begon et al. 1996a). Parasite-host interactions have 
been extensively modelled. Such interactions often result in a lower reproductive contribution to the 
next generation by the individual that is being parasitised. This can be due to increas
k
elaborate traits are prod
a
responses at both intraspecific (e.g. competition for mates) and interspecific (e.g. increased likelihood to 
be predated upon) levels. Notice also that unless they actually kill the host, they merely facilitate the 
regulation process by enhancing already existing regulatory factors. 
 
F
hosts may be merely a vector that transmits the parasite (or a disease) to another organism without 
being significantly affected itself in the process. Such additional species naturally complicate the 
                                                           
9 It is at this point worth pointing out that although the term invasive alien species is used throughout this study, many 
diseases fit perfectly in the definition of IAS. Hence they are included in the discussion whenever convenient.   26(162)
interactions further. An example of such a case in Finland is the barberry (Berberis vulgaris), which is an 
ancient alien species used as an ornamental plant. The species acts as an alternate host to black rust 
nia graminis), which is a parasite of grasses including cereal crops (Nummi 2000). Hence the role of 
rbreeding (or hybridisation) can be very difficult to detect (Nummi 
000  When two closely related species interbreed, the result is generally a loss of diversity at the 
ltimately at the species level).  
bum). Pure stands of G. verum exist nowadays 
nly in some islands (Nummi 2000). 
n addition to the above direct biological interactions, IAS may impose structural impacts on either 
 in 
eir forage, which may lead to regeneration not being able to take place and the already sparse 
ix its own nitrogen, which is often a limiting factor for the growth of many 
pecies, especially in young volcanic sites such as Hawaii. Nitrogen availability in the soil may affect the 
(Pucci
the barberry as an alternate host enhances the chances of survival by the black rust. 
 
2.2.4  Interbreeding 
 
If the invading species is genetically close enough to the native one, interbreeding may occur. One of 
the difficulties here is that inte
2 ).
genetic level (and possibly u
 
An example of interbreeding is provided by hatchery-bred salmon in the western coast of North 
America. In addition to spreading diseases, the hatchery-bred salmon can interbreed with wild salmon 
of the same or closely related species, often leading to fitness reductions or sterility of offspring (Naylor 
et al. 2005). In Finland, hybridisation can be exemplified by the native lady’s bedstraw (Galium verum) 
interbreeding with the invasive upright bedstraw (G. al
o
 
Factors that limit interbreeding include for instance spatial separation, incompatibilities in crossing and 
reduced fitness of the hybrids (Barbour et al. 2006). In addition, in plants interbreeding may be 
prevented by temporal separation in flowering. For instance, if flowering by the two species is in 
asynchrony (i.e. at different times), interbreeding may not be physically possible. This has been found 
to be an important factor in limiting interbreeding between native and exotic Eucalyptus species in 
Australia (Barbour et al. 2006).  
 
2.2.5  Structural effects 
 
I
human systems or on ecosystems. They may impact on various kinds of manmade structures by, for 
instance, physical blocking of power plant water intake pipes. Such impacts will be returned to when 
the economic consequences of IAS are discussed. Structural impacts that function through biotic 
processes include habitat transformation and alteration. 
 
Habitat transformation involves a change in the type of habitat. An example is provided by the 
introduction of European rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) to central Chile where it became a major pest due 
to lack of predation and lack of control by the myxomatosis disease. The ecological consequences were 
sizable. Following the invasion, the presence of rabbits restricts the native perennial herbs to areas 
under the canopy of sheltering shrubs. Rabbits are also more lethal and destructive than local rodents
th
matorral being further opened up. Although there does not seem to be much competition between 
rabbits and native fauna due to the way they are spatially distributed, the species dependent on dense 
scrub may find it harder to find such habitat in future as rabbits keep on opening up the habitat (Jaksic 
and Fuentes 1991). 
 
Habitat alteration involves change in the characteristics of the habitat, but not of the habitat type itself. 
Alteration may occur if, for example, the invading species impacts on mutualistic interactions between 
the native species (Traveset and Richardson 2006) or if it is a nitrogen-fixer that increases the level of 
nitrogen in the soil altering the balance of populations. Fire tree (Morella faya, previously Myrica faya) in 
Hawaii exemplifies such an impact through interactions with the abiotic environment (Vitousek et al. 
1996). The tree is able to f
s
species composition substantially. Through nitrogen fixing the fire tree increases also availability of   27(162)
nitrogen to other species, and often the species benefiting from such a change in the conditions are 
other invasive species. Thus one species may succeed in changing the dynamics of the entire system. 
 
Another example – this time in an aquatic setting – is provided by the deliberate introduction of the 
Nile perch (Lates nilotica) to Lake Victoria (Primack 1993). The case exemplifies the complex 
interactions and impacts through the biotic environment. The perch was introduced for fishing, but 
nded up causing the extinction of several hundred endemic fish species. The case was more complex 
y be more subtle than the basic biological 
teractions. They may function by, for instance, changing the patchiness of the system, the fire regime, 
ydrology or nutrient and energy flows (Andersen et al. 2004b). The physical impacts of IAS often 
i r and Clout (2005) list the following 
omplexities: i) dual personality species (species that may be commercially important but cause damage 
expansion; iii) interactions between two 
lien species may cause damages, although neither species on their own is damaging; iv) invasion by one 
mposes in its native range or under confined conditions (for instance in field trials or in zoos). 
inally, ability for habitat modification may increase the invasion success of the species as well as allow 
 noted by scientists the world over and national or regional 
stud ), 
Can ), 
e 03; Parkes and Murphy 
uncil 2003), the United Kingdom (DEFRA 2003; Fasham and Trumper 2001) 
e
than the perch just predating or outcompeting the other species. There are high nutrient inputs into the 
lake from the surrounding agricultural land. Populations of algae and other flora and fauna increase due 
to this, but were previously controlled by the endemic fish. As overfishing and predation by the perch 
ran down the numbers of native fish, the algae were able to thrive and bloom, depriving the deeper 
water of oxygen. As a result, the native fish living in the depths were forced to the shallower waters, 
where they in turn were predated. The result was a vicious circle leading to more eutrophication and 
more loss of biodiversity. 
 
The impacts involving habitat alteration or transformation ma
in
h
nvolve a great deal of uncertainty and complexity. De Poorte
c
elsewhere); ii) time lags between the establishment and range 
a
species may facilitate invasion by others (invasion meltdown); v) there may be evolutionary adaptations 
over time; and vi) IAS impacts may be compounded by global change. 
 
Many of these types of impacts are difficult to predict prior to the introduction. In fact, a fundamental 
feature of IAS impacts is that it is not possible to predict all the impacts with certainty (Newman 1993). 
Furthermore, often the impacts in a new area cannot be predicted on basis of the impacts that the 
species i
F
for a faster growth rate in sub-optimal habitats compared to species that are not capable of 
transforming the habitat (Cuddington and Hastings 2004). Further discussion on ecological impacts and 
their evaluation can be found in Parker et al. (1999). The main points to note here are that the impacts 
may be wide-ranging and uncertainty is inherent to the issue. 
 
 
2.3 Institutional basis for controlling invasive alien species 
 
2.3.1  Invasive alien species and the policy environment 
 
The challenge presented by IAS has been
ies have been made in for instance Australia (Martin 2003), Austria (Rabitsch and Essl 2006
ada (Colautti et al. 2006), China (Yan et al. 2001), European Union (Schrader and Unger 2003
rmany (Gebhardt 1996; Reinhardt et al. 2003), New Zealand (Jay et al. 20 G
2003), South Africa (van Wilgren et al. 2001; Le Maitre et al. 2002) and the United States (Pimentel et 
al. 1999; 2005) – as well as some attempts to look at the issue globally (Lowe et al. 2000; Shine et al. 
2000).  
 
In addition to scientists, also politicians are increasingly finding the issue important. It has been 
brought to the political arena in for instance Australia (Nairn et al. 1996), the European Union (EC 
2002; Council of the European Union 2002a,b; Council of Europe 2003; Scalera and Zaghi 2004), New 
ealand (Biosecurity Co Z
and the United States (GAO 2002; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1993).  
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The European Community has recognised IAS as an emerging issue, but does not have a specific 
research programme on alien species, and so far little work has been done on economic evaluation of 
IAS impacts (EC 2002). At ministerial level in the 2413
rd Council Meeting (Environment) in Brussels in 
March 2002 it was established that in implementing Sustainable Development Strategy, the Council 
(Council of the European Union 2002a): 
 “recognises the importance of scientific research … to provide the knowledge on which recommendations may be 
 species associated with agriculture. Also the Sixth 
ognised. They feature for instance in 
cen  reports on national plant protection strategy 2004−2013 (MAF 2003b), biological diversity in 
f Agriculture and Forestry (MAF 2003a) and national strategy for 
 and animals to 
national and national legislation regarding 
 issue of IAS in their own sectors – 
 to co-operation are small – in other words, when the agreement is 
not very much needed in the first place. Trade agreements are perhaps an exception to this, as they 
based … in particular with respect to genetic resources, invasive alien species and forest biological resources; … 
[and] stresses the importance of capacity building in relation to invasive alien species …”  
 
There have been assessments in sectoral contexts, for instance in relation to forests (Cock 2003) and 
biological diversity. In relation to biodiversity, the European Platform for Biodiversity Research 
Strategy emphasises the need for interdisciplinary research and international collaboration, and suggests 
three priority issues for research: i) development of techniques to predict invasiveness; ii) improvement 
of monitoring, detection, prevention and control techniques; and iii) multidisciplinary scientific support 
for appropriate policy on prevention, management for control and legislation, public awareness and 
information (EC 2002). 
 
The Community Biodiversity Strategy includes four sectoral biodiversity action plans, which refer to 
IAS in sectoral contexts. The action plan of agriculture (EC 2001) identifies “uncontrolled spread of 
alien and wild species” as a possible result of agricultural practices on biodiversity, but it does not set 
out any specific IAS-related measures. It also recognises as a primary aim implementation of practices 
which prevent the spread of non-native
Environmental Action Programme (2001−2010) acknowledges concern regarding the potential risks to 
biodiversity from undesired and unforeseen consequences of the introduction of IAS (EC 2002). 
 
Also in Finland the importance of IAS is beginning to get rec
re t
matters handled by the Ministry o
adaptation to climate change (MAF 2005). In addition, a report on future conditions of the Finnish 
agrifood industry to year 2030 (MAF 2002a) mentions IAS indirectly in several parts. First, it is pointed 
out that a possible reduction in genetic basis makes production more vulnerable to pest risks. Second, 
climatic changes are seen to enable establishment of new weeds, diseases and pests in new areas. 
Finally, free movement within the expanding European Union is seen to spread diseases
previously unoccupied areas.  
 
The IAS issue is thus pervasive and beginning to get attention in the political arena. Such attention 
naturally raises also critical viewpoints. There has recently been some discussion within the academia 
whether the current attention given to IAS is just another form of xenophobia. We leave the answer to 
this question for the reader to figure out and refer the interested reader to the opposite arguments of 
Simberloff (2003a) and Sagoff (2005; 1999). 
 
Having briefly looked at the issue from historical, ecological and political perspectives, let us complete 
our overview by reviewing the current international, supra
IAS. The legal texts are presented in more detail in Appendix 1. 
 
2.3.2  International legislation 
 
There are several international agreements that touch upon the
some examples of these are provided in Appendix 1. Despite all the international agreements, the 
importance of domestic policies is substantial, because international agreements need to be 
incorporated into national law before they enter into force (Bell and McGillivray 2000). 
 
Sometimes the mere fact that agreements are multilateral and have many parties makes them weak 
compromises. Barrett (1999) has analytically shown that global agreements with many parties can 




ou  even without effective sanctions. Two important 
 
g than necessary. This basic idea is stated in the preamble to the SPS 
hus the SPS agreement adopts the same basic principles that the WTO itself is built on: market 
g risk should be taken into account. Moreover, the 
greement urges to take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects when decisions 
urther, adopting a precautionary approach seems to be unacceptable under the SPS, unless adequate 
 
n called beef hormone case between 
 outcome of the United Nations Conference on 
th
w effective sanctions to be used against those who breach them. In fact, in another paper Barre
97) shows that the threat of trade sanctions may sustain even global environmental agreement
turally, international agreements may also impose moral obligations on individual agents (o
ntries) and hence influence behaviour over time c
IAS-related international agreements are introduced below. 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) was signed in Marrakesh, Morocco in 1994. The agreement is similar to the Agreement 
n Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), but whereas TBT deals with general standards, SPS is exclusively  o
for standards related to food safety and animal and plant health.  
 
The definition of sanitary and phytosanitary measures corresponds to preventative measures in this 
thesis. The basic idea behind the SPS agreement is that these preventative measures are acceptable tools 
and can also restrict international trade flows, provided that i) the need for them can be scientifically 
proven; ii) the measures are not discriminating between similar member countries; and iii) the measures
re not more trade-restrictin a
agreement as follows (WTO 1994):  
“no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health, subject to the requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail 
or a disguised restriction on international trade.” 
 
T
liberalisation, reciprocity, non-discrimination and transparency (Dunkley 2000). Any measure applied 
should not unjustifiably or excessively restrict trade, should not discriminate between similar trading 
partners, has to be scientifically proven and should be undertaken in a transparent fashion.  
 
An important point to note is that risk assessment should be based on scientific evidence and the cost-
effectiveness of alternative strategies to limitin
a
regarding the level of protection are made. If there is a measure that achieves the appropriate level of 
protection but is less trade-restricting than the current measure, then the current measure is more trade-
restricting than is necessary. 
 
F
scientific evidence is available or research into the issue is initiated. However, what exactly constitutes 
sufficient scientific evidence for different member countries is likely to vary, as is the understanding of 
what is meant by “a reasonable period of time” within which the precautionary measure should be 
reviewed (WTO 1994). 
O
th
e of the main disputes under the SPS agreement has been the so-
e United States and the European Communities, which was ruled in favour of the US. The ruling was 
based on lack of scientific evidence from the European Union on showing the dangers of using 
hormones in beef production. Some studies quoted in this thesis, for instance Kelly et al. (2002) and 
EC (2006), are constituents of this process of providing the necessary scientific evidence to justify 
specific trade-restricting phytosanitary policies. 
 
The second important international agreement relevant to IAS is the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD was the
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. Thailand became the 188  party 
to the agreement when it ratified the text on January 29, 2004.  
 
The agreement aims at conserving biodiversity, promoting sustainable use of its components and 
sharing fairly and equitably the benefits from genetic resources (CBD 1992). It also recognises that 
environmental issues cannot be separated from the larger economic framework at which individuals 
operate (Bragdon 1996). The relevant part for IAS (Article 8) states that (CBD 1992):   30(162)
“Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: … (h) Prevent the introduction of, control or 
d reaten ecosystems, habitats or species.” 
ted States – have yet to ratify it.  
reamble of the directive notes the danger presented by harmful invasive organisms. Harmful 
rganisms are defined as “pests of plants or of plant products, which belong to the animal or plant 
 
f lies with the importer to show that a specific 
                                                          
era icate those alien species which th
 
The principle is stated fairly simply and imprecisely, leaving an impression that the issue has been 
recognised but then watered down for some reason. In fact, the initial draft of the Convention included 
a much stronger clause, which would have established a CITES style authority and a priority-based IAS 
listing process (Jenkins 1996). As it stands, the Convention can be criticised for requiring action only 
“as far as possible and as appropriate” (CBD 1992), as well as for pointing explicitly to national 
sovereignty over natural resources (Bell and McGillivray 2000). Furthermore, many countries – 
cluding the Uni in
 
Despite these shortcomings, it is so far the only widely adopted international instrument we have for 
dealing with IAS and as such it is a valuable institution. The Convention also established an 
intergovernmental scientific advisory body, the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice (SBSTTA), whose functions include, among others, assessing the measures taken 
 accordance of the Convention. The SBSTTA guiding principles emphasise that primary attention  in
should be given to preventing IAS introductions (Perrault and Carroll Muffett 2001). 
 
2.3.3  Community legislation 
 
On 21 December 1976 entered into force a directive that deals specifically with harmful organisms and 
troduces the concept of protected zones in what was then European Economic Community. This is  in
Council Directive 77/93/EEC on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of 
organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community. It has 





kingdoms, or which are viruses, mycoplasmas or other pathogens” (EC 2000). However, the directive, 
despite its name, only considers the risk to productive plants, not to plants in natural ecosystems. It 
thus seems to be entirely based on protecting agriculture and forestry.  
 
The directive emphasises the necessity of actions at the place of production or on first point of 
introduction to the Community, as well as basically prohibits the use of separate national legislation, 
unless established at the Community level. Protected zones – defined earlier in Definition 4 – are 
presented as the regional tool to account for differences in ecological conditions. The trade restrictions 
included in the protected zone system can be justified on basis of Article 6 of the SPS agreement.  
 
The directive also presents the idea of a Community level fund to deal with the risks as well as to 
nforce control at the external frontiers of the Community. For instance Portugal received funding e
through the fund for over a third of its expenses incurred in eradication of the pinewood nematode 
(Bursaphelenchus xylophilus). However, the usage of the fund is limited to pests that arrive with traded 
goods, since only in such cases are the member countries eligible to receive compensation through the 
fund. 
 
The approach of the directive
10 is based on ‘blacklists’ of organisms, i.e. it permissible to import and 
trade in plants or plant products unless otherwise specified. The opposite approach would be the so-
alled ‘whitelist’ system, under which the burden of proo c
organism does not present a threat. A system based on a whitelist would probably be more effective at 
preventing invasions, but could in some cases breach the SPS agreement, where the imposer of a trade 
restriction has to scientifically prove the need for the protection measures. The blacklist system is thus 
more acceptable from the free trade point of view, but it has to be noted that such systems may be slow 
 
10 The directive has subsequently been amended (2002/89/EC) such that it may in certain conditions be applied also to 
species outside the annexes.   31(162)
to react to new information regarding certain species being harmful. Some countries have adopted a so-
ey et al. (2002). 
 
Wh e 
re  by IAS to natural ecosystems is covered in Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 
). Hence IAS are 
c
2000/29/EC allows trade restrictions in relation to species that 
reaten plant production, Council Regulation 338/97 does the same for species that threaten natural 
 on the Protection 
f Plant Health (18.7.2003/702), which replaced the old Plant Protection Act of 1994 (Government of 
er, there are conditions under which denial of compensation can be carried out. First, 
uality defects seem to be ruled out of the compensation mechanism, and second, failure to follow 
good production practices (undefined in the Act) may also result in denial of compensation. The penal 
                                                          
called ‘greylist’ system, where different species can be assigned to different categories, depending on the 
estimated risk they impose. More on the advantages and disadvantages of different lists can be found in 
Schmitz and Simberloff (1997) and in Filb
ereas Council Directive 2000/29/EC deals with pests threatening primarily productive plants, th
at presented th
1992, on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (EC 1992). The IAS relevant 
part is similar to the relevant part in the Bern Convention (see Appendix 1), but this time the 
requirements are specified to a greater extent. However, it is notable that the entire directive deals 
ainly with protected natural areas (it lays the foundation for the Natura 2000 network m
only in luded as ‘supplementary provisions’ (EC 1992).  
 
Further, preventing an introduction is available as an option for the members “if they consider it 
necessary”. In other words, preventative actions are not in any way required by the directive. Hence the 
power of the directive for protecting the environment from the IAS is much weaker than the power of 
Directive 2000/29/EC for protecting plant health in production sectors. 
 
Finally, trade aspects of IAS are dealt with in Council Regulation
11 338/97 of 9 December 1996, on the 
protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein (EC 1996). IAS are to be 
included in Annex B which shall contain: 
“(d) species in relation to which it has been established that the introduction of live specimens into the natural 
habitat of the Community would constitute an ecological threat to wild species of fauna and flora indigenous to the 
Community.” 
 
Thus, whereas Council Directive 
th
environment. Again, the approach is based on a blacklist (Annex B of the regulation).  
 
2.3.4  Finnish national legislation 
 
The supranational EU legislation discussed above is incorporated in the Finnish national legislation. 
Basically, Council Directive 2000/29/EC is included in the Act on the Protection of Plant Health of 
2003, Council Directive 92/43/EEC in the Nature Conservation Act of 1996 and Council Regulation 
338/97 stands by itself. 
 
Perhaps the most important piece of national legislation in relation to IAS is the Act
o
Finland 2003). The new Act is essentially similar to the old one, but it identifies in greater detail the 
responsibilities of the authorities. The authority responsible – the Plant Production Inspection Centre 
KTTK – is specifically named in the Act. In addition, the plant protection authorities are now entitled 
to assistance from the customs, border control, police and rescue officials, indicating that the issue is 
being given appropriate attention. 
 
As is quite evident by comparing the Act with Council Directive 2000/29/EC, the Directive is 
executed by means of this Act. Its main points are that it obligates individual farmers to inform the 
authorities of quarantine pest observations, as well as to follow any orders regarding eradication. It also 
sets out the punishments for not following the instructions. On the other hand, it also sets out the right 




11 The difference between directives and regulations is that directives need to be included in national legislation before they 
enter into force, whereas regulations stand by themselves. However, also directives do stand alone after a few years 
(specified in the directive) if they by that time have not been included in national legislation.   32(162)
provisions and the compensation procedure state that compensation is primarily paid for pests that are 
to be eradicated, as opposed to those that are merely to be controlled or contained.  
 
A certain kind of more flexible and precautionary approach is more evident in the new Act. First of all, 
h. 
he Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry may permit actions regarding pests that have not (yet) been 
ltogether, the new Act is a stronger tool than the previous Act for plant protection authorities to 
 IAS. Second, even outside these areas, introductions 
re allowed for silvicultural purposes. Thus the implication seems to be that nature can be protected, 
rovided that doing so does not compromise economic production possibilities. Also the powers of the 
o e of IAS that threaten health of productive plants. Hence the 
ature Conservation Act seems to be much weaker than the Act on the Protection of Plant Health – 
 to result in ‘significant’ damage to native species or environment. 
ow ‘significant’ is interpreted by the legal system in this context remains unknown to me. It is also 
ude the ‘Finnish Clearing-House 
echanism’, ‘North European and Baltic Network on Invasive Alien Species (NOBANIS)’, ‘Baltic Sea 
Alien Species Database’ and ‘Regional Biological Invasions Center’ (in St. Petersburg). See the reference 
section for the internet addresses. 
the definition of a plant pest now allows the Act to be applied to those pests that may cause direct or 
indirect damage to natural plants or plant products. In other words, the Act can in principle be applied 
to species threatening natural ecosystems. Further, the Act explicitly states that in addition to the 
species in the blacklist, it can be applied to species outside that list if they pose a threat to plant healt
T
included in the appropriate annex of Directive 2000/29/EC. Further, the Plant Production Inspection 
Centre KTTK (i.e. the relevant authority) may take such action even when not ordered by the Ministry, 
if they see that the threat is imminent. This is a remarkable improvement on the normal, rather rigid, 
functioning of blacklists. On another side, the reference to essentiality of procedures is new to this Act 
as compared to the previous one. It remains to be seen how the Act is executed in practice in relation 
to these points.  
 
A
ensure protection against some IAS, but it also seems to make provisions for the State to escape 
compensation payments in many cases – for instance with species that cause mainly quality defects. 
 
Another piece of national legislation dealing with IAS is the Nature Conservation Act (1096/1996) and 
especially Section 43 on ‘Preventing the spread of non-native species’ (Government of Finland 1996). 
Whereas the Act on the Protection of Plant Health deals primarily with species harmful to production 
processes, the Nature Conservation Act accounts for the impacts of invasive species on ecosystems.  
 
However, it is worth noting two points. First, plant introductions are still allowed in gardens and fields, 
hindering any real attempt to control the spread of
a
p
fficials are much weaker than in the cas
N
just as was the case with the associated directives. 
 
Finally, three other pieces of national legislation that deal with IAS from their own perspectives are the 
Animal Diseases Act (e.g. Article 13), Fishing Act (Article 94) and Hunting Act (Article 42) 
(Government of Finland 1980; 1982; 1993; Nummi 2000). These in principle dictate that species of 
foreign origin cannot be imported to Finland or released in the wild without permission from the 
appropriate Ministry. Both the Fishing Act and the Hunting Act dictate that the permission has to be 
denied if the importation is likely
H
interesting to note that fish and crab species that can be imported without permission can be set out in 
a separate decree. Thus the Fishing Act – in contrast to other legislation discussed above – makes use 
of whitelists rather than blacklists as a policy tool. 
 
 
2.4 Invasive alien species in Finland  
 
There is one general report on IAS in Finland, titled ‘Alien species in Finland’ (Nummi 2000). The 
paper was submitted as a national report to the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity. On a regional scale a report titled ‘Introduced species in the Nordic countries’ was 
released in 2000, produced by a working group established under the Nordic Council of Ministers. In 
addition to these two reports, the internet resources available incl
M  33(162)
 
There are approximately 1,380 known alien species in the Nordic countries. Of the approximately 640 
alien species in Finland, a vast majority – about 93% - are terrestrial, and most of them plants (SYKE 
2001). Of the estimated 42,000 species living in Finland about 1.5 % are thus non-native (Wahlström et 
l. 1992). Studies have been made on only a few separate species
12, perhaps the most comprehensive 
resented by pinewood nematode 
rsap
points  liably estimated ex-ante. 
glandulif
are studies by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry on tomato spotted wilt tospovirus (TSWT) 
TSWT 
 
here are two properties of Finland to note in relation to IAS. On one hand, the harsh climate and the 
Nummi (2000) divides the Finnish IAS into three main categories
i iona  many rats. This 
an  wi
ii) ional ga
ies  en introduced in the ly for 
rposes. 
i y uninte  
ry we sho cerned about for the purposes of the present study. 
 to Di C  the hi
 
S   ) are ju 
2 Leivo 2004; Nordström et mmi 2000; Timgren 2001; 
T 2003; W
Invasive species  When and how?  Impacts 
a
one being the national preparedness strategy for the threat p
(Bu helenchus xylophilus) (MAF 2002b; 2006). It, however, lacks detailed economic analysis and merely 
out that costs are dependent on so many variables that they cannot be re
Nummi (2000) also includes four case studies: pinewood nematode, Himalayan balsam (Impatiens 
era), spiny water flea (Cercopagis pengoi) and Canadian beaver (Castor canadensis). In addition there 
(MAF 2003d) and cyst nematodes (MAF 2004a). Apart from the studies on pinewood nematode and 
the studies do not explicitly consider socio-economic factors. 
T
relatively isolated geographical location present an obstacle to the invasion of many species, but on the 
other hand the relatively low number of native species allows easier establishment of suitable new 
species (Nummi 2000).  
 
:  
)  Ancient unintent l introductions – including  plants, house mouse and 
category includes m y of the plants that have spread th agriculture.  
  Historical intent
includes the spec
 introductions – including fish, 
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 last hundred years or so, main
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002; Kauhala 1996; Leinone
Finland (Nummi’s category 2
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 listed in Table 3 (after Jalli and Pa
 al. 2003; Nu
omppo and Joensuu  estman et al. 2002). 
 
Canada goose (Branta canadensis)  1964 intentionally for game hunting  Crop damages, minor on ecosystems  
Canadian beaver (Castor canadensis)  1933-37 to restore the European beaver 
(wrong species!)  (Restored) European beaver (Castor fiber), forestry 
Common wild oat (Avena fatua)  At least since 1920s in imported grain seed 
and feed grain   Competes strongly with agricultural crops 
Fallow deer (Dama dama) 1930/50s    Minor 
Mink (Mustela vison)  1920s-1930s escaped from fur farms   ibly European mink (Mustela lutreola)  Birds, poss
Muskrat (Ondatra zibethicus)   relations (locally)  1920s intentionally for game hunting  Changes aquatic species
Mute swan (Cygnus olor)  1934 intentionally for parks  ith native Cygnus cygnus  Minor, may compete w
Pheasant (Phasianus colchicus)  1901 intentionally for game hunting  Minor, possible agricultural crop losses 
Raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides)  troductions in former  1930s spread from in
USSR  Minor 




White-tailed deer (Odocoileus 
virginianus) 
 wildlife  spreads a  1934, 1948 intentionally to enrich
and for game hunting 
Minor (crop damage, road accidents, 
parasite that is fatal to elks) 
T ions in Fin
 
A s y 3),   4 
 Kivipelto 2000; KTTK 2002; Leppäkoski 2000; MAF 2004a; Ministry 
f the Environment 2005; Nummi 2000; Rautapää 2002; SYKE 2001; SYKE 2002; Timgren 2001). 
able 3. Historical invas land.  
s for more recent invasion  in Finland (Nummi’s categor some examples are provided in Table
(after Kauppila and Bäck 2001;
o
 
                                                           
12 There is much work in Åbo Akademi University on aquatic invasive species. We have chosen to limit the discussion in 
this thesis primarily to terrestrial species.   34(162)
Invasive species  When and how?  Impacts 
Colorado potato beetle  1983, 1998, 2002 spread from the south-east 
aided by winds  Potato crop reduction  (Leptinotarsa decemlineata) 
Spiny water flea (Cercopagis pengoi)  1992 in ship ballast  Ecosystem effects unknown, clogs up nets, 
waterways and beaches 
Hogweed(s) (Heracleum spp.)  Intentionally as a garden plant  Competition with native species, contact causes 
severe skin burns 
Pale cyst nematode (Globodera pallida)  2000, unknown  Potato crop reduction 
European rabbit (Oryctolagus 
cuniculus)  Unknown, possibly pet escapes  Status in Finland fairly unknown 
Rugosa rose (Rosa rugosa)  Early 1900s but rapid spread since about 
1990 
Modifies ecosystems unfavourable to native species, 
hinders recreational use of beaches 
Spanish slug (Arion lusitanicus)  1990 in imported soil  Garden plants, cosmetic aspects 
Zebra mussel (Dreissena polymorpha)  1995 (Gulf of Finland) in ship ballast  Minor so far, big impacts in e.g. North America 
Table 4. Recent invasions in Finland. 
 
The list is only a sample of species that have recently invaded Finland, but it represents the variability 
ow introduce in more detail the species that is the target of the 
mpirical analysis in this study – Colorado potato beetle. 
beetle Leptinotarsa decemlineata Say (Coleoptera: Chrysomelidae) is an oligophagous 




2.5 Colorado potato beetle 
 
2.5.1  Ecology of the Colorado potato beetle 
 
The Colorado potato 
insect, feeding exclusively on Solanaceae family and primarily on Solanum genus. It is one of the most 
important pests, and the most destructive insect defoliator, of cultivated potato (Solanum tuberosum) 
(Hare 1990; Raman and Radcliffe 1992). Other species targeted by the beetle include tomato, egg plant, 
pepper and tobacco (EPPO 2005; Hare 1990; O’Neil et al. 2005). Despite these other targets, potato is 
the main host plant in Finland, both in quantitative and in economic terms.  
 
 
Figure 5. An adult Colorado potato beetle. 
 
An adult beetle is pictured in Figure 5. The beetle usually has two to three generations a year, although 
in the northern latitudes it generally has one generation and in the south can have as many as four 
he life cycle of the beetle includes the spring adults that emerge from the soil where they have over-
wintered in around middle of June (in eastern Ontario), which is about the same time as the potato 
generations (EPPO 2005). If the mean daily air temperature does not exceed 11−14ºC and humidity is 
high, the beetle population may not be able to spread and the population size may actually decrease. On 
the other hand, mean daily air temperature of 17−20ºC results in mass spread and development (EPPO 
2005). The mean summer temperature in Finland in 1971−2000 is 14.1-16.0ºC in most parts of the 
country (FMI 2006). 
 
T  35(162)
crop begins to break through the ground (Harcourt 1971). Although the actual time of emergence 
depends on the local climatic conditions, it is usually in synchrony with the potato crop emergence. The 
beetle then lays eggs, with a single female laying as many as 2,000 eggs over the summer (EPPO 2005). 
Given a temperature above +12ºC, the eggs hatch in 4-12 days, and turn into larvae, of which there are 
four instars. The fourth instar buries itself in the soil and pupates. After about 10-12 days, the summer 
adults emerge (EPPO 2005; Harcourt 1971; Raman and Radcliffe 1992). 
 
The reproductive potential of the beetle is massive. It has been calculated that in favourable 
environmental circumstances, but with 90% egg mortality and varying degrees of larval mortality, a 
single pair can produce an offspring population that in five years, if not controlled, measures 
1,100,000,000,000 (1.1 x 10
12) individuals (EPPO 2005). 
 
Crop damages 
All the CPB life stages feed on potato, with the fourth instar causing about 75% of the total larval 
defoliation (EPPO 2005; Harcourt 1971; Raman and Radcliffe 1992). The CPB reduces tuber yield of 
otatoes indirectly by reducing the leaf area, hence decreasing the area available for photosynthesis. 
relationship between photosynthetic leaf area reduction and yield loss is not 
actin et al. 
995). At 10ºC food intake by the beetle is zero, reaching the maximum at 25ºC (EPPO 2005). In 
t, causing a total crop loss (Hare 
990). There are no density dependent mechanisms to help it conserve its food resource (Harcourt 
attempts to determine the level of yield losses. The 
tate-wide yield losses in Michigan, USA were on average 12% of the yield, although they could be up 
p
Although the 
straightforward, in general reduced leaf area leads to a decreased yield. The relationship is affected by 
for instance how much the leaf area is reduced, and at what stage of plant development that is done 
(Hare 1980; Hare 1990; Nault and Kennedy 1998). 
 
The magnitude of damages is also affected by the outside temperature. The feeding rate of the CPB, 
and hence also the defoliation rate, is dependent on temperature, as is the development rate of the 
beetle. In general, as the temperature increases, so do the feeding and development rates (L
1
addition to temperature, the CPB shows feeding and egg-laying preferences regarding different potato 
cultivars, but the differences in cultivar tolerance and resistance seem to be minor (Kivioja 2005). 
 
If left uncontrolled, the beetle is able to totally defoliate the potato plan
1
1971). Detailed quantitative descriptions of the beetle’s destructiveness in Europe are lacking. EPPO 
(2005) states that in some EPPO countries the yield losses are up to 50% of the yield. Baker et al. 
(1998) cite a study in which yield losses in Poland were 5% with control and 40% without control. 
Newspaper reports from Russia suggest a figure of 20%, but this is probably only a rough estimate 
(Parkkonen 2002).  
 
In North America there have been several scientific 
s
to 21% in seriously affected areas (Grafius 1997). In the case of tomato, yield losses up to 67% have 
been observed in a field test in Maryland (EPPO 2005). These figures may be slightly higher in Europe 
because most of the beetle’s predators, parasites and diseases have remained in America (Sandhall and 
Lindroth 1976; Raman and Radcliffe 1992). This is a phenomenon that is fairly commonly encountered 




The CPB avoids winter colds by digging into the soil – to a depth of about 25-40cm – to overwinter 
nd by entering a period of diapause, which both increase its chances of surviving through the winter 
n 1996; EPPO 2005; Nault et al. 1997). The low temperature exotherm determines 
                                                          
a
(Boiteau and Colema
the lowest temperature that can be survived by a freeze intolerant insect species. For CPB adults in 
diapause it is about -12ºC, although generally exposure to -7.5ºC for 48 hours or more is lethal to most 
beetles (Boiteau and Coleman 1996). If the soil in which the beetles overwinter is wet, temperatures 
below zero may be reached. This is true especially when there is no protective snow cover.  
 
 
13 Consider for instance the already mentioned case of the European rabbit escaping myxomatosis when invading Chile.   36(162)
In Finland the mean winter temperature in 1971−2000 is between -4ºC and -10ºC in most parts of the 
re has 
een some indication that the northern populations (in Russia) have adapted to the colder climate 
h winter presents challenges to the beetle dispersal, but does not prevent it (Boman et al. 
006a). Hence the beetle has the ability to establish in at least southern Finland. Having said that, there 
country (FMI 2006). However, it is the extreme temperatures and especially the consecutive cold days 
that ultimately determine whether the beetle can overwinter in Finland. In the Ukraine mortality during 
hibernation has averaged 30%, but could be up to 83% (EPPO 2005). 
 
In addition to the winter temperature, also the summer temperature has been found to be important 
for determining whether the beetle can establish in a particular area. If the summer is too cold, there is 
no opportunity for proper development, and thus even a mild winter can exterminate the population. 
Studies in Finland show that normal Finnish summers or frosty nights do not limit dispersal of the 
beetle, whereas a very cold summer (10-15ºC) does limit the dispersal. On the other hand, the
b
through faster development (Boman et al. 2006a,b). 
 
In Russia it has been estimated that the requirement for a full generation developing (needed for 
establishment) is at least 60 days of temperature being over +15ºC, and the winter temperature not 
falling below -8ºC (Vlasova ca. 1980, cited in EPPO 2005). However, the summer of 2004 saw the first 
confirmed case of winter survival in Finland (Dr. Leena Lindström, verbal communication; KTTK 
2004). Finnis
2
are uncertainties related to the particular conditions that determine whether overwintering and survival 
of the beetle is successful or not in northern latitudes (Lyytinen et al. 2006). 
 
Pesticide resistance 
In 1937 only seven species of pests were known to be resistant to one or more pesticides. By 1984 this 
number had increased to 447 species (Schepel 1996), and by 1991 there were over 500 insects and mites 
resistant to at least one insecticide or acaricide (Georghiou and Lagunes-Tejeda, cited in Grafius 1997). 
his trend is also exemplified by the CPB, which is renowned not only for its powers of destruction, 
, with the useful life of each successive 
troduction becoming progressively shorter (Hare 1990; Raman and Radcliffe 1992). The CPB is 
est as 
efore in EPPO countries, due to use of effective plant protection products and routine control. The 
ged since, due to development of pesticide resistance in the beetle 
opulation. For instance, in Poland 100% of the individuals tested were found to be resistant to 
illa maculata) feeds on CPB eggs and young larvae (Coll et al. 1994). Also ground beetle (Lebia 
andis), daddy longlegs (Phalangium opilio) and spined soldier bug (Podisus maculiventris) feed on the CPB 
but not on the potato plants. In addition, Doryphorophaga doryphorae fly parasitises the CPB larvae (Hare 
1990; Stetter Neel 1992). For other predators and parasites of the beetle, see EPPO (2005) and O’Neil 
et al. (2005). However, native enemies have not provided enough protection against the CPB in the US 
(Cañas et al. 2002; Hare 1990; O’Neil et al. 2005).  
 
T
but also for its ability to rapidly develop resistance to insecticides. 
 
In the Long Island, USA, the CPB has been targeted with insecticides for more than 100 years. The 
beetle’s resistance to DDT was first observed in 1952, seven seasons after the introduction of the 
pesticide. This indicates that the beetle was able to evolve resistance to DDT in 14 generations. After 
the failure of the DDT, each new insecticide introduced failed
in
resistant to at least 25 insecticides (Georghiou and Lagunes-Tejeda, cited in Grafius 1997), and many 
CPB populations have developed resistance to almost all registered insecticides (Hare 1990). Hence, the 
economic problem is that pesticide effectiveness decreases and costs increase over time due to 
application of larger quantities or more expensive pesticides (Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1986).  
 
EPPO (2005) argued that about 15 years ago the beetle was no longer considered as important a p
b
situation may have somewhat chan
p
permethrins, whereas in Estonia the figure was about 20%. As for organophosphates, in Poland the 
prevalence was again 100%, whereas it was about 50% in Estonia and about 60% in Russia (Lindström 
et al. 2006). 
 
In Europe natural predators have not established to control the beetle. In the US a lady beetle 
(Coleomeg
gr  37(162)
Also alien species have been tried in biological control. An egg parasitoid Edovum puttleri was imported 
to the US from Colombia to control the beetle (Ruberson et al. 1989). However, it does not tolerate 
temperatures below about 13ºC, hence decreasing its effectiveness in many areas (Lashomb et al. 1987). 
Also bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis has been applied, but it works only on the first larval stages and 
works better in warmer climates. Having said that, its use has been found in some studies to be more 
cost effective than traditional insecticides (Stetter Neel 1992).  
 
Altogether, no natural enemy (native or alien) has been found that would be able to keep the beetle 
population below a damage threshold (Cañas et al. 2002; O’Neil et al. 2005). The CPB can also be 
controlled through means other than insecticides or biological control. The most important alternative 
method is crop rotation (Grafius 1997; Stetter Neel 1992). Other methods include early planting, hand 
picking, removing plant vines, mulching, floating row covers and using flame throwers (Hare 1990; 
Stetter Neel 1992). These alternative control methods are beyond the scope of this study. 
 
2.5.2  Spread and distribution 
 
The beetle originates from Mexico (Hare 1990) and is currently established in North America, some 
a), many Asian countries (including Turkey, 
ran, several countries of former USSR and Russian Far-East), and most European countries (except 
Central American countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Cub
I
for Britain, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and some Spanish and Portuguese islands) (EPPO 2005; 
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Figure 6. Global distribution of the Colorado potato beetle in 2003.  
 
The presence of the beetle in Europe dates back some 80 years, as demonstrated in Figure 7 (KTTK 
n.d.). It was introduced from the USA to Bordeaux in France in 1922, from where it rapidly spread 
throughout Europe, reaching Spain and Germany in 1930s, Portugal and Poland in 1940s, Bulgaria and 
Lithuania in 1950s and Greece and Estonia in 1960s (EPPO 2005; KTTK n.d.).  
 
The spread in Europe has in recent years been slowed down by international co-operation, for instance 
between France and the Channel Islands. The aim of the co-operation has been to prevent any further 
spread (EPPO 2005). However, for instance in Austria its population size is again on the increase 
(Rabitsch and Essl 2006). The European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EPPO) 
lists the species in its Appendix 2, indicating that it is present in the EPPO region, but is not widely 
distributed and is officially being controlled (EPPO 2004; 2005). 
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Figure 7. Spread of the Colorado potato beetle in Europe. 
 
The beetle can disperse by means of wind-borne long-distance migration. This seems to be its primary 
mode of transport to Finland, although it can also be carried over large distances in sea water. In 
addition, transportation of its host plants in, for instance, trucks and trains provides a third method of 
long-distance dispersal. Near-range dispersal can take place through walking or flying (EPPO 2005; 































Figure 8. The number of farms invaded by the Colorado potato beetle in Finland 1998−2005. 
 
n 
inland took place in 1983, but was very localised and short-lived (Rautapää 2002). The major invasions 
which also initiated interest in this study took place in the summers of 1998 and 2002. In 1998, there 
were 149 potato farms affected, of which 26 were professional farms and two professional organic 
                                                          
Figure 8 depicts the number of invaded farms in 1998−2005.
14 The first recent invasion by the CPB i
F
 
14 The number of invaded farms is obtained from KTTK:   39(162)
farms.
15 In 2002, the biggest invasion so far, there were 324 farms affected, 55 being professional farms. 
The interim years 1999−2001 as well as 2003−2005 saw no large scale beetle invasions, although some 
observations were made each year. The time-span of the data is not very long, but within this dataset, it 
seems that the invasion magnitude is increasing in both the invasion years (2002 vs. 1998) as well as in 
the interim years (2003−2005 vs. 1999−2001).  
Most of the plots affected in both 1998 and 2002 were situated in south-eastern Finland, suggesting 
r Russia or Estonia. This suggestion is supported by genetic 
tudies conducted at the University of Jyväskylä, confirming Russia as the origin of the beetles that 
ave invaded Finland (Grapputo et al. 2005). The density of observations by municipality in years 1998 
 
that the beetles had spread from eithe
s
h
and 2002 is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Colorado potato beetle observations in Finland in 1998 and 2002. 
 
Finland has a protection system in force against the CPB. Certain areas in Finland have the European 
nion protected zone (ZP) status for the beetle (EC 2000; KTTK 1998; MAF 2004b). These areas  U
include Satakunta, Turku, Pirkanmaa, Uusimaa, Häme, Kymi and the Åland Islands and they represent 




Figure 10. The protected zone area in Finland. 
 
 
                                                           
15 Under the current practice, the same chemical treatment is carried out on organic farms as on other farms. Thus, if 
subjected to an invasion, these farms lose the organic status (KTTK, verbal communication).   40(162)
The actions within the protected zone and the eradication measures to b
ouncil Directive 2000/29/EC and in the Regulation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
e undertaken are specified in 
s increasing its destructiveness in Europe, there is also an opposite effect. Since 
e feeding and development rates are temperature dependent, the beetle finds it harder to feed and 
i pe. It may not thus cause as much defoliation as it does in southern 
 to many other European countries, the potato yields in Finland are 
e to acquire pesticide resistance. Thus the impacts of 
al control substances 
ion to economic aspects of the issue. 
C
38/04. Although the protected zone is only for the given areas, national actions are applied in the entire 
country. Hence the beetle is eradicated regardless of whether it is found within the protected zone or 
outside the zone. Our understanding of why the entire country was not given the protected zone status 
is that, according to the Community legislation, the species has to be theoretically able to establish in 
the area. In determining the protected zone, areas north of the current zone were probably thought to 
be climatically unsuitable for the CPB to establish. 
 
In relation to Finland, two points can be made. First, even though the CPB has left its parasites and 
predators behind, thu
th
surv ve in the colder parts of Euro
nvironments. However, compared e
already fairly low due to poor climatic conditions. For instance, in 2004 the yields were 22.7 t/ha in 
Finland, whereas the figures elsewhere were 45.7 t/ha in the Netherlands, 44.2 t/ha in Germany, 42.4 
t/ha in the United Kingdom and 30.9 in Sweden (FAOSTAT). Under such circumstances, any further 
crop losses can be seen as fairly harmful for the domestic producers. Furthermore, as the summer 
temperatures also vary significantly the implications remain ambiguous.  
 
Second, even if the beetle is able to establish in Finland it is likely to have just one full generation a 
ear. This affects the time it takes from the beetl y
pesticide resistance, although still important, may not be as dramatic in the northern conditions as they 
are further south. However, if the invading population is already resistant due to application of 
pesticides elsewhere, and if there are no or little fitness costs associated with resistance, the implications 
f this argument are also ambiguous and require further research.  o
 
To conclude, in light of the characteristics discussed above, there seem to be five important ecological 
factors to take into account in the analysis: i) the beetle has spread very rapidly across the continent in 
the past, although its spread has slowed down as it has approached the ecological limits of its survival 
range; ii) in propitious environmental conditions, its population size can increase extremely rapidly; iii) 
it is capable of causing significant damage to potato plants; iv) cold summers and winters present an 
obstacle to its establishment, but the areas in Finland where it can permanently establish are difficult to 
redict; v) lack of natural predators and ability to develop resistance to chemic p
make the beetle difficult and expensive to control.  
 
For the interested reader, further discussion on the CPB and Finland can be found in Koukkunen 
(1999), Pirvola and Nedeström (1984), Rautiainen (2004) and Tomminen (1999). Genetic analysis of 
the CPB population in Finland can be found in Boman et al. (2006a,b), Grapputo et al. (2005) and 
Lyytinen et al. (2006). A more thorough discussion of the CPB ecology can be found in Hare (1990). 
Having discussed the basic ecological and institutional factors related to IAS in general and the CPB in 
pecific, we now turn our attent s
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3. INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES – ECONOMICS 
 
We now move on to discuss the economic damages, the management framework and how IAS issues 
an be modelled. Section 3.1 discusses the potent c ial economic benefits and costs of IAS as well as some 
3 nd cos
 
Intentionally introduced IAS may provide several potent  introduced species 
produce about 98% of global food supply, valued at mo P al. 
2001). They also produce positive ben i ar
medicine, visual pleasure (garden plants), biological  (p
– controversial to say the least – proposal suggests introducing species such as the African elephant 
( (Pa  North America ore biodi id 
c pecies (Do
 
If we strictly adopt the d iti er ), an  
w ficial  is n v th an 
be both: they may provide the desired benefits, but also res reseen detrimental e
 
A n done by de Neergaard et al. (2005) on two wattle 
s  and Acacia dealbata) in South Africa. On one hand the species consume large 
q ad rovid se  
indigenous biodiversity. On the other hand, they provid
c e a come for loc lds 
s n g the impacts of IAS, and also 
t ntial benefits be taken i in  caused. 
 
Despite th ates is ef
t I  conducted at the national level (Pimentel et al. 
 and plant diseases and pests, 
nd costs of certain human diseases (AIDS, influenza and syphilis). The updated version of the study 
pecies types. In New Zealand 
xotic pests, weeds and diseases cause annual damage equivalent to a minimum of one percent of gross 
                                                          
models that can be used in estimating those benefits and costs. Section 3.2 moves on to presenting the 
IAS management problem and showing in a very simple model the presence of externality and public 
good aspects. Section 3.3 reviews economic papers on IAS, concentrating on three specific themes: 
prediction, vulnerability and control. This is followed in Section 3.4 by a review of studies that discuss 
the fundamental concepts of pre-emptive versus reactive control, including cost-benefit analyses similar 
to the present study.  
 
 
.1 Potential benefits a ts 
ial benefits. For instance,
re than $5 trillion annually ( imentel et 
efits for the society 
 contro
n the form of, for example, v ious products, 
l and human accompaniment ets). A recent 
Loxodonta africana) and lion  nthera leo) to n Great Plains to rest versity and a
onservation of the s nlan et al. 2005). 
efin on of the Executive Ord
ot considered to be an in
 13112 (recall Definition 6  alien species
ith only bene  impacts asive species. The problem is  at species c
ult in unfo ffects. 
s an illustrative example, co
pecies (Acacia mearnsii
sider the case study 
uantities of water in an alre y dry environment, p e cover for criminals and pre
e heating and building material to the local 
nt a threat to
ommunities, are used for m dicine extraction and act  s a source of in al househo
elling them for firewood. He
he pote
ce care needs to be taken w
nto account when discuss
hen considerin
g the damages
e universal scope of the issue, the United St
horough economic study on 
fectively the only country where a fairly 
AS damages has been
1999; 2005). The study includes control costs, production losses to animal
a
estimates the annual costs as about US$120 billion. In addition, Pimentel et al. (2001) estimate the 
annual costs for a group of six countries (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, India 
and Brazil) as US$314 billion.  
 
In certain other countries cost estimates exist for particular sectors or s
e
domestic product (Bertram, in Jay et al. 2003). In Germany, twenty species cause an estimated annual 
damage of 100-265 million euro (Reinhardt et al. 2003). In Australia, weeds cause annual damage to 
agriculture worth about A$4 billion
16 (Martin 2003). In Canada the projected annual costs of sixteen 
species were estimated to be CAD$13-34 billion
17 (Colautti et al. 2006). Such aggregate figures do not 
provide much guidance on individual management questions, but they do point out the scale of the 
issue and as such are valuable in highlighting its importance. 
 
 
16 A$ 1 ≈ 0.65 euro (Nordea Bank exchange rate, 08.03.2006). 
17 CAD$ 1 ≈ 0.75 euro (Nordea Bank exchange rate, 08.03.2006).   42(162)
Concentrating on species that impact on a particular type of production process – agricultural 
roduction – Table 5 lists some examples from the literature on damages caused by IAS in agricultural 
ed earlier, most species that are potentially 
vasive do not invade, and of those that do only a small proportion becomes established, let alone a 
p
environments. Note that the cost estimate is often for one area and one type of damage only and as 
such represents the minimum damage inflicted.  
 
Another word of caution goes the other way: as discuss
in
pest. Thus the review is merely a biased sample of some invasions that exemplify the problem. It is 
worth bearing in mind that economic studies are usually not made of species that cause little or no 
damage at all. Further, if the invasive species was not there, it is possible that a native species could 
cause the same negative impacts. Having said all that, the small proportion of IAS that do establish as 
pests are capable of causing significant damage. 
 
Invasive species and location  Impacts  Estimated cost  Reference 
Canada goose (Branta canadensis) in Germany  Agricultural damages (grazing and 
field trampling) 
DEM 1-3M annually (damage by both 
Canada goose and native geese)  Gebhardt 1996 
Citrus canker disease in California  Crop damages  Ex-ante: $1.8-2.4B (NPV), including 
changes in consumer and producer surplus  Jetter et al. 2003 
England  Ex-ante: control costs of £3.87M present 
value over 30 years  Mumford et al. 2000 Colorado potato beetle 
(Leptinotarsa decemlineata)  England and 
Wales 
Potato crop damages through reduced 
photosynthesis  Ex-ante: £0.4-2.7M (1979 prices) annually 
in costs of control and crop damage 
Bartlett 1980 cited in 
Baker et al. 1998 
Desert locust (Schistocerca gregaria) in the 
Sahel, Middle East and North Africa  Crop damages  $500M in 1987–96 on control   Hardeweg 2001 
European purple loosestrife  
(Lythrum salicaria) in 48 US states 
Reduction in biomass of native 
species, changes in wetland structure  $45M annually on control and forage loss  Pimentel et al. 1999; 
Aulio 2002 
Great Britain  Crop loss of winter wheat  £6.50/rabbit (experimental conditions)  McKillop et al. 1996 European rabbit 
(Oryctolagus cuniculus)  Germany  Damage to agriculture and forestry. 
Burrows damage parks and runways  DEM 10M annually in 1970s, today higher  Gebhardt 1996 
Field bindweed (Convolvulus arvensis) in 
Kansas  Crop damages  $40M annually  Cited in Settle et al. 
2002 
Golden apple snail (Pomacea canaliculata) in 
the Philippines  Damage to rice seedlings  $28-45M annually (1990)  Naylor 1996 
Leafy spurge (Euphorbia esula) in Montana, 
N. and S. Dakota and Wyoming 
Rangeland, wildland and idled 
cropland weed  $130M annually  Bangsund et al. 1999
Mango mealybug (Rastrococcus invadens) in 
Benin 
Mango crop damages through 
reduced photosynthesis 
Avoided annual cost $50M in biological 
control programme, $531M present value 
over 20 years. 
Bokonon-Ganta et 
al. 2002 
Pheasant (Phasianus colchicus) in Germany  Damage to vegetable fields, vineyards 
and Ca. DEM 2.5M annually  Gebhardt 1996   seeds and seedlings in corn fields 
Red imported fire ant (Solenopsis invicta) in  Damage
California 
 to irrigation and mechanical 
equipment, health, biodiversity, etc.  $387-989M annually  Jetter et al. n.d. 
Tilletia indica in NW Mexico and Europe 
Causes Karnal bunt of wheat, quality 
impact on wheat, impacts foreign 
trade 
$7M annually in NW Mexico, €1.5-34M in 
the EU during the first year. 
Kelly et al. 2002; EC 
(2006) 
Tobacco whitefly (Bemisia tabaci) in England 
and Wales 
Transmits plant viruses, causing 
tomato crop loss  £11.5M decrease in national gross margin  Morgan and 
MacLeod 1996 
Table 5. Invasive alien species damage costs from case studies in an agricultural setting.  
 
As indicated in Table 5, even a close subset of invasions – those affecting agricultural production – 
imply a diverse range of areas, effects and cost estimates. The potential costs caused by IAS are wide-
anging, but can be roughly divided into four categories: control costs, p r roduction losses, secondary 
DA 2003). For further discussion, see for instance Gewin (2003). 
market effects, and health, environmental, and cultural effects. These are discussed below in turn, also 
introducing some basic models that can be used to estimate those costs. 
 
In addition to the damage categories discussed below, a recent concern is that IAS may be used 
deliberately to upset food production or otherwise disrupt the functioning of the society. This is not a 
separate category in that the effects are likely to take place through the same damage categories. 
However, the quiddity of this type of damage is its distinct nature of intentional malevolence. The 
World Health Organization has already paid attention to the issue (WHO 2002) and for instance the US 
Department of Agriculture has received additional funding of hundreds of millions of dollars for agri-
ecurity (US s
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3.1.1  Control costs 
 
IAS often cause damages to such an extent that they need to be controlled in one way or another. Basic 
control methods include for instance chemical treatment with control substances, biological control, 
immunisation, host management (e.g. crop rotation) or genetic alteration of hosts by either traditional 
methods or through genetic engineering (Newman 1993).  
 
The objective of the control measures varies – a common division of available actions deals with 
revent any further 
pread. If also this is not possible, the final measure is to control the species in order to keep its 
nsity below some minimum threshold level. Finally, restoration of the ecosystem 
pread can be extremely costly to control. Total 
radication can in such circumstances be very difficult or impossible to achieve and eradication costs 
kely 
 increase and the effectiveness of control likely to decrease (Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1986). The 
n containment, the objective is to protect the nearby areas, either inside the country in question or in 
98, see also Sharov 2004). Also continued new invasions may affect 
e success of control measures and their economic profitability, especially if eradication is the chosen 
eradication, containment and control (CBD 1992; Council of Europe 2003; Shine et al. 2000). The most 
extensive measure is to eradicate the entire population. If eradication is found not to be feasible or 
economical, it is possible to try and contain the population to a given area and thus p
s
population size and de
to the pre-invasion state may in some cases be seen as a viable policy. There are various important 
aspects related to control measures undertaken and the costs that ensue. There is no space to go into 
the issue in detail or to provide extensive examples, but some main points are raised below. 
 
Although for instance the guiding principles of the CBD advocate eradication as the next best thing if 
prevention fails, very few eradication programmes have been carried out in Europe (Genovesi 2005). 
The reasons for this include inadequate national laws, unclear responsibilities among authorities and 
opposition by animal rights groups. In addition, invasions that are not targeted immediately when a 
species is first encountered and thus become wides
e
are likely to increase the fewer individuals there are left. The case of Kapiti Island in New Zealand 
exemplifies the problem. It cost NZ$ 50,000 to eradicate the first 11,500 individuals of the invasive 
possum (Trichosurus vulpecula) population and NZ$ 220,000 to eradicate the last 80 (Cowan 1992).
18 And 
all this took place on a relatively small island with no immigration and with large pests that are relatively 
slow to reproduce. Similarly, the eradication of the twelve individuals of Himalayan porcupine (Hystrix 
brachyura) in Devon, Great Britain cost about 230,000 euro (Genovesi 2005). Hence eradication is often 
feasible only when the size of the invading population is relatively small and it is geographically 
restricted (Council of Europe 2003). For examples of eradication successes and failures, see Genovesi 
(2005) and Simberloff (2003b). 
 
Containment and control also involve challenges. If chemical control substances are used, the target 
species may develop resistance to the substance. Hence, as time goes by, the costs of control are li
to
magnitude of this problem naturally depends on the control method used as well as the properties of 
the species itself. For example, Colorado potato beetle is notorious for its capability of developing 
resistance to most insecticides in a very short time, and hence this factor is integral in problems related 
to the beetle. If, on the other hand, biological control is used, a different set of management challenges 
that may impact on the costs and feasibility of control is likely to emerge.  
 
I
neighbouring countries (Council of Europe 2003). Natural geographic formations in the habitat may 
either help or hinder any containment efforts, and hence need to be accounted for. For instance, 
Sharov and Liebhold (1998) show that once a pest is present, stopping it from spreading is not an 
economically viable strategy unless there are sufficient natural barriers that can be used. On the other 
hand, in their specification slowing the spread is optimal even when only a small area remains non-




                                                           
18 NZ$ 1 ≈ 0.58 euro (Nordea Bank exchange rate, 08.03.2006).   44(162)
Finally, the incentives of stakeholders are important in determining whether authorities receive help in 
control or not. For instance, in the case of species that threaten agricultural production, help from 
farmers may be readily available. Large-scale help is much less likely in the case of species that threaten 
natural ecosystems in perhaps distant locations. Thus, support from the public and political 
ommitment are integral factors to account for in the control strategy (Council of Europe 2003). As an 
example, see Parkes and Murphy (2003) for a discussion on how exotic mammals are managed in New 
Zealand. 
 
We briefly discuss below how control costs can be taken into account in economic cost-benefit 
analyses. The two aspects discussed deal with the geographical extent to which the pest is present (pest 





The spread of an (invasive) organism can be modelled to analyse the pest population pressure. There is 
a wide range of literature on dispersal of a population in biological sciences, and several different 
4a; Hastings 1996). Dispersal may be for instance 
nidirectional, random, seasonal, metapopulation-related, only related to certain age groups, and so 
s noted, several types of biological spread models are available (see for instance Crawley 1986; 
in the growth rate of the population and in the probability 
ensity function of propagule dispersal. If the primary mode of movement of the IAS is transport 
through traded
 
odels involving pest dy y 
n into account the model 
ulation over a number of years until some maximum 
models can be applied (Andersen et al. 200
u
forth. In general terms dispersal can be seen as a result of three separate but interrelated processes. 
These are i) population growth; ii) immigration and emigration; and iii) movement of the population. 
The ultimate drivers of dispersal are population growth, evolutionary factors and in some cases 
environmental change (Johnson 1967). In the case of IAS the role of long-range (as opposed to short-
range) dispersal is an important issue to account for. 
 
A
Hastings 1996; Levin 1981; Levin 1986; Liebhold et al. 1995; Newman 1993), and the type adopted 
should naturally be appropriate to the problem in hand. For instance, any barriers to random spread 
need to be taken into account, and for instance the ability for habitat transformation may increase the 
growth rate and hence dispersal of IAS (Cuddington and Hastings 2004). For pests carried by the 
prevailing winds the assumption of random spread may not be realistic for long-range dispersal, but it 
may work fairly well for short-range dispersal. As noted earlier, any barriers that are present may also be 
important for the choice of management strategy. Also environmental fluctuations may affect dispersal. 
In an IAS context, for instance Neubert et al. (2000) model the spread of an invasive species when 
there are seasonal or stochastic fluctuations 
d
 goods, gravity models and traffic flow models may be used (Andersen et al. 2004a). 
M namics may become very complex if the life-history of the pest is accuratel
accounted for. Pest individuals are added by birth, for instance logistic or exponential, and removed by 
death of individuals. In addition there may be immigration and emigration. This is yet relatively 
straightforward, but when different life stages (e.g. pupa, larva) and different age-groups with life-stage 
r age-group specific birth, death, immigration and emigration rates are take o
may get quite complex (Kropff et al. 1995). 
 
In IAS related analysis, the objective of pest dispersal model is to estimate how the invading population 
might disperse in given conditions. Despite the extensive work done on dispersal models in biological 
sciences in relation to some species, the economic cost-benefit assessments often deal with simple 
inear or logistic spread of the invading pop l
carrying capacity is reached. Lacking suitable data on CPB dispersal, also we adopt this straightforward 
method of estimating dispersal.  
 
Decision models 
Impacts of pest control may be modelled using economic decision models. The earliest use of 
microeconomic theory in as essing the economic im s pact of pests was by Hillebrandt in 1960 (Azzam et 
al. 1995). He d he 
marginal costs  in 
etermined the optimal pesticide dosage by the basic economic criterion: equate t
of pesticide application with the marginal revenue of the action. This is illustrated   45(162)
Figure 11. The figure depicts the marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) of pesticide 
evenue (the benefit from applying the additional unit) is downward sloping. The optimal 
esticide quantity (z*) is at the intersection of these two curves. 










Figure 11. The optimal quantity of pesticide application. 
 
The idea behind this thinking is simple: if the additional benefits of spraying one more unit are greater 
than the additional costs incurred in doing so, then it pays off to carry out spraying that unit. As private 
marginal costs are likely to be constant (i.e. unit price of pesticides does not change the more units you 
pply) and private marginal revenues are reduced the more units you apply (due to diminishing marginal 
e economic threshold 
vel of pesticide application in this case. A simple example of a threshold model can be presented as 
s etzstein 1993): 
 D times the pre-control pest 
be reduced to 
a
productivity of pesticide use) there comes a point when no more should be applied. This is the level 
marked z* in Figure 11 and it represents the privately optimal level of pesticide use. 
 
Some twelve years after Hillebrandt’s application, Headley introduced the concept of an economic 
threshold (Azzam et al. 1995; Carlson and Wetzstein 1993). Again, the marginal cost of control is 
equated to the marginal value product of control. The point now, however, is that pesticide application 
may not be profitable until a certain threshold pest population size or concentration is reached. At low 
pest concentration levels it does not pay off to apply the pesticide, because the marginal revenue from 
doing so is less than the associated marginal cost. In other words, there is a minimum population 
concentration N
* below which pesticide application is not profitable. This is th
le
follow  (after Carlson and W
 
πNO = p (q – DN)     (1) 
π = p [q – DN (1- v)] – pz     (2) 
 
Producer profits without control πNO are the (constant) price of output p times the potential yield 
without the pest q, from which the amount of pest damages is subtracted. This damage is equal to per 
individual damage done by the pest D times the pre-control pest density N.  
 
Producer profits with control π are the (constant) price of output p times the potential yield without the 
pest q, from which the amount of pest damages is again subtracted. This damage is now reduced by the 
control actions, and is equal to per individual damage done by the pest
density N adjusted by the percent reduction in pest numbers due to control (1-v). From this expression 
the (constant) cost of control pz is subtracted.  
 
The threshold population size N* can be calculated by equating these two functions. By doing this, it is 
possible to find the population size at which the profits with control are exactly equal to profits without 
control. With a pest population any higher than this, the profits with control are greater than without 
control, and hence the population level N* is the economic threshold level above which control is 
profitable. The resulting formula can 




z = *       (3) 
 
At this population level the marginal cost of control (pz) is just equal to the marginal revenue of control 
pvDN*).  (
 
This type of decision models may be considered from either private or social point of view. When 
social perspective is taken, the term cost is understood more widely and for instance the environmental 
impacts of pesticides can be included in the analysis. The private producer naturally is unlikely to 
include this social component in his calculation, and thus the need for social guidance can be analysed 
by comparing the private and social optima. 
 
Decision models have been used fairly extensively in the context of agri- and horticulture. For instance, 
Binns et al. (1992) estimate the threshold level in the case of Colorado potato beetle to be four to eight 
larvae per stalk, depending on the growing conditions. Hansen (2004) calculates the thresholds level for 
pollen beetles (Meligethes aeneus) in spring oilseed rape (Brassica napus) crops in Denmark, and Naranjo et 
al. (1996) analyse the impact of crop prices, control costs and efficacy of control on the thresholds for 
tobacco whitefly (Bemisia tabaci) in cotton in the United States. Azzam et al. (1995) apply the approach 
to deal with livestock diseases and Saphores (2000) discusses decision models when pest dynamics are 
tochastic. Any temporal model sho s uld take into account also future development of pest resistance to 
cond, 
sion of social costs of 
ease the threshold to such high levels that significant crop losses result, and 
US$1 billion (Pimentel et al. 1999; 
cumulative present value costs caused by the snail to agricultural production to be between US$425 and 
US$1200 million in the Philippines.  
chemical control substances, as well as future development of the plant resistance against the pest 
(Shtienberg 2000). 
 
Doyle (1997) presents some criticism of threshold models in the case of weeds. Much of this criticism 
is likely to apply to other harmful organisms. First, they depend on experimental evidence at weed 
levels that may be of little use in reality. More generally, they can be criticised for being limited to the 
onditions at which the experimental measurements were carried out (Kropff et al. 1995). Se c
Doyle (1997) argues, most decision models assume uniform distribution of weeds. Third, there is often 
considerable uncertainty regarding the weed density (with pre-emergence herbicides), the crop loss 
function and the herbicide dose-response function. Due to this uncertainty producers often apply 
ontrol in such a way that the actual threshold becomes irrelevant. Finally, inclu c
chemical control may incr
as such the threshold level becomes meaningless for the producer (Doyle 1997). 
 
3.1.2  Production losses 
 
Invasions may cause damage to various anthropogenic production processes. A well-known example is 
the zebra mussel (Dreissena polymorpha) in the Great Lakes of the United States. The species spread from 
Europe in ship ballast and has subsequently spread rapidly within the United States. In addition to 
competing with native flora and fauna, the species results in direct economic damage by blocking 
ower plant intake pipes. The annual costs are estimated to be about  p
2005). Another notorious example is the invasion of Guam by the brown tree snake (Boiga irregularis). It 
arrived on the island in the landing gear of the US military aircraft. In addition to causing the extinction 
of several native bird and lizard species, the snake causes frequent power outages on the island by 
short-circuiting power lines. The power outages alone are estimated to cost US$7 million a year to the 
ower utility and its customers (Pimentel et al. 1999; 2005; Pimm 1991).   p
 
Examples from agri,- silvi- and aquaculture abound, so we shall here give just one example of each. A 
more detailed discussion on cost-benefit analyses of agricultural IAS is given in Section 3.4. In 
agriculture, Naylor (1996) discusses golden apple snail (Pomacea canaliculata) which has invaded the rice 
production systems in many East and Southeast Asian countries. The snail can spread through the 
irrigation network and impacts on the yield by feeding on rice seedlings. Naylor (1996) calculates the   47(162)
 
In silviculture, MacLeod et al. (2002) analyse the threat presented by Asian longhorn beetle (Anoplophora 
abripennis) to European hardwood tree species. The adults feed on the bark of small twigs as well as on 
 through competition with native fish for zooplankton. The impact of the species on the 
ommercial anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus) fishery has been dramatic: the annual rents from the anchovy 
uction processes. This damage 
ategory has perhaps been studied the most in socio-economic sciences, most likely due to the fact that 
are relatively easy to observe and quantify in monetary terms. Thus it is often 
damages. 
gl
leaves and petioles, whereas the later-stage instars move into the woody tissues and create tunnels 
inside the tree. In China, the beetle is among the ten species that cause the greatest economic damage 
to Populus trees. It spreads in wood packaging material, and the projected damages in Europe could be 
significant: about 90% of the wood in the infested poplar tree areas could be downgraded in quality and 
hence lose about half of their value (MacLeod et al. 2002).  
 
In aquaculture, Knowler and Barbier (2000) and Knowler (2005) address a comb jellyfish Leidy’s comb 
jelly (Mnemiopsis leidyi) which invaded the Black Sea, arriving from the US in ship ballast. It affects the 
ecosystem
c
fishery have declined from US$ 17 million to US$ 0.3 million. The present value costs caused by the 
jellyfish are several hundred million US dollars.  
 
Thus, IAS are often costly directly by interfering with various prod
c
production losses 
possible to make a detailed and fairly accurate analysis of production related costs. Production that 
relies integrally on natural resources – including agri-, silvi-, horti- and aquaculture – is evidently most 
at risk, but it is worth noting that also production sectors such as electricity generation, nature tourism 
and transportation can be affected. 
 
We now review some models that may be used to analyse the production impacts of agricultural pests, 
including insects, diseases and weeds. Note that some of the model types presented here do not deal 
exclusively with invasive pests. If we are interested in pest impacts on production (for instance crop 
damages), there are no intrinsic reasons to differentiate between native and non-native pest impacts in 
the models. It is only when we wish to account for pest management and the aggregate policy response 
that the model needs to consider the origin, spread and other specific characteristics of the pest.  
 
Pest impacts can be modelled from a variety of viewpoints and with varying degrees of integration of 
different aspects.
19 Below we briefly discuss ecophysiological models, yield-loss models and damage 
functions, which all relate integrally to the extent of production related 
 
Ecophysiological models 
When we are interested in the impact of a dispersing species we need to account for both the ecology 
of the pest species and the process we are interested in from anthropogenic perspective – for instance 
growth of agricultural crops. Efforts to link pest and crop models started in the 1980s (Kropff et al. 
1995). Using ecophysiological crop models it is possible to examine the issue in an integrated fashion. 
For instance, plant dry matter production per area per day can be calculated from carbon dioxide 
assimilation (once respiration is subtracted). The effects of the pest can then be accounted for through, 
for instance, reduced photosynthetic area. This way we can estimate the reduction in growth of the 
resource caused by the pest (Kropff et al. 1995). 
 
The actual damage mechanism depends on both pest and crop characteristics. The general mechanisms 
include for instance: i) resource competition; ii) reduction in the assimilation rate; iii) tissue 
onsumption; and iv) hampering of water uptake. Pests are not easy to assign to these groups, however, 
t the plant in several ways (Kropff et al. 1995). 
c
since they may affec
 
Two types of ecophysiological models can be distinguished (Kropff et al. 1995). The first type estimates 
the daily dry matter production by the plant based on leaf photosynthesis and respiration. In order to 
                                                           
19 We leave aside for instance predator-prey (e.g. Gaucel et al. 2005), parasitoid-host (e.g. Gubbins et al. 2000; Grasman et al. 
2001) and epidemiological (e.g. Anderson and May 1979) modelling frameworks.    48(162)
do this, these models utilise information on light absorption and radiation at different heights at 
different times of the day. Effects of the pests can then be introduced through their impacts on, for 
example, leaf photosynthesis and respiration. The second type deals with modelling dry matter 
accumulation using absorbed radiation directly by the canopy. Pest effects can in this case be 
introduced th
 
se of the Colorado potato 
eetle, an ecophysiological model can be used to estimate the reduced dry matter production by the 
et, this approach is only integrated as far as ecology of the two species is concerned – the economic 
rough their impact on radiation use efficiency of the plant.  
In an integrated approach the models of pest dynamics and crop ecophysiology need to be linked. The 
point of linkage is naturally system specific and can be for instance related to resource capture by the 
plant (light, water, nutrients), some plant process (photosynthesis, respiration, translocation) or some 
state variable (biomass, leaf area) (Kropff et al. 1995). For instance, in the ca
b
potato plant due to the decreased photosynthetic leaf area. The pest population dynamics model on the 
other hand includes the pest feeding on the potato leaf as a constituent of the pest population growth. 




components remain missing. Thus, in addition to the two ecological components of the model (host 
plant growth and pest population dynamics) an economic component should be included in the 
integrated model in order to assess the pest impact on human systems. 
 
Yield-loss models 
Yield-loss models link the estimated loss of yield to each level of pest or disease intensity (Shtienberg 
d loss, it allows consideration of various management strategies with different costs 
nd producing different levels of crop loss. The yield-loss approach can thus be especially useful for 
ield-loss models have been used extensively. For example, Willocquet et al. (2000) build an extensive 
o  say works for various pests and conditions and can be applied to 
ther crops. Their usefulness is also not restricted to the present conditions. Shtienberg (2000) 
e effects of climatic change on crop production, 
amage done by different types of pests and the distribution of those pests and crops. Such models are 
2000). In other words, yield loss models can be considered as economic equivalents of the 
ecophysiological models, where the pest intensity was linked to impacts on plant physiology. In yield-
loss models this is extended to economic impacts of those physiological changes.  
 
The approach is in principle similar also to economic threshold models, but the objective is slightly 
different. In economic threshold models the pest population level at which pesticide application 
becomes profitable is the focus of interest. Yield-loss models on the other hand try to estimate the 
issue from a wider perspective than merely when to spray. As it links the pest population level to the 
magnitude of yiel
a
cost-benefit calculations where different strategies impose different pest population levels and different 
types of costs, perhaps to different agents at different points in time. The approach can also be used to 
estimate whether total eradication of the pest is economically viable, i.e. what are the benefits of 
eradication compared to its costs as well as to the costs of adaptation.  
 
Y
yield-l ss model for rice, which they
o
discusses forecast models with reference to yield-loss models. These can be used for predicting whether 
there will be yield losses in particular conditions. Different environmental conditions correlate with 
different levels of pest infestation, and thus can be used to estimate the expected magnitude of crop 
losses. For instance, Goudriaan and Zadoks (1995) discuss the global climate change and the 
consequent agro-ecosystem response. They consider th
d
to a large extent based on meteorological factors and naturally work very differently for different types 
of pests. In fact, Shtienberg (2000) discusses the models with reference to diseases, which are easier to 
forecast based on meteorology than pest outbreaks. 
 
Damage functions 
Damage functions are actually simplified yield-loss models. They are discussed in more detail in 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), Mitchell (2001) and Carlson and Wetzstein (1993). A damage 
function was already encountered in equation (3) when decision models were discussed. In general,   49(162)
yield-loss models and damage functions in particular can be seen as a straightforward method of linking 
the ecological and economic model components into an integrated bioeconomic model. In damage 
functions a yield-loss model can be incorporated into an economic production function. Damage 
epresents the potential output in the absence of the pest and D(N) is the damage function in 
hich N denotes the post-control population density of the pest. It can generally be assumed that the 
ea of a disease, which is transmitted by a vector to adjacent agricultural production areas in 
hich crop damages occur. These follow a simple damage function of the form D(N(loc)) where N(loc) 
al units is simply 
ubtracted from the potential output q. Proportional damage functions on the other hand are of the 
ion depends on 
e level of the yield in the absence of the pest as well as on the functional response of the crop to the 
.1.3  Secondary market effects 
f the IAS impacts on some production process, typically more inputs are needed to produce the same 
quantity of outputs as prior to the invasion. These inputs (for instance control substances as well as 
additional labour and machinery) are costly, and thus the general implication is that the costs of 
production increase. Depending on the market structure, some share of these additional costs is passed 
on to consumers. The same effect takes place if the invasion results in production losses to such an 
function approach takes advantage of a standard production function, say q = q(x), where q is the 
quantity produced and x is the quantity of standard inputs. This function can then be modified such 
that it also takes the pest damage into account. For instance,  
 




higher the post-control pest density, the higher the damage. The higher damage then impacts negatively 
on the output produced, which ceteris paribus leads to lower producer profit.  
 
For example Brown et al. (2002) explore a model based on a damage function. In their case there is a 
source ar
w
denotes the insect population at location loc. The model examines the behaviour of the farmer in 
relation to width and type of the barrier crop between the farmed area and the source area.  
 
Damage functions can feature in a wide range of different models and can be expressed in various 
functional forms. They can for instance be either additive or proportional (Mitchell 2001). Additive 
damage functions are of the form q = q – D, where the amount of damage D in physic
s
form q = q(1-D), where damage D is now expressed in proportional terms, 0 ≤ D ≤ 1. 
 
Mitchell (2001) argues that proportional damage functions are especially suitable for competitive pests 
such as weeds. For predatory pests such as insects the form of the ideal damage funct
th
pest presence. Mitchell (2001) goes on to argue that in general the appropriate form is neither additive 
nor proportional, but may include elements of both. He also demonstrates through an empirical study 
of the European corn borer (Ostrinia nubilalis) and Bt corn that using the wrong type of damage 
function may result in a substantial error in results. Despite this result, in most studies the form of the 
damage function is rarely based on findings of ecological theory or statistical analysis guided by it 
(Mitchell 2001).  
 
In addition to being merely additive or proportional, the damage function can be a complex function 
that combines pest dynamics and an ecophysiological model, and thus becomes in effect a yield-loss 
model. Preferring to avoid additional uncertainty caused by this complexity, this study adopts a simple 
proportional damage function. This decision can be justified by the fact that – at least to our knowledge 




Secondary market effects take place through the domestic or international market of the (agricultural) 
product that is affected by the IAS. These effects are possible if the invasion results in damages to a 
production process or consumer perception of the product. Detailed discussion on the topic is 
knowingly left out from the scope of this study, but let us briefly observe some possible basic impacts. 
Discussion with diagrams is presented in Appendix 2. 
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extent that the prices increase because of the diminished quantity supplied. As the product prices 
increase, the consumers suffer a loss of consumer surplus, because they have to pay more for the 
product. Also producers may suffer from production losses and control costs – as discussed earlier. 
What in the end happens to producers and consumers depends on the market structure. The producer 
and consumer impacts of increased costs are presented below under different types of market structure.  
 
To start with, consider the situation in which there is no foreign trade and supply and demand are both 
elastic. An invasion induces a leftward shift in the supply curve: at each price level less is supplied as 
production costs have increased. If neither the supply nor the demand curve is perfectly elastic or 
perfectly inelastic, the shift in the supply results in consumer surplus being reduced. Hence, the 
onsumers unambiguously lose in the case of an invasion. Part of the consumer loss goes to producers 
epends on the market 
stru
 
If s e 
rev d that can be 
ll any 
uantity. This is the only case in which the consumers are unaffected by the invasion.  
rding the relationship of domestic and world prices. 
c
and part to overall welfare loss. The overall impact on producers is unclear and d
cture. 
upply is perfectly inelastic (vertical supply curve), the situation is to a large extent similar as in th
ious case. Perfectly inelastic supply means that there is a fixed quantity of the goo p
produced. In such a case shift of the supply curve results in consumer surplus being reduced. Hence, 
again the consumers unambiguously lose in the case of an invasion and the impact on producers is still 
unclear. 
 
If supply is elastic but demand is perfectly elastic (horizontal demand curve), change in the supply curve 
results in no consumer surplus effects. This is because due to the perfectly elastic demand, any price 
changes are absorbed by the producers and consumers remain unaffected. If demand is perfectly 
elastic, it means that with any price above the demand curve none of the consumers would be buying 
anything domestically. The price cannot be set above the demand curve, if the producers are to se
q
 
Let us now add foreign trade (imports) to our discussion of domestic market impacts. World price is 
assumed horizontal (any quantity can be provided internationally at that price) and domestic supply has 
the standard upward-sloping form. The world price is assumed to include the transportation costs. 
There are three possible cases rega
 
1. Pre- and post-invasion domestic prices above world price: The world price may be lower than the 
domestic price at the domestic market equilibrium. In such a case the impact of the invasion is that the 
market equilibrium remains otherwise the same as in the standard case above, but the share of domestic 
production is reduced. The consumers are thus not affected since they can buy at the same world price 
as before. The domestic producers on the other hand unambiguously lose in producer surplus. The 
gainers in this case are the international producers. 
 
2. Pre- and post-invasion domestic prices below world price: In this case the domestic equilibrium price 
is below the world price. This may be the case when price transfers are imperfect, for instance if the 
international transportation cost is large relative to the product price. This may to some extent be the 
case in Finnish potato markets. Since following the invasion the post-invasion equilibrium is still below 
the world price, standard domestic market analysis applies. In other words, whether there is or is not a 
world price is irrelevant in this case. 
 
3. Only pre-invasion domestic price below world price: The third case is when the initial price is below 
the world price but the domestic post-invasion equilibrium is above the world price. In other words, 
the invasion increases production costs such that it becomes profitable to import some quantity of the 
product. The consumers would lose in consumer surplus, but since the world price acts as a maximum 
price, the impact is not as large as in the second case above. For the domestic producers the impact is 
ambiguous and depends on how far from the world price the pre- and post-invasion domestic prices 
are.  
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A final point to note about the domestic market effects is that in cases with no foreign trade, they are 
e domestic market effects may act as a 
ost if we are concerned about the specific country in question. This is because some proportion of 
her she is doing better herself with Free Trade than she 
ations which are not Free Traders, she or they derive the 
o stay free of them. The case is all the more so if the ‘clean’ country is 
ependent on the activity that the species threatens. For instance, for Finland, which still is relatively 
rantine procedures.  
i ost-invasion domestic market equilibrium
21, the 
ffect of the protection system as such is to decrease the equilibrium quantity and increase the 
or the protection system to be internationally justifiable (compliant with the WTO rules), it has to 
nce protect human, animal, plant or environmental health. 
ease the market share of domestic producers. If the increase in import price is large enough, 
 is even possible that the domestic producers end up producing the whole amount demanded.  
                                                          
primarily transfers from consumers to producers or vice versa
20. If we are only concerned about 
aggregate figures, market effects through prices do not count as a cost as such. If we are concerned 
about the distribution of income, then they may count as a cost or a benefit (for instance, a transfer 
from the rich to the poor could count as a cost under some circumstances, even if it is only a transfer 
from the society’s point of view). With foreign trade added, th
c
income may be transferred to international producers. Again it is, however, primarily a transfer with 
one country benefiting and another losing. It depends on the precise market structure as well as our 
point of view whether such impacts should be counted as costs (or benefits) or not. 
 
As for international market effects, Lord Farrer pointed out already in 1881 that: 
”The true test of the value of Free Trade to England, or to any other country, is not whether she is progressing 
faster, or even doing a larger trade than another, but whet
would do without it; and whether, in her relation to other n
greater benefit from their respective commercial systems.” (Lord Farrer 1904) 
 
It is reasonable to argue that free trade is not a goal in itself, only the means for a better livelihood. If 
the negative side effects of free trade, including invasions by exotic organisms, become large relative to 
the benefits, some kind of trade protection is well justified. Many IAS are fearsome for countries that 
have thus far managed t
d
dependent on its forestry sector, an invasion by the pinewood nematode (Bursaphelenchus xylophilus) 
would have significant impacts. Such countries are likely to take action to protect themselves against 
the risk, and these protective actions affect international trade flows: if there is no outright ban on 
imports, they will at least become more expensive due to surveillance and qua
 
Let us consider this situation from the importing country point of view, assuming elastic demand and 
domestic supply. From purely supply and demand point of view (i.e. excluding the ‘real’ reasons for the 
protection system, such as protecting animal, plant or human health), the system is equivalent to the 
price of imports increasing. It is thus a fairly typical non-tariff barrier (NTB) that results in an upward 
shift in the effective world price.  
 
Assum ng that the world price is below at least the p
e
equilibrium price. In both pre- and post-invasion cases, the share and quantity of domestic production 
increase relative to the situation in which no protection system exists. Thus the system gives the 
domestic producers an advantage they did not have prior to the protection system. Consumers on the 
other hand lose in consumer surplus because the price increases. The additional expenditure goes to 
domestic producers, not their international counterparts. 
 
F
serve its primary purpose, i.e. in this insta
Thus, from biosecurity point of view, the price increase caused by the introduction of the protection 
system can be considered to be a risk premium that has to be paid if we wish to protect ourselves from 
the threat posed by IAS. At best this protection can prevent the shift in the domestic supply curve due 
to the invasion induced additional production costs. In such a case the domestic producers would gain 
a double benefit. First, they would not face the increasing costs implied by the upward shift in the 




20 Naturally crop losses and increased input requirements count as costs, but the market impact here refers to how the price 
responds to these changes and who ends up paying the bill. In addition, under certain market situations some deadweight 
loss may materialise due to decreases in supply. 
21 By this we mean the intersection of the domestic supply and domestic demand curves – the equilibrium that would be 
effective if there was no international trade.   52(162)
 
From the point of view of an exporting country the situation is somewhat different. The analysis above 
can be extended to consider a case in which increased domestic production costs result in a loss of 
market share in world markets. This is likely to result in losses to domestic producers. For consumers 
the result is ambiguous as it depends on what happens to domestic prices – they may even decrease if 
the supply is diverted from exports to domestic consumption. 
ffects that are likely to be far more important than the mere loss of 
duct. This is the case in for instance the European Union protected zone 
ystem, where imports of pest-related products from outside the protected zone system or designated 
est-free producer that does not need to rely extensively on 
hemical control substances may earn that country a comparative advantage in marketing certain 
c wing an invasion, and it is well known that losing a 
putation is quick and easy but regaining it requires a lot of time and effort. 
heir importance should be borne in mind, especially in relation to various diseases. 
 
More interestingly, there may be e
international market share caused by an increase in production costs. These include the impacts of 
international regulation and reputation. A country infested by a potentially dangerous IAS is likely to 
find its foreign commerce restricted in products that may harbour and spread the IAS in question. This 
has been illustrated by for instance bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the United Kingdom 
or more recently by the avian influenza in Turkey and Rumania, who both have seen their bird-related 
exports no longer accepted by the European Union. 
 
On the other hand, a protection system against an invasive pest may promote exports of the 
domestically produced pro
s
buffer zones are restricted or banned. A protected zone exporter on the other hand can export 
wherever s/he wants to. 
 
The reputation of a country as a safe, p
c
produ ts. This kind of an advantage can be lost follo
re
 
Most of the discussion above (apart from the points made about the reputation) deals with the supply 
side effects. As the brief discussion on reputation suggested, IAS or fear of them may also impact the 
demand side of markets. Sometimes the demand side responses are warranted, but it is also possible 
that unfounded fear may result in significant economic costs. There is no space to discuss these further 
here, but t
 
3.1.4  Health, environmental and cultural effects 
 
The final IAS cost category deals with health, environment and culture related costs. Some of the 
impacts were already mentioned in Chapter 2 when the physical impacts of IAS were discussed. 
However, these physical impacts can also influence human well-being in various ways, and thus they 
should be considered also as economic costs. In fact, differentiating between the physical impacts and 
the economic impacts may sometimes be fairly difficult.
22 Some examples of these effects are given 
below. 
 
1. IAS can act as vectors of human disease
Invasive alien species may either spread human diseases (zoonoses) or themselves be categorised as 
such.
23 This category can be exemplified by the Asian tiger mosquito, already discussed in Chapter 2. In 
addition, many pathogens themselves can be categorised as invaders, one of the most devastating ones 
being the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Another topical and possibly quite devastating 
example is the recent spread of the avian influenza in Asia and Europe. The economic costs materialise 
through for instance increased number of sick-days, lowered productive output and increased pain and 
suffering. 
 
                                                           
onsider for instance the case of human diseases. The physical impact of the disease is the impact on the infected p 22 C erson. 
he economic impact is the subsequent loss in well-being of the person (as well as loss of his/her labour input). 
23 Remember footnote 9. 
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2. IAS may alter ecosystem structure and processes
The types of  apter 2. 
Those chang ympathetic 
specie driv f people. IAS 
duced loss of biological diversity will have economic impacts, and IAS may also reduce possibilities 
changes that IAS may cause in natural ecosystems were already discussed in Ch
es may translate into economic impacts in various ways. For instance, if a s
s is  en to extinction, there may be a loss of welfare suffered by certain groups o
in
for recreation or nature based relaxation.  
 
3. IAS may affect cultural heritage
In addition to the fact that IAS may cause ecological degradation and disruption in the ecosystems they 
inv e 
as  transform a traditional heritage biotope into an ecosystem dominated by an 
alue. In 
any cases non-market valuation using either stated or revealed preference methods is required to 
s.  o 
 aggregate 
es in effect a barrier crop between the pest and the unaffected 
creased. Nevertheless, many studies of pest control 
ade, it may also be that people suffer a direct loss of welfare because of that change. Such can be th
e if, for instance, IAS c
exotic species. On the other hand, if a visually attractive IAS has been around for some time, it may be 
that it has acquired a status of an accepted species by the general public, who then oppose any attempts 
to control the species. The case of lupin (Lupinus sp.) in Finland resembles this situation, as does the 
case of invasive grey squirrel (Sciurus carolinensis) and native red squirrel (S. vulgaris) in Europe (Bertolino 
and Genovesi 2003) or the case of Pacific rats (Rattus exulans) within the Maori population in New 
Zealand (McNeely 2001). 
 
 feature that is common to most costs in this category is that they may be very difficult to v A
m
estimate the cost Again, there is no space to go into this issue here. The interested reader is referred t
Kopp et al. (1997) and Krupnick (2004). 
 
3.1.5  Policies, aggregation and model choice 
 
We have now discussed cost categories and models that can be combined to produce a fairly functional 
economic analysis with a bioeconomic model. However, we need to bear in mind that in many cases 
(especially in those that deal with agricultural production) the economic models approach the issue 
om a private point of view. Hence, we need to make additional modifications if we want to fr
the farm level models to a regional or national level, for instance to analyse the impact of various 
policies.  
 
In aggregation at least three issues should be taken into account. First, pest control – in many ways 
similar to vaccination – has public good properties. The producer, when protecting his crop, not only 
protects himself against the pest, but that protection also extends (unintentionally) to the neighbouring 
rms. The protected field thus becom fa
areas. Second, pesticide use may have negative impacts that are external to the private producer. These 
include possible implications for the environment or consumer health. Third, division of income 
between different producers as well as between producers, consumers and taxpayers is affected by the 
presence of the pest and the type of control policy adopted. 
 
Because of these wider issues, it would be beneficial if the bioeconomic model was built in such a way 
that it can be easily aggregated to the social level. In our opinion the role of empirically applied 
economic models is to assist not only the producer, but also – and perhaps more importantly – the 
policy making process such that national or regional policies can be designed and implemented in such 
 way that some indicator of welfare can be in a
strategies do not include both economic and policy considerations. In our opinion both are necessary: 
the economic component to provide the formal structure, and the policy component to address the 
aggregate costs and benefits of various alternatives. The importance of the policy component is put 
succinctly by Perrings (2000): 
“Historically, many evaluations of control options have calculated the ex post benefit-cost ratios for either 
successful invaders or effective controls. This is tantamount to calculating the ex post value of a winning lottery 
ticket. It tells nothing about the efficiency of the original decision to buy the ticket. It cannot guide ex-ante 
decisions about when to control and when not to control. Nor can it guide the choice between control options.” 
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According to Doyle (1997) weed models have traditionally concentrated on three questions: 
i)  level of infestation above which control measures are justified (threshold model) 
ii)  relationship of the level of weed infestation and crop losses (yield-loss model) 
iii)  level of control required to contain the infestation or to eradicate the weed 
 
The third category of models can draw widely from epidemiology where much work has been done on 
this. Decision and yield-loss models on the other hand constitute an integral part of a bioeconomic 
model. As Shtienberg (2000) puts it: 
“A management action is justified only if the disease is observed in the field at an intensity higher than the action 
threshold level, and if the yield loss model suggests that the benefits gained from applying the management action 
, the farm level production 
nction should allow aggregati on 
included within each componen
 
s indicated, IAS may impose various costs on the society. This alone does not mean that the society 
should do some and public good 
aspects) involved that dictate that the market does not take care of the problem. In addition, when 
arbier and Shogren (2004) explore the linkage between growth of an economy and the endogenous 
risk of biological invasions. They conclude that, on basis of their results, it is unlikely that a 
 economy produces the socially optimal level of self-protection by households against IAS. 
ptimal self-protection can happen only if there exists a policy that corrects all consumer and producer 
 in production and non-
val in consumption. It is non-excludable because once protection against an invading species is 
provided, any o y or state) cannot be excluded from enjoying the 
benefits. If th pest is prevented from invading, nobody can be prevented from enjoying the protection 
 
e amount of protection enjoyed by others. Because of these two properties it is difficult to charge a 
price from consumers of the protection service, and hence public  e typically provided by 
e free market. 
rough the weakest control point. Stretching this 
rgument over a wide scale, we could soon conclude that globally, if one country provides zero 
protection, th
and hence Bu ett (2005) has described IAS protection as a weaker link public good. In this case the 
investment of those who invest more on protection is negatively affected by those who invest less, but 
those who invest more are still better protected against IAS than those who invest less (Burnett 2005). 
would exceed the cost.”  
 
The differences between the models discussed above are not clear-cut and the division may in many 
cases be rather artificial. Nonetheless, an ideal model for the purposes of studies such as the present 
one requires four components: i) pest dynamics; ii) ecophysiology of crop production; iii) production 
function; and iv) social aggregation. The first two combined produce a yield-loss model, which can be 
ncorporated to the production function as a damage function. Finally i
fu on to a social level to allow policy analysis. The level of complicati
t may vary, but all the components in some form are essential. 
 
3.2 Managing invasive alien species 
 
A
thing about the issue. However, it is the market failures (externalities 
considering the costs we also need to bear in mind the positive effects of some IAS. It is thus 
appropriate to aim for, in the words of Perrings (2000), a regime which “allows the social benefits of 





impacts of an invasion. Thus, because of externalities and public good properties there is a role for the 
society in invasive alien species policy. 
 
IAS control is a public good of the ‘weakest link’ type (Perrings et al. 2002), or rather of the ‘weaker 
link’ type (Burnett 2005). It is a public good because it is both non-excludable
ri
ne member (person, producer, compan
e 
service. Further, it is non-rival because any one member’s consumption of protection does not reduce
th
goods ar  under-
th
 
Moreover, protection against IAS is of the ‘weakest link’ type because its effectiveness depends on the 
weakest link in the protection chain. It does not matter how well other parts of the chain provide 
protection if the species gets into the country th
a
en the level of protection is zero for the whole world. This obviously can be questioned, 
rn  55(162)
More technically, for the weakest link public goods the lowest contribution determines the overall 
quantity of the public good produced, whereas for the weaker link the lowest contribution has the 
largest marginal effect on utility, followed by the second lowest contribution and so forth (Arce M. and 
andler 2001). Nonetheless, the public good property partly explains the need for the involvement of 
the state in protection. How critical a factor the weaker link property is depends on the characteristics 
f the species and the regions. Burnett (2005) argues that the characteristics that favour using the 
een two places; ii) heavy movement of goods and 
eople between the places; and iii) the probability of invasion to one place increases as the species 
becomes present in the other place. 
 
 the management challenge in the case of IAS that are harmful to 
resent in the 
T hectares. An invasive alien pest is 
troduced to a subset of this area, with a total of At contaminated hectares (0 ≤ At ≤ ATOT). Assume 
pest control costs are the only type of production cost that there exists. Any impacts on world price are 
ssumed away. The per hectare producer profit in the non-invaded area is 
S
o
weaker link approach include: i) shared borders betw
p
This section formalises what exactly is
production. The simple analytical presentation below demonstrates the externality p
invasion event.




NOINV NOINV pq = π      (5) 
 
The per hectare profit in the non-invaded area πNOINV is simply the (constant) price of the agricultural 
product p times the per hectare quantity produced in non-invaded area q . In the invaded area the 




z p z pq z INV INV − = ) ( π      ( 6 )   
 
The per hectare profit in the invaded area πINV is equal to the (constant) price of the agricultural 
product p times the quantity produced per hectare in the invaded area qINV, which is now dependent on 
the magnitude of pest control z. From this the costs of control (per unit cost of control pz times the 
magnitude of control per hectare) is subtracted. The producer objective is to 
 
[] NOINV NOINV z INV INV INV pq h z p z pq h
z
+ − = ) ( maxπ    (7) 
 
Each producer maximises the per hectare profits in their production area, multiplied by their total 
production hectares depending on whether they have been invaded (hINV) or not (hNOINV). The invasion 
is assumed exogenous, in other words the private producers cannot a priori prevent the pest from 
invading their fields. More precisely hINV =hINV (ξ), where ξ represents the exogenous magnitude of the 
invasion. The private optimum can be acquired from the first order condition  
 
0 = ⎟
⎠ ⎝ ∂ ∂ z z
 
The society’s objective is to maximise total welfare Π (assumed equal to producer profit for simplicity) 
 
() NOINV t TOT z INV t z









p      (8)  =
∂ INV h
π
− + − = Π    (9) 
 
ow, the overall magnitude of the invasion At depends on two factors: the original (stochastic and 
ξ and the amount of control z (which thus measures the intensity of 
N
exogenous) size of the invasion 
control) undertaken by the representative producer 
 
                                                           
24 For a more thorough way to formalise the issue, see Burnett (2005). For more discussion on weaker-link public goods, see 
Arce M. and Sandler (2001).   56(162)
At = At (ξ, z)      ( 1 0 )  
 
Note the difference here to the private case. The overall invasion area depends also on intensity of pest 
control by private producers, whereas in the private case the producers merely control the pest to the 
stage that is optimal for them. Hence (10) becomes 
 
() NOINV t TOT z INV t z
pq z A A z p z pq z A )) , ( ( ) ( ) , ( max ξ ξ − + − = Π   (11) 
 
The first order condition for the social optimum is  
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The first term in expression (13) represent the impact of z in reducing the losses (control costs and 
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oth terms in expression (13) are non-negative provided that two conditions hold. First, the impact of 
 on other producers in terms of crop 
sses (which is what this second term measures), and hence there is no divergence between the social 








t, the area invaded. The second term denotes the 
impact of z in reducing the private losses of producers in the invaded area At, excluding the area of the 
producer in question (hINV), which was already accounted for in expression (8). Hence, the first term 
denotes the positive impact of control in reducing the spread of the pest, and the second term denotes 
the positive impact of z in reducing the losses of all other producers. 
 
B
control on price times reduced production losses must be no less than the cost of control (p∂qINV/∂z ≥ 
pz). This makes sense: the private producer would not apply control if the per unit benefits of control in 
terms of reduced damages were not greater than the per unit cost of control. Second, the invaded area 
has to be greater than the invaded area in the single producer’s premises (At ≥ hINV). This also makes 
sense: if only one producer is affected, then there are no impacts
lo
and private optima in this respect. Note that even if this is the case, there may be divergence in the 
overall optima, since the impact of the first term of (13) may outweigh the second term. 
 
Since condition (13) is the difference between social and private optima, it needs to be added to the 
private condition to make it match the social condition. As it is non-negative, it implies that the level of 
protection in the private optimum is too low – too little protection is provided by the private actor. 
This is because they do not take into account the positive effect that protection (z) has on the spread of 
the pest (i.e. its impact on At). When making the control decision, the private producer only looks at 
his/her objective function, where At does not feature. Thus, the decision to use control is made with 
no regard to its beneficial impact on At. This in essence is the externality associated with invasive alien 
species and their control. 
 
We have now discussed in basic terms what the IAS management problem deals with. There is an 
externality because private agents only consider the benefit of protection to themselves and not on 
others, and through their sub-optimal protection other agents suffer for the pest more than is socially 
optimal. There is also a public good aspect in protection, as nobody can be excluded from enjoying the   57(162)
3.3 Invasion models 
 
In this section we briefly discuss some issues that are specific to IAS and not to native pests or weeds. 
Ecological invasion models in general are discussed in Williamson (1989). He highlights four uses of 
ecological models: i) predict the success of potential invaders; ii) explain what has been observed; iii) 
dicate the possible behaviour of ecological systems subject to invasions; and iv) highlight gaps in the 
e characteristics of the receiving system. Finally, the third category 
volves various control actions available once the species has already invaded. The review below is by 
ptimal screening procedures and different invasion pathways are the focus of many economic studies. 
portation related pathways (e.g. shipping, 
ilitary, mail), living industry pathways (e.g. plants, animals, food, pets) and miscellaneous pathways 
discussed briefly in Section 3.1.3). The question then is how to 
stablish efficient border protection measures. 
r, specific, pathways. The same issue is studied by Janssens and 
esterman (2005) in the case of Dutch agriculture. They study two options for reducing phytosanitary 




In terms of economics and policy, IAS can be considered for instance using the frameworks of 
multiattribute decision analysis (Maguire 2004), risk assessment (Andersen et al. 2004a,b; Landis 2003; 
Renn 2005) or cost-benefit analysis (Mumford et al. 2000). We discuss the existing literature under 
three headings, namely i) prediction and screening of invasions; ii) factors affecting vulnerability of the 
ecological-economic system; and iii) optimal control under various circumstances. The first category 
deals essentially with the characteristics of species and pathways that they may use in invasion. The 
second category deals with th
in
no means complete, but provides some indication of the topics that are involved in IAS economics.
25
 
3.3.1  Prediction and screening 
 
In terms of prediction and screening, some basic ecological factors were already discussed in Chapter 2. 
Here we discuss two further economic issues, related to the optimal screening procedures and control 
of intentional introductions.  
 
O
Invasion pathways can be divided in broad terms into trans
m
(Campbell and Kriesch 2003). Inspection services are under pressure from the constantly increasing 
import quantities as well as in many cases from the government to reduce phytosanitary inspections in 
face of a limited budget. Further complications arise from the diverse range of imported goods and 
their origins. For countries in which agricultural trade is important, it is nonetheless vital to maintain an 
appropriate level of protection (as 
e
 
Moffitt et al. (2005) discuss the issue in analytical terms in the face of severe uncertainty and resource 
constraints. The basic idea is that a border inspector receives a shipment with a given number of crates, 
and having no resources to inspect all the crates has to decide how many crates to inspect. The 
probability that a crate is infested is unknown. They use a hybrid info-gap model with stochastic 
dominance to come up with a cost effective protection protocol. 
 
Surkov et al. (2005) study the issue from an applied perspective. Their main research question is “how 
available resources can be allocated for inspection of imported ornamental plant commodities such that 
the phytosanitary risks associated with these commodities are minimised”. Their results suggest that in 
the face of resource limitations, it would be economically sensible to switch resources from inspecting 
more pathways to inspecting fewe
W
inspections, namely i) transferring the responsibility to private sector; and ii) reducing the number of 
inspections by relating the inspection intensity to risk analyses for different invasion pathways. They 
point out that challenges are presented by the conflicting private and public interests and the current 
lack of freedom in implementing new regulatory concepts within international regulations of the 
European Union and the International Plant Protection Organisation.  
    
25 There is an increasing body of literature developing on IAS economics. A couple of years ago it would have been possible 
to review almost all the articles concentrating strictly on IAS and economics. Today this is not possible. Thus, we shall here 
discuss some articles under the three heading mentioned that introduce the various topics in question.   58(162)
 
An altogether different question is whether we would be better off ignoring the prediction rules totally. 
Smith et al. (1999) use decision theory to derive the optimal screening procedure, i.e. when to ignore 
the advice of the screening process. Their point is, briefly, the following. If for instance rain can be 
predicted at 90% accuracy (which at first feels fairly impressive), but normally rain occurs only on 1% 
of all days, the times that the system erroneously predicts dry days as rainy (10% of 99%, i.e. 9.9%) is 
much greater than the rate at which it correctly predicts rainy days as rainy (90% of 1%, i.e. 0.9%). 
hus, provided that the outcome of predicting a rainy day erroneously as a dry day is not catastrophic, 
.3.2  Vulnerability of the ecological-economic system 
economic activities determine the rate of species invasions, and if so, which particular 
ctivities are most important. They argue that, despite the rather weak dataset available, disturbances 
 important attempt to look at the connection between key economic 
aria les and biological invasions.  
n a similar fashion, Vilà and Pujadas (2001) use a regression analysis to study the relationship between 
T
we would be better off ignoring the predictions altogether. This property materialises when the so-
called base-rate of an event (1% in the example above) is low (Smith et al. 1999).  
 
This is often the case with invasions: Smith et al. (1999) calculate base-rates of 0.007% – 17% for 
invasive weeds in Australia. They show that if, for instance, the pest risk assessment system has an 
accuracy of 85%, its recommendation would be better-off ignored unless the damage caused by the 
species is at least eight times the damage caused by not introducing a potentially useful harmless 
species. The policy implication is that under certain circumstances the society would be better off 
concentrating on controlling and eradicating casual and naturalised species rather than trying to predict 
the pest status at the import stage. Having said that, for instance in aquatic invasions where 
establishment may be irreversible, acceptability of intentional introductions in the first place should be 
questioned (Smith et al. 1999). 
 
Intentional introductions of IAS are also discussed by Thomas and Randall (2000), who apply a 
principal-agent model to study the issue. The principal is a risk-neutral public agency and the agent is 
the individual or agency that introduces the species. They point out that in a perfect world the damages 
could be avoided through either perfect ex-ante information that would result in only beneficial 
introductions or through perfect revocability that would make it possible to cancel ex-post any harmful 
introduction. Their approach deals with a mixture of imperfect ex-ante information and imperfect 
revocability, and they suggest that current procedures should be improved to focus more on 




Whereas the previous section discussed studies that concentrate mainly on the characteristics of the 
invasion pathways, this section reviews studies that discuss the economic factors that affect the 
vulnerability of the receiving system to invasions (ecological factors were already discussed in Chapter 
2). These factors include economic activity, diversity of the productive resource base and protective 
actions through for instance tariffs. 
 
The level and type of economic activity is an important factor affecting the vulnerability of the 
receiving system. Levine and D’Antonio (2003) show how trade accumulates new species in the United 
States in a similar fashion to standard species-accumulation curves used in ecological sampling. 
Dalmazzone (2000) and Baiocchi and Dalmazzone (2000) examine whether available data supports the 
hypothesis that 
a
associated with economic activities (including land tenure, level of GDP and population density) seem 
to be important in determining the vulnerability of the system to invasions. On the other hand, 
variables related to trade are not found to be statistically significant. They acknowledge that the 
conclusions derived from their analysis need to be verified using a stronger dataset. However, even with 




land-use and socio-economic parameters and density of alien plants in Europe and North Africa. They 
find a statistically significant relationship between import value and alien plant density, as well as 
between Human Development Index and alien plant density, which together explained about 60% of   59(162)
the variation in alien plant density. However, as the authors caution, relationship does not necessarily 
imply causality.  
 
On the other hand, Costello and McAusland (2003) show that freer trade can in fact reduce the damage 
n addition to trade, diversity of the productive base is important in determining the vulnerability to 
 too little diversity. They 
dicate possible options for policy intervention to correct the market failure. Their suggestions include 
ys optimal to employ tariffs, but there are plausible 
ircumstances in which inspections should be optimally set to zero. This occurs when most incoming 
oods are infected, and it is better to let them in without any inspections and instead charge a high 
tariff equal to the expected damages. Finally, if future impacts of IAS are accounted for, more stringent 
spections are optimal, although the rate of tariffs may move in either direction (McAusland and 
optimal level. This gap represents the level of disguised protectionism. However, the authors point out 
that in reality the information requirements to differentiate legitimate public good protection from 
disguised protection are vast. 
 
from unintentional biological invasions. This is because although freer trade results in increases in the 
quantity traded, and hence the probability of introductions, it also changes the production mix of 
goods. If, for instance, as a result of freer trade less agricultural products are produced, then the 
damages from an invasion by an agricultural pest will be on aggregate smaller than under restricted 
trade. On the other hand, also the opposite is true. If a country specialises in agricultural production, 
the potential costs of an invasion increase. The authors also acknowledge that crop damage may be a 
poor proxy to total damage caused by IAS. Furthermore, their arguments are not sustainable at a larger 
scale, where production can no longer move to new pest-free areas. 
 
I
invasions (remember the discussion of resistance and resilience in Chapter 2). Laxminarayan and 
Weitzman (2002) discuss multiple drug use in medication. Diversification of the drug base helps to 
counter the endogenous risk of development of resistance to any single drug. In a similar fashion, 
Weitzman (2000) shows how the decision to plant more of a widely grown crop increases the 
endogenous risk of new pathogens evolving to attack that crop globally. In other words, there is a long-
run trade-off between increasing profitability due to concentration on high-yield crop varieties and 
increased risks of endogenous evolution of new pathogens from doing so. Using a game-theoretic 
framework, Heal et al. (2004) discuss why we may systematically choose
in
a homogeneity tax (or a diversity subsidy) and redefinition of property rights by, for instance, issuing 
tradable permits for the use of the crops that are most popular in the region. 
 
Finally, the vulnerability of the receiving system can be managed through for instance prohibitions and 
tariffs. Knowler and Barbier (2005) show that preventing trade in exotic species with beneficial impacts 
is not economically sensible. They study horticultural trade and develop a model dealing with a private 
plant breeding industry that imports an exotic plant species into the area. They discuss the use of 
market instruments, including a Pigovian tax, to regulate the industry and protect the society from the 
associated risks. The results from their empirical assessment of the saltcedar (Tamarisk spp.) in the 
United States indicate that to achieve the social optimum, the mere presence of risk associated with 
imports does not warrant prevention of commercial sales of exotic plant species with beneficial effects 
for consumers.  
 
The use of tariffs to control invasions has been discussed by various authors. Paarlberg and Lee (1998) 
discuss the link between import tariffs and the level of health risk from imports with special reference 
to the foot and mouth disease. They show that the level of tariffs is very sensitive to the risk of 
importing a contaminated product, as well as the expected magnitude of the spread of the disease. 
McAusland and Costello (2004) show that the optimal level of the tariff increases in the infection rate 
of the traded goods, but at high levels of infection the optimal level of inspections decreases with the 






The regulator may also choose too high a tariff. Using a political economy model, Margolis et al. (2005) 
show that private actions result in the regulator choosing a tariff level that is larger than the socially   60(162)
3.3.3  Optimal control 
 
Having discussed the properties of origins, pathways and recipients of invasions, the final literature 
 
 control or reduce the damages from the few harmful invasions. He concludes that protection is 
ut that if such a barrier crop exists, pest damage 
an be significantly reduced. The benefits of using the barrier crop depend on, for instance, the value of 
lative to the marginal damages. This way a rapid growth in costs in the future can be 
voided. For large invasions that necessarily have marginal growth rates of less than one, interaction of 
oran et al. (2002) focus on pre-
vasion controls and argue that due to small probabilities involved, irreversibility of the outcomes and 
category to be discussed includes studies that examine what to do once an IAS is in the country. 
Optimal control of invasions has been widely modelled. Extensions of this approach include optimal 
control with stochastic effects and under ignorance. This category was already discussed to an extent in 
Section 3.1.1, but in that discussion there was no explicit differentiation between native and invasive 
species. Therefore, in this section we discuss some studies that deal with IAS. 
 
Perrings (2000) establishes the conditions under which allowing establishment and spread of IAS is 
optimal. He emphasises that the invasion dynamics are not the only important issue determining 
optimal control, since also the relative costs and benefits of native and non-native species are 
important. Jensen (2002) analyses a dynamic model of protection against an invasion, and once invasion 
has occurred, its control or damage reduction. The society should, he argues, explicitly account for the 
trade-off between present expenditures to protect ourselves from the invasion, and future expenditures
to
optimal if and only if the cost of the invasion is large enough. He further argues that this conclusion 
holds regardless of whether that cost is known for certain or only in distribution (Jensen 2002).  
 
An empirical application is provided by Brown et al. (2002), who analyse optimal pest control given 
spatial nature of the problem, using a case study of Pierce’s disease on grapevines. The disease is caused 
by bacterium Xylella fastidiosa, which is transmitted by leafhoppers. In their system there is a barrier crop 
that prevents the pest from spreading, and they point o
c
the protected grapevine output and barrier effectiveness. The authors also point out that if the lands are 
divided among different owners, coordination is important and any barrier crop related actions are 
likely to have spillover impacts on neighbouring owners (Brown et al. 2002). 
 
Olson and Roy (2002) extend the analysis to include stochastic effects. They analyse the circumstances 
under which eradication of an IAS is or is not optimal, given that the natural growth and spread of the 
invader are subject to stochastic changes. They show that if the discounted expected invasion growth 
rate is greater than one, it is optimal to eradicate small invasions even if the marginal costs of control 
are large re
a
the different variables determines whether eradication is optimal or not. Eiswerth and van Kooten 
(2002) augment stochastic analysis by an expert survey to analyse optimal management strategies under 
uncertainty. They show that in the case of yellow starthistle (Centaurea solstitialis) spread-control 
strategies are optimal, whereas eradication is not. Their main point is that decision-making under 
uncertainty can be analysed even when hard data are missing, if the framework is complemented with 
verbal descriptors by experts of the growth and damages caused by the species. 
 
Optimal control under ignorance has also been studied theoretically. H
in
the novelty of the events leading to incomplete information, decision models based on expected utility 
theory have limited value. They discuss optimal pre-invasion control using both ignorance and risk-
management models. One outcome of the comparison of these two frameworks is that in ignorance 
framework the extreme low-probability outcomes are weighted more heavily than in the expected-utility 
framework, implying a precautionary approach. 
 
 
3.4 Studies on pre-emptive vs. reactive control   
 
The previous sections have already hinted at the problem of whether invasions should be prevented in 
the first place, or whether eradication or control after the invasion is optimal. This issue of pre-emptive   61(162)
control (prevention, mitigation, avoidance
26) versus reactive control (treatment, adaptation, 
ed results. Butler and Maher (1986) also bring up the issue of distribution of costs and 
oint out that if compensation is paid to the victims of the externality, it should not be based on 
nstraint or minimising expenditure subject to a 
iven damage level. The authors discuss these objectives and show that they are constrained versions of 
 how they 
function timal 
magnitude of treatment under Pareto optimality  age 
 what happens to the 
ed States. As mentioned earlier, the species damages 
 
covery, they argue, prevention and control are complementary when the population size is 
small, but become substitutes as the population size increases. This seems consistent with the findings 
of Olson and Roy (2002) discussed earlier. The optimality condition requires that the marginal costs of 
                                                          
amelioration) has been discussed in various papers and contexts. Olson and Zeckhauser (1970) brought 
up the issue already 35 years ago: “The cost of moving away from or otherwise adjusting to the 
diseconomies may be less than the cost of preventing or limiting the diseconomy at its source”.  
 
In a relatively early paper, Butler and Maher (1986) undertake a theoretical analysis of the issue. 
Somewhat confusingly, they call pre-emptive actions “abatement” and reactive actions “damage 
prevention”. The logic is that in their analysis it is the industry that undertakes abatement and an 
individual (the victim of the pollution) that undertakes reactive control, and in that way this action 
actually is damage prevention for the individual. The authors argue that by not taking the actions by the 
victims of an externality into account, the society may end up devoting too many resources to pre-
emptive control. This is analogous to findings of Margolis et al. (2005) who show that unaccounted 
private actions result in the regulator choosing a tariff level that is larger than is socially optimal. 
Further, Shogren (2000) argues that once we acknowledge that people do adapt, assuming otherwise 
may lead to bias
p
uncorrected marginal damages, as this would induce the victims to undertake too little reactive control. 
 
Barrett and Segerson (1997) discuss the issue in relation to activities that result in environmental 
externalities, which could be reduced either through prevention prior to their occurrence or treatment 
after the occurrence. They discuss both the case where the effectiveness of treatment is known and 
where it is uncertain. In addition to Pareto efficiency, there are other objectives that policies may seek, 
including minimising damages subject to a budget co
g
Pareto efficiency and result in second-best outcomes. 
 
Barrett and Segerson (1997) show that given these other objectives, some factors affecting the relative 
desirability of prevention versus treatment may affect the decision in ways that differ from
 under Pareto efficiency. For instance, if the probability of contamination increases, op
is unaffected, whereas under the maximum dam
ptimal treatment magnitude unambiguously increases regardless of constraint o
level of prevention. In a similar fashion, an increase in the uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
treatment does not change the optimal levels of either strategy under Pareto optimality, whereas under 
a budget constraint it may lead to an increase in the level of prevention and a decrease in the level of 
treatment. 
 
Leung et al. (2002) use stochastic dynamic programming to study how to devote resources between 
prevention and control efforts given uncertain invasion events. They apply their general model to the 
case of Zebra mussel (Dreissena polymorpha) – an aquatic species that spread from Europe in ship ballast 
nd has subsequently spread rapidly within the Unit a
power plants by blocking their water intake pipes. The authors show that the society could be made 
better off by spending up to US$ 324,000 annually to prevent the invasion of a single hypothetical lake 
with a power plant. This figure can be compared to US$ 825,000 that the US Fish and Wildlife Service 
spent on all aquatic invades in all US lakes in 2001 (Leung et al. 2002). 
 
Kim et al. (2005) also model the optimal allocation of resources between prevention and control with 
uncertainty in the arrival and discovery time of the invasive species. Their aim is to find how resources 
should be devoted between actions before and after the discovery of the organism. Their analytical 
indings suggest that it is efficient to invest on prevention before – rather than after – the discovery. f
After the dis
 
26 Note, Barrett and Segerson (1997) use the term mitigation to mean reactive control, whereas for instance Perrings et al. 
(2002) and most others use it to mean pre-emptive policies. Where confusion may arise, we have replaced the terms used by 
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SThe main point here is to present existing studies that are in principle similar to the current study and 
discuss economic issues related to policy alternatives that are similar to the policy alternatives analysed 
in this study. The policy setting in two of these studies (Colorado potato beetle and tomato spotted wilt 
tospovirus) is exactly the same as in the present study, whereas in the other studies the analogy of pre-
emptive versus reactive control is similar, although the exact policy environment and the institutions 
ng); iii) catalogue the impacts and 
involved may be slightly different. 
 
The studies are reviewed bearing in mind the basic steps of cost-benefit analysis: i) specify the set of 
alternative projects; ii) decide whose benefits and costs count (standi
select measurement indicators (units); iv) predict the impacts quantitatively over the life of the project 
or policy; v) monetise all impacts; vi) discount benefits and costs to obtain present values; vii) compute 
the net present value (NPV) of each alternative; viii) perform sensitivity analysis; and ix) make a 
recommendation based on the NPV and sensitivity analysis (Boardman et al. 2001). 
 
Specify the set of alternative projects: In many of the above cases, it is the current policy of pre-
emptive control (including eradication) that is assessed against the alternative of allowing the species to 
invade the country. There are hence usually only two (mutually exclusive) policy alternatives. The 
benefits of the current policy can primarily be considered in terms of costs avoided. The study on the 
screwworm fly is a notable exception, as it considers a wide range of alternative protection strategies. 
 
Decide whose benefits and costs count: Whose costs and benefits are included in the study is generally 
poorly indicated, and it is not in any of the above cases done explicitly. Of course, when one reads the 
studies thoroughly it is possible to find out which parties are included. However, for instance the role 
of taxpayers and consumers is often poorly presented. Furthermore, the gainers and losers are often 
not identified separately. Instead, only the aggregate costs and benefits are reported, without an 
indication as to how those costs and benefits are distributed in the society. 
 
Catalogue the impacts and select measurement indicators: It is not always straightforward to see which 
 easiest to monetise and hence analyse quantitatively. 
costs are included in the analyses. This is primarily due to the studies not having a formal structure 
presented in analytical terms. On the other hand the analytical papers often are not or cannot be 
applied to real-life cases. Hence, in our opinion, a neat combination of analytical and empirical 
assessment is required, resulting in applicable analytics or formalised empirics, depending on one’s 
point of view. As discussed in Section 3.1, impacts of IAS can be roughly divided into i) control costs; 
ii) production losses; iii) secondary market effects; and iv) health, environmental and cultural effects. It 
is often the first and second categories that are included in cost-benefit analyses. The simple reason for 
this is that they are the ones
 
Predict the impacts quantitatively over the life of the project or policy: Prediction of impacts involves 
estimation of uncertain future events. These can be simulated, giving the variable values a mean and a 
distribution and checking what happens. They may also be estimated using best-guess estimates by 
experts. The above studies primarily seem to use educated guesses for different values, some relying on 
literature, some on pre-existing models and some on expert opinions. Uncertainty can be included in 
the analysis at this stage to some extent, by assigning different probabilities to different events. 
 
Monetise all impacts and compute the net present value: Monetisation of different impacts is usually 
not too difficult, because the impacts are often already chosen such that they are easy to monetise. This is 
in general the case with the studies above, although in the cases of the leafy spurge and the melon 
thrips certain secondary impacts are included. The inclusion of export losses in the assessment of the 
melon thrips affects the results dramatically, yet such effects are not considered at all in the fairly 
similar cases of the Colorado potato beetle and the tobacco whitefly. The same applies to assessment of 
secondary impacts in the case of the leafy spurge. It is thus noteworthy how remarkably the results are 
affected by inclusion of impacts that are often left unconsidered. 
 
Hence, it is important to try and include as many impacts as possible in the analysis. Instead of ignoring 
the hard-to-monetise impacts, they should be included as possible impacts and discussed at least 
qualitatively if monetisation proves too difficult or controversial. Ignoring such costs altogether is   65(162)
seldom good for the reliability of the results retr
evelopment of prices in the future, which m
ieved. Additional difficulties include for instance the 
ay be difficult to predict and to take into account. 
lace is difficult if those prices do not exist or if they 
flation levels may be difficult to predict, especially in developing countries. 
d
Sometimes also getting the prices right in the first p
re distorted. Also future in a
 
In addition to the net present value figures, four of the studies report also benefit-cost ratios for the 
policy alternatives. We see these ratios as a good way to report the results, due to them being fairly 
easily computed and additional information being conveyed in them. 
 
Discount benefits and costs to obtain present values: The study on the tobacco whitefly includes a 
static analysis, in which no discounting is needed. Whether a static analysis is appropriate depends once 
again on the particular circumstances. In a temporal assessment, discounting is generally warranted. In 
one study above it is not reported whether discounting is applied and at what rate, and in one study it is 
ertainly not applied. As for which discount rate to use, the issue of value uncertainty arises. Three of  c
the studies apply a rate of 6%, the rate earlier recommended by the British Treasury for public projects, 
and one applies the rate of 3.5%, the current recommendation.  
 
Perform sensitivity analysis: We are dealing with inherently uncertain matters, yet in many occasions 
nothing is done to include that uncertainty in the analysis. Even basic sensitivity analysis where the 
input values are varied by a given percentage in either direction would be a good start, and would give 
some indication as to how stable the results are. The screwworm fly, the western corn rootworm and to 
ome extent the melon thrips studies are the only ones in which satis s
c
factory sensitivity analysis is 
arried out. Further, even if we are fairly confident that on average our input variables are reliable, 
reporting only the expected output values may be dangerous. The notorious example is the building of 
a bridge such that it can only support the weight of average traffic flow. Consideration of distribution 
of input and output variables (and especially the extreme values) is important, and should always be 
reported, even if only briefly in words. 
 
Make a recommendation based on the NPV and sensitivity analysis: Science carries a responsibility. If 
we are making a study regarding the economic viability of a project or policy, we should give, to the 
best of our knowledge, a policy recommendation. It can naturally be conditional on for instance 
probabilities, as in the screwworm fly study. It is not us researchers who make the decision, but it is us 
who should interpret what our analysis tells us in terms of policy guidance. On the other hand, if no 
sensitivity analysis of any kind is conducted, the reluctance to make clear policy recommendations is 
somewhat understandable. 
 
Bearing these points on mind, it is now finally the time to start considering the case presented in this 
study. The presentation starts by first considering the conceptual framework and the analytical model 
(Chapter 4) followed by the empirical analysis (Chapter 5).   66(162)
4. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL 
 
4.1 Model preliminaries   
 
The aim in this study is to construct a theory-based simulation model capable of comparing alternative 
control strategies ex-ante. The main purpose is to evaluate the viability of two specific policy options 
when facing uncertainty together with local and global change. The interest is in seeking simple models 
that first describe production at the farm level with and without the pest. These can then be aggregated 
over a larger area and different policy options added to the model. The policy options impact 
differently on production and imply different costs and benefits and different parties (consumers, 
roducers, etc.) to whom the cost and benefits accrue. The model presented is purposefully simple in  p
order to facilitate a straightforward direct application later in the study. Yet, as we shall see, even such 
simple models can generate fairly robust suggestions regarding the optimal control policy. 
 
The policy response to the invasion is assessed using a basic ex-ante cost-benefit framework. The 
framework compares the expected costs of pre-emptive control with the expected costs that could 
ensue if a particular invasive alien species was allowed into the country (reactive control). As discussed 
arlier, these costs may include some or all  e of the following: i) control costs; ii) production losses; iii) 
econdary market effects; and iv) health, environmental and cultural effects. For reasons explained later 
ical section explicitly and in this theoretical section implicitly that only 
ised actors. The agent decreases production, but can be controlled by some costly 
 control success of 0-100%. The agent could thus be, for instance, a pest that is controlled 
with pesticides or a weather phenomenon s co h res. 
The discussion below deals with an agricultural producer, but with appropriate adaptations it could be 
dapted to for instance silvi-, horti- or aquacultural production. 
 
A pollution model approach by Barrett and Segerson (1997) can be adapted to the case of plant health 
sts and considers possible benefits as negative 
osts. The model is dynamic regarding the state variables, but the opportunities for decision-making are 
he future in light of uncertainty. 
herefore, the temporality must be taken into account in the modelling exercise. The variables used in 
n our model the physical [P] characteristics are updated at every period, whereas information [I] and 
categorised by Kann and Weyant (1999). In our case, instead of evaluating all (infinite) states of the 
world, we try to evaluate a large number of states for the two discrete policy alternatives. The reliability 
of the model is assessed through sensitivity analysis of key variables and their impact on results, 
s
in detail, we assume in the empir
osts in the first two categories (control and production costs) take place.  c
 
The idea of the model is that an agent harmful to production threatens to invade some proportion of 
the production area, and affect the society through its impacts on producers and consumers. It can be 
prevented from establishing or invading by some costly means, but it is also possible to leave its control 
ntirely for decentral e
means with a
uch as a flood that is  ntrolled wit  physical structu
a
and invasive pests. Their model is adaptable to the present case when it is supplemented by a 
production function with an incorporated damage function. Furthermore, as the invasion primarily 
imposes costs on the society, the model deals with co
c
restricted, i.e. only at the beginning of the analysed period a decision is made as to how to control the 
invasion. That decision is then maintained. Dynamic impacts are included through pest spread and 
several climatic and ecological trends, but not through temporal switches in the control strategy.  
 
In other words, our policy problem has a temporal nature as it includes interactions between actions 
taken today and the impacts of those actions experienced in t
T
such models can be divided as follows (Kann and Weyant 1999): 
1.  Set of physical state variables (economic and climatic indicators) [P] 
2.  Set of control variables (describing the policies) [C] 
3.  Set of information variables (in models that include learning) [I] 
 
I
control [C] variables are updated only at a limited number of periods – in our case solely in the first 
period. Thus our model can be considered to be a kind of Single-Period Decision Analysis model as   67(162)
sensitivity analysis on which variables affect the outcome most and, finally, a discussion on which 
inputs we know least of. 
 
We analyse the two alternative policy strategies in their pure forms, and their spatial or temporal 
combinations are not allowed. The assumptions of the model are as follows
27: i) reactive control is only 
damage reducing, not production enhancing; ii) strategies have no external costs or benefits; iii) 
revention costs can be fully transferred to consumers; iv) producers are price-taking profit maximisers; 
) international price transfers may be imperfect, i.e. prices are allowed to increase due to damages; vi) 
t ver the price range considered; vii) price changes are fully transferred to 
onsumers; viii) control costs are linear; ix) the society is a risk neutral cost minimiser; and x) the pest is 
costs; ii) minimise expenditure subject to a given level of damages; iii) 
inimise damage subject to available funds; or iv) minimise the difference between periods, i.e. reduce 
variability (Barrett and Segerson 1997). At this point, we find the first criterion of unconstrained cost 
minimisation a reasonable one to use, although it is worth pointing out that even this basic framework 
allows consideration of various objectives.  
ariable costs of the 
rotection system which aims to prevent the pest from establishing. Protection system may also 
p
v
he demand curve is linear o
c
host-specific and causes no external health, cultural, ecological or food safety damage. 
 
The society invests resources in managing IAS. The objective of the society can be, for instance, to i) 




4.2 Pre-emptive control costs 
 
In the case of pre-emptive control the economic cost consists of the fixed and v
p
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he expression to the right of the summation sign estimates the discounted annual costs of pre-
ue to uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the pest invasion and other environmental stochasticity, 
it is appropriat  fixed costs of 
re-emptive control (CF) and the annual variable costs of pre-emptive control (CVt). The fixed costs of 
he 
umber of inspection visits. Hence CVt are affected by the area invaded and eradicated (At), which is 
measured by the production hectares invaded, and by the number of inspection visits (It) needed for 
control and surveillance (∂CVt/∂At > 0, ∂CVt/∂It > 0). Note that we also implicitly assume that the 
resulting crop losses remain so small that they do not imply price effects. 
 
he area eradicated At depends on the probability of the invasion γt (0 ≤ γt ≤ 1) in any one year 
 
T
emptive control. The annual costs are discounted at discount rate r and summed up over the years t = 1 
to T to estimate the total expected present value costs.  
 
D
e to talk about expected total costs (E(TC)). These consist of the annual
p
pre-emptive control are costs that are independent of the invaded area. In other words, whether there is 
no invasion, a small invasion or a large invasion does not affect the fixed costs in any way. 
Furthermore, they are assumed constant over time (no t subscript). 
 
The variable costs of pre-emptive control, on the other hand, depend on the eradicated area and t
n
T
multiplied by the invasion magnitude (i.e. the size of the invasion coming from outside the system) in 
                                                           
27 These assumptions are further discussed in Appendix 3. 
28 On notation: small case t is used to denote that the particular variable can take different values in different points in time. 
If a variable does not have subscript t, it is assumed constant over time.   68(162)
the present year (AINITt). It is also possible that the protection system has failed in the previous year, and 
some proportion of the area invaded in the previous year is still invaded. This is determined by the 
failure probability of the protection system ωt  (0  ≤  ωt  ≤ 1 ), the proportion of the area in which 
rotection failed wt (0 ≤ wt ≤ 1) and the winter survival of the beetle population θt (0 ≤ θt ≤ 1). Hence 
the area in which variable costs of protection ensue also depends on the invaded area that is being 
 
n the case of reactive control, the model considers changes in producer and consumer surpluses. 
p
carried over from the previous year ωt-1 wt-1 θt-1 At-1 due to failure of the protection system.  
 
4.3 Reactive control costs 
 
I
Producer surplus changes result because of price changes, pest control costs and the value of lost 
production. Consumer surplus changes are caused by invasion induced increases in product price. The 




change in aggregate profit as the cost of the policy. The 
nnual change in consumer surplus (∆CS) is evaluated through price impacts. Before looking at these, 
mined. 
tion, a special case with no winter survival 
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The annual change in producer surplus (∆PS) is evaluated through impacts on the producer objective 
function, and by considering the ensuing 
a
it is necessary to consider how the size and spread of the invasion are deter
 
Both pre-emptive and reactive control costs depend on the area invaded. However, in reactive control 
the overall goal of total eradication can no longer be achieved due to public good nature of control, and 
thus the pest is able to spread within the agricultural network. Two different spread scenarios are 
analysed, differing on the functional form of spread. In addi
(a
Scenario 1: non-linear spread, restricted by the total production area;  
Scenario 2: linear spread, restricted by the total production area; 
Special  winte  s  case: no r urvival, restricted by the size of the invasions. 
 
The spread of the pest in Scenario 1 (non-linear spread) is based on a typical biological growth 
function. The population size at time t+1 (Nt+1) depends on the population size at time t (Nt), the 
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In the simulation the area invaded At (measured in hectares) is used as an approximation of the 
population size Nt. Hence in the analysis it is the area invaded, not the pest population, which grows. In 
addition to spread of the existing population, new random invasions are allowed just like in the case of 
pre-emptive control. The difference equation for the development of the invaded area in Scenario 1 is 
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As in the case of pre-emptive control, the area invaded   depends on the probability of the invasion γt 
(0 ≤ γt ≤ 1) multiplied by the invasion magnitude in the present year (AINITt). However, in addition there 
is an initial year spread multiplier sINITt which accounts for the fact that in the case of reactive control 
the pest spreads already in the first year, due to imperfect control measures. In the case of pre-emptive 
control this first year spread is not taken into account, as it is assumed that the coordinated and timely 
control measures can curb any spread. Hence, the area invaded in the initial invasion year is always 




















 accounts for the fact that if the existing invaded area is already large and close 
to the total available production area (ATOT), it is less likely that any new invasions would add to the 
invaded area. Hence the size of the invasion is weighted by the proportion of available unaffected 
production area. 
 
The last term in the equation represents expression (17) when adapted to the current situation. It is the 
new area that becomes invaded due to the spread of the existing population. The spread multiplier st (st 
≥ 1) is the equivalent of the reproductive rate R in expression (17). The size of the current population 
y the total area invaded At multiplied by the level of winter 
urvival θt which together represent the area that is capable of beginning to increase. The spread is 
nt of the carrying capacity K in 
xpression (17). The spread is also limited by the fact that only a given proportion of the population (θt) 
survives the wi  with a spread 
ultiplier of 1.8 and different levels of winter survival (with θt = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0), assuming an 
(Nt in expression 17) is represented b
s
limited by the total available production area (ATOT) which is the equivale
e
nter and is able to spread. Figure 12 below illustrates spread in Scenario 1
m
invasion of 400 hectares every three years. 
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n Scenario 1 with different levels of winter survival.  Figure 12. Spread i
 
Scenario 2 is based on linear spread, with a given area added to the existing invaded area each year (for 
some justification for this form of spread, see Hastings 1996). The difference equation for the 
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and if  0
2
1 = − t A  then  0 1 = − t a  
 
The first term is similar to the first term in the case of Scenario 1, but the second term now comprises 
of linear spread, measured in hectares. Hence the additional area is simply the invaded area in the 
previous year plus the area of linear spread at, both multiplied by the rate of winter survival. Finally, the 
whole expression is subject to the invaded area not becoming larger than the total production area. This 
condition was not required in Scenario 1, because the specification of the spread function (18) already 
acts as a maximum area constraint. In addition, if the invaded area in the previous year is zero, then 
naturally also the magnitude of linear spread will be zero. 
 
The two spread scenarios with the basic starting values used later in the analysis are presented in Figure 
3 in a deterministic manner. In the figure it is assumed that there is an invasion only in the first year 
f 
lustrating the spread functions. 
1
and that the entire population survives the winter (θt = 1.0). The figure is thus only for purposes o
il
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Figure 13. Spread scenarios in reactive control. 
 
Finally, in the special case (SC) of no winter survival, the area invaded is 
 
γ =      (20) 
 
he expression simply comprises of the first term of expressions (18) and (19), excluding the restraint 
Now that the  s clear, let us consider how the changes in 
producer and consumer surplus are estimated. 
INITt t INIT t
SC
t A s A
T
on the invasion magnitude, which is not needed since there is no winter survival.  
 
principle of estimating the invasion area i
 
4.3.1  Change in producer surplus 
 
The producer objective function is of the following form (the time subscript t has been dropped from 
this section for clarity, subscript i denotes the hectare in question): 
 
ax  i i S i c q p − = π      (21)  m
   71(162)
In a standard fashion, the prod y 
produced of the agricultural p i r 
rice pS. From this the per hectare production costs ci are subtracted.  
 ∂
2D / ∂Ni
2 = 0. The shape of the damage function naturally depends on the pest 
ynamics and the interaction between the pest and the produced plant species. Yet, it is not 
er of pest ind iduals eradicated by the producer φi. N0i depends on exogenous factors such as 
mperature, proximity of permanent populations and so forth, but also on various farm attributes, 
er of post-control individuals is thus determined by 
 
ucer aims at maximising profits πi, which consist of per hectare quantit
roduct q multiplied by the invasion state dependent per unit produce
p
 
The production function incorporates a damage function and is of the following form  
 
[] ) ( 1 ) ( i i i i N D x q q − =      (22) 
 
The quantity produced qi depends on per hectare quantity of non-control inputs xi (fertilisers, 
machinery, land). The properties of qi(xi) have no practical relevance for the model as long as they 
remain unaffected by the presence of the pest. This is fairly realistic, so we deal here with an 
unspecified form qi = qi(xi).  
 
The percentage damage caused by the invasive pest (D, with 0 ≤ D ≤ 1) depends on post-control 
amount of pest individuals present on the i
th hectare (Ni). The properties of D(Ni) are assumed to be 
∂D / ∂Ni > 0 and
d
unreasonable to assume that the larger the pest population, the larger the damage done. However, the 
sign of the second derivative is not quite so clear. Here we assume that the damage done is 
proportional to the number of pest individuals, i.e. that the damage increases at a constant rate. In the 
empirical section this is further simplified to a single (stochastic) number indicating the damage caused.  
 
The damage done can be limited by controlling the number of pest individuals. The number of post-
control individuals Ni depends on the number of pest individuals invading the i
th hectare (N0i) and on 
the numb iv
te
including location, farm size, neighbouring areas, etc. However, the producer has basically no short 
term influence over them. The numb
 
i i i N N ϕ − = 0      (23) 
oducer follows 
 
The number of pest individuals removed by the pr
 
  i i z η ϕ =       ( 2 4 )  
 
he number of pest indi T viduals removed φi is the product of a parameter measuring the effectiveness 
of reactive con r of reactive control inputs such as pesticides 
i). The amount of control applied is a producer decision variable. The decision in practice is affected 
production area. 
i
x tity of control inputs (zi) multiplied by their unit price 
z). Note that a
ontrol.
29 The aim of the protection system is to reduce 
trol inputs (η) and the pe  hectare quantity 
(z
by the cost of control, its effectiveness and on the pre-control number of pest individuals in the 
 
As for the cost side, the private cost function consists of the quantity of non-control inputs (x) 
ultiplied by their unit price (p ) plus the quan m
(p ny production subsidies are ignored. 
 
  i z i x i z p x p c + =      (25) 
 
Thus far the producer objective function has only been subjected to one possible policy – that of 
reactive control. Let us now supplement the producer objective function by the other available policy, 
.e. investment by the society on pre-emptive c i
the number of pest individuals present in the region – in the successful case all the way down to zero. 
                                                           
29 Remember that in the empirical analysis we assume that these two policies cannot be taking place at the same time. 
Hence, the implications discussed in the text related to this issue remain an analytical point of interest.   72(162)
Thus N0i is dependent on the level of protection as measured by aggregate funds invested in it C (with 
V F C C C + = ): 
 
     (26) 
 
ompiling all the above information into a single expression, the producer objective is to 
) ( 0 0 C N N i i =
C
 
[] ( ) i z i x i i i S
z x
i z p x p N D x q p
i i
+ − − = ) ( 1 ) ( max
,
π     (27) 
s.t.  i i i z C N N η − = ) ( 0  
 
Let us now take a closer look at the properties of this producer objective function. In what follows 
profit maximisation takes place in the usual fashion, by differentiating the objective function with 
spect to the control variables (x, z) and equating the derivatives to zero for the maximum. Thus for  re i i
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η      (29) 
 
In expression (28) the left-hand side (LHS) represents the marginal benefits of applying one more unit 
of input x, i.e. the marginal value product of input x. It includes two components. The first is the 
potential marginal benefit received by the producer if there are no pests present [D(·) = 0]. The second 
component is the reduction in the potential marginal benefit due to presence of the pest.  
D ∂
 
Consider that D(·) = 0. In this case the second term [ ] ) ( 1 ⋅ − D
 
becomes equal to one and the condition 
is the standard economic criterion. If 0 < D(·) ≤ 1, the marginal value of the pest damage is subtracted 
from the potential marginal benefits. This is because of our earlier assumption that the damage done is 
proportional to the yield per hectare. Now, if the quantity of input x is increased, it is expected that the 
quantity produced per hectare (q) also increases, but as this also increases the amount of damage, the 
arginal damage has to be subtracted. The right-hand side (RHS) represents the marginal co m
te
sts. The 
rm px follows e of one more 
unit of the inpu
 
In expression (29), the RHS again represents the marginal cost of control, which in a competitive 
market for control measures is equal to the unit price of the control method. The LHS is the marginal 
enefit of reactive control. It is equal to the value of the additional quantity produced because of 
decreas
 from the unit price which in a competitive market is equal to the unit pric
t.  
b
ed damage. As before, pSqi determines the potential value of the quantity that would be 
produced in absence of the pest, and ∂D/∂Ni measures the change in damage percentage induced by a 
one unit change in pest numbers Ni. This is multiplied by η, a measure of how many units of Ni are 
removed per unit of zi. Combining these gives the marginal benefit of control in terms of reduced 
damage. 
 
For the maximum profit the derivatives of both xi and zi are equated to zero and thus to each other, 
hich after some rearranging yields:  w
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It is now easy to see the economic profit maximisation condition: the value of marginal product of x 


























p η    (31) 
on. Now, consider an indirect profit function 
 where the control variables are set at their optimal levels x
* and z
* as discussed above. 
e. the impact of the invasion) on 
 
which is the basic profit maximisation conditi
) , (
* * * * z x π π =
The impact of a change in the initial invasion magnitude N0i (i.
















     (32) 
 
The expression measures the marginal value of damages caused by an increase in N0i (the term ∂Ni / 
∂N0i is equal to unity and is not shown). Expression (32) is unambiguously negative, implying that so is 
the impact of the pest on the producer’s profits. However, this conclusion holds only for as long as the 
roducer price is assumed to remain constant.  p
 
he price of the agricultural product can be thought to be dependent on the aggregate damage done by  T
the pest and the aggregate amount of additional inputs required. In other words, the invasion reduces 
supply and thereby increases the   
process and indirectly by increasing the production costs. In the model these effects are approximated 
y N . Thus, in the objective function, let p  = p (N ). Then the impact of N  on producer’s profits is: 
prices in two ways: directly by causing damage to the production


































     (33) 
 
The difference between expressions (32) and (33) is thus solely the term qi(∂pS / ∂N0i) [1-D(·)]. The sign 
f this term depends on whether the price increases or decreases. As it is reasonable to assume that the 
. Expression (34) indicates the impact of costs of protection C.  
 
o
price does not decrease, it can be concluded that the sign of the term is positive. The impact of the 
invasion on producer profits now includes a positive term (the price increase) and the negative term 
discussed earlier. Hence the overall impact of the invasion depends on the relative magnitudes of the 
damage done by the pest and costs of its control, compared to the increased income due to the price 
change. 
 
As a point of curiosity, the impact of protection on producer profits can now also be seen when we let 
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N D N p i i S i ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 0 0
* π
irst term in the expression is negative: it denotes the fact that increased protection (C) by the 
ociety reduces pest induced price increases, and hence lessens potential increases in producer profits. 
The second term (which is subtracted from the first) is also negative: it denotes the positive impact of 
protection on producers through reduced damages. Hence the aggregate impact of protection on 
producers is unambiguous, as there is a theoretical possibility that increasing N0i could raise prices and 
hence revenue by more than what the associated crop losses are, making producers better off. As social 
intervention reduces N0i, the outcome is not clear.  
s  74(162)
 
Having discussed the properties  ctive function, let us return to the expected 
change in producer surplus. The annual impact of an invasion can now be estimated as the difference 
between aggregate producer profits in the case when no production hectares are invaded 
NOINV
t Π and 
aggregate producer profits when an area A
of the producer obje
r estimating the annual change in producer surplus. 
 
     (35) 
 (36) 
 
is derived from expression (27) when the pest is not present (Ni and zi are equal to zero). This 
yields the first term in (36).  is derived from expression (27) when the pest is present in some 
areas (Ni and zi are greater than zero). This comprises of two terms. The first one is the aggregate profit 
in areas where the pest is not present, but which nonetheless receives the elevated price (middle term in 
36). The second term is the aggregate profit in the areas in which the pest is present, and which suffers 
the damages and increased production costs, but also receives the elevated price (last term in expression 
36). These together give the annual change in aggregate producer surplus. 
 
4.3.2  Change in consumer surplus 
 
Having analysed producer behaviour and the impact of policies on producers, let us turn to the other 
component in reactive control cost: the expected change in consumer surplus. Since we assume 
constant returns to scale, the produced quantity is qtATOT. Hence the annual change in consumer 
surplus (∆CSt) is estimated by:  
 
t of production hectares are invaded 
INV
t Π . Reintroducing 
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The term ∆pt in the expression refers to the change in price of the agricultural product triggered by the 

















b c  d 
e g  f 
h i 
Quantity 
qDtAt   
Figure 14. Elastic demand and elastic supply with and without the pest invasion. 
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The dometic supply (demand) curve depicts the quan
gricultural product. Invasion induces a leftward sh
tity supplied (demanded) at each price level of the 
ift in the supply curve: at each price level less is  a
supplied as production costs have increased and crop damages have occurred. As a result consumer 
surplus is reduced from area a + b + c + d to just a. Supply change thus results in the consumers losing b 
+ c + d in consumer surplus. Expression (37) corresponds to this area in Figure 14, indicating also that 
we assume the demand curve to be linear over the (relatively small) price range considered. This is not 
too restrictive an assumption for as long as the price changes and changes in supply are not very big. 
ote also that we assume that there are no exports or imports.
30 N
 




t B t A
A
D p p ε − = ∆      (38) 
 
We assume that there is an historical base price pB, which is subsequently modified by the magnitude of 
the invasion At / ATOT and the damages incurred Dt, which together measure by how much supply is 





ation was discussed in Section 3.1.5. It is now 
vident that the model presented here is easy to aggregate to a social level and hence can be directly 
se  in empirical policy analysis. When we add the annual change in producer surplus (expression 36) 
t ge in consumer surplus (expression 37) and sum the impacts over T years, we get an 
re
determines by how much the price changes given a change in 
 
4.3.3  A eactive control costs and policy choice criteria 
 
We ha  at the impact of the invasion (a biological phenomenon) and society’s actions (a 
) on individual producers and consumers. It is time to consider the aggregate 
impact and policy choice. The importance of aggreg
e
u d
o the annual chan
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This is a more detailed version of expression (16) and will be applied in empirical analysis in Chapter 5. 
We have now built up functions for estimating the costs of both policy alternatives (expressions 14 and 
9).   3
 
Adopting the objective of unconstrained cost minimisation, the problem of the risk neutral and welfare 
maximising society is to choose  { } ) ( ), ( min 2 1 TC E TC E , in other words  {} ) 39 ( ), 14 ( min . However, 
having chosen this objective, it is good to bear in mind that this is an analysis of a single invasive 
species only. The fact that one of the policies is optimal in this analysis in no way implies that limited 
government budget is worth spending on this particular species and not some other species. With this 
caveat in mind, it is time to move on to the empirical analysis. 
                                                           
30 It might be worthwhile including some modification factor to account for exports and imports, since in the latter stages of 
active control when the pest has spread to most of the country, these impacts may be significant. The modification could 
be a simple restriction determining that price is not allowed to increase above some predetermined level. Issues related to 
international trade were discussed earlier briefly in Section 3.1.3. 
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5.  THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 whom 
 
We have now discussed the physical and economic impacts of IAS and the institutional setting in which 
they are considered. We also reviewed economic models that discuss the issue from either standard 
agricultural or from the invasive alien species point of view, and presented an analytical model to study 
the policy problem. It is now time to undertake an empirical analysis of the policies discussed. The case 
tudy deals with the Colorado potato beetle and potato production in Finland.   s
 
We will first discuss the costs that are included in the analysis and give a qualitative discussion of 
impacts that are excluded from the analysis. We also present the cost structure of the analysis. We will 
then present the data available, including the trends and the stochastic variables used in the analysis. 
Then, the basic analysis is undertaken. First, to validate the model the results of an ex-post analysis over 
the period 1998−2004 are discussed. Second, the results of an ex-ante analysis over the period of 50 
ears are presented. These basic results are followed by a sensitivity analysis and an analysis of to y
the policy costs accrue intertemporally and intratemporally. Before proceeding, let us for clarity define 
what is meant when the words policy, scenario and trend are used in the analysis. 
 
DEFINITION 8 – POLICY STRATEGY, SCENARIO AND TREND 
Policy strategy  Refers to the policy that the decision maker chooses, in this study this means either pre-emptive 
control (protected zone) or reactive control (no protected zone). 
Scenario  Refers to pest spread in the case of reactive control. In this study there are two scenarios: logistic 
spread scenario (Scenario 1) and linear spread scenario (Scenario 2). 
Trend  Refers to change in external conditions. In this study there are three linear trends (local change, 
regional change and pest characteristics change). Trends are studied at three different levels: off, 
slow and rapid. 
 
 
 Policy costs  5.1
 
An invasion by the CPB would have impacts on various parties in Finland. Those affected include 
producers, manufacturers, exporters, importers, consumers and taxpayers. Producers and 
manufacturers (industry) are affected by increasing production costs, reduced yields and possible price 
changes. Exporters and importers are affected by the domestically produced potato price and quantity 
changes, legislative restrictions on imports and exports and changes in reputation status of the country 
that may affect exports. For instance, should Finland lose its protected zone, potato could no longer be 
exported to other protected zones. Importers on the other hand could start importing potato from 
anywhere if the protected zone was renounced.
31 Finally, consumers are affected by the potato price 
and quantity changes and taxpayers by the burden of having to pay for the actions undertaken by the 
society to deal with the pest. Hence several groups are affected regardless of whichever policy is 
eventually chosen. 
 
The economic implications materialise through changes in consumer and producer surplus. In the 
empirical part we ignore imports and exports and furthermore deal only with ‘producers’ and 
‘consumers’ of potato. Potato is such a basic good that taxpayers and consumers can for all practical 
purposes be equated. Finally, it is good to note, as has already been mentioned before, that it is possible 
to design various types of transfer mechanisms to make sure that the right agents (however that is 
defined) pay for the costs. Hence, the discussion on affected parties and to whom the costs accrue is 
conditional on what type of costs we choose each group to face. 
 
Costs caused by IAS were earlier divided into four categories. Let us now present the costs that the 
CPB could cause in Finland according to this categorisation, as well as to explain why the impacts in 
certain categories are left out of the analysis. The costs that are included in the analysis are discussed 
here only briefly, since they are extensively discussed in the data section. 
 
                                                           
31 Naturally any restrictions applying to other pests or diseases would still remain in force and restrict imports.   77(162)
Control costs 
Control costs are included in the analysis. In both policy options, control costs are encountered. The 
effectiveness and cost of control differ in the two policies. In the case of the protected zone, the society 
can co-ordinate control and aim at eradication of the pest. It can also manage the development of 
pesticide resistance to some extent through co-ordination. In the case of reactive control, individual 
producers undertake control to the extent determined by their private objective functions. In the 
empirical case this is reduced to a single figure for simplicity. 
 
Production costs 
Production costs in the case of potato are included in the analysis. The beetle targets primarily potato in 
Finland and potato is also produced almost throughout the country. Theoretically also tomato 
production could be threatened. Tomato is produced on about 120 hectares in Finland, with the annual 
16 euro per kilogram. 
he value of the tomato crop is thus about 42 million euro annually (Niemi and Ahlstedt 2005). 
e CPB 
vasion. Further, Finnish tomato is produced in glasshouses, and thus the beetle would have some 
production being around 36 million kilograms. The mean price in 2004 was 1.
T
 
Tomato production takes place primarily in Ostrobothnia and Närpiö, and to some extent in the south-
western parts of the country. These are not the areas that would initially be at risk from th
in
difficulty in finding the tomato plants. However, if a large part of the country was invaded by the CPB, 
it might be possible that also tomato crop would be at risk. Despite this possibility, possible tomato 
production losses are not included in the analysis.  
 
Secondary market effects 
Certain domestic market effects are included in the analysis. The Finnish potato markets are not fully 
integrated to the European markets in that changes in domestic supply do impact on the price the 
consumers pay. Hence an invasion that reduces domestic supply and increases domestic production 
osts may have also consumer effects.  
 
International market effects on the other hand are not included in the quantitative analysis, but are 
qualitatively discussed here in order to have a complete assessment of possible impacts. Finland as a 
member of the European Union is committed to unrestricted trade within the union, as well as to any 
regulations set out in the various agreements enforced by the World Trade Organization. However, the 
fairly distant and isolated location of Finland combined with a small population size makes it only a 
marginal trader in many commodities. The value of food imports to Finland in 2004 was 2.3 billion 
euro, which is about 11% of the estimated money flow in the food sector (Niemi and Ahlstedt 2005). 
Part of the imported commodities consists of those primary products that cannot be produced in 
Finland or that are produced in insufficient quantities, but some proportion is also being imported due 
to the increased integration of the European markets. Food exports from Finland on the other hands 
had a value of 910 million euro in 2004, of which exports to Russia accounted for about 20% (Niemi 
and Ahlstedt 2005). 




are shown in Figure 15.
32 Figure 16 (after FAOSTAT) plots the annual Finnish domestic potato 
production and imports as a percentage of quantity produced. It is fairly evident, by comparing the data 
in Figure 15 to domestic production quantities in Figure 16, that international trade in potato is a fairly 
small business in Finland.  
 
                                                           
32
annual 
 The data are from FAOSTAT. The original data on the value of trade (in dollars) were converted to euros using average 
exchange rates, which were calculated from monthly rates provided by the PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service 






























































































Quantity Value  
Figure 15. Quantity and value of Finnish potato exports (left) and imports (right) in 1995−2003. 
million euro. There was an increase in exports from the level 
 production in terms of both quantity and value.  
 to 1999. This quantity remains high also in the year following the bad yield, which is a trend 
at can be seen also when a longer time-series is analysed. This is natural as consumption of this year’s 
 
Exports in 2003 were worth about three 
of 1995−1999 to a new level in 2001−2003 and a subsequent drop back in 2004. It is worth noting that 
the exports are still only a fraction of domestic
 
On average, imports of potato are greater than exports, but imports are still fairly insignificant when 
compared to domestic production. They have not exceeded 4% of domestic production in any year in 
the period 1995−2003. However, there is some inter-annual fluctuation in imported quantities and bad 
domestic yields seem to be to some extent substituted by imports. For instance the poor yield in 1998 is 
clearly visible in the import graph. It seems to have caused about five-fold increase in imported quantity 
from 1997
th













































































igure 16. Production of potato in Finland and imports as a percentage of production in 1995−2003. 
 imports only from pest-free areas seems 
stified when looked from this perspective. However, causalities are not entirely clear here. The low 
F
 
Looking at the issue from a producer organisation point of view, one could argue that imports are such 
a small share of consumed potato in Finland that there is no point in risking the domestic production 
by not regulating international trade with respect to plant pests. In other words, since imports always 
pose a risk of exotic pest invasions, there is little point to take that risk since the potential benefits 
would not be substantial: imports are so low that consumer prices would be little affected.  
 
Furthermore, given the relatively small import quantity, also regulation (e.g. inspections) is much easier 
to carry out efficiently. Hence the current policy of regulated
ju
import quantity may be – at least partially – precisely because of the protection system, which increases 
the import price of potato, as was discussed earlier. 
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If the protection system was removed, the import prices might decrease and consumers could 
substitute imported potato for domestic potato. However, one reason for the low volume of trade is 
that the transport distances are fairly long, and potato is a relatively cheap good that requires quite a lot 
f space in transport. Hence the pure distance increases the transport costs such that large-scale trade 
 The extent to which imports could substitute 
r domestic potato and the effects of the protected zone for potato exports thus determine the trade 
o
with Central Europe may become unprofitable.  
 
On the other hand, on basis of the value of Finnish potato trade it can be argued that if the protection 
system is not profitable in terms of providing least-cost protection against the CPB, there is not much 
point in maintaining it for purposes of export protection.
fo
implications of the current protected zone policy. In our opinion, in this particular case these impacts 
may play a role, but are unlikely to be substantial. Hence they are at least at this stage excluded from the 
analysis. 
 
Health, environmental and cultural costs 
Health, environmental and cultural costs are excluded from the quantitative analysis. Instead, they are 
qualitatively discussed here for completeness. 
 
The beetle does not spread any zoonotic diseases, i.e. diseases that can infect humans. Main health 
pacts are likely to arise from the increased use of chemical control substances in the potato fields 
ods, while the principal domestic sources were 
heat, oat and strawberries. Compared to acceptable daily intake levels (ADI), the intake of individual 
in Europe (or at least not in Finland), together with its 
iet that is restricted on Solanacae, imply that there will be no or very little ecosystem effects. The 
ence, as with the health impacts, the main environmental impacts are likely to arise from the 
creased use of insecticides to control the beetle. Chemical control substance use overall in Finland is 
o d per hectare in 2004 (Niemi and 
hlstedt 2005). This figure is minute when compared to use in many other European countries, for 
 altogether 1,680 tonnes of chemical control substances were sold in Finland, of 
which 58 tonnes were agricultural insecticides (Savela and Hynninen 2004; Eurostat). Hence about 
3.4% of the tot
reases 
his effect is somewhat compensated by the fact that in cold and wet 
im
invaded by the beetle. If these substances are used in accordance with the existing legal requirements 
and regulations, there should be no health impacts from this source to the general public. The farmers 
who do the spraying may suffer from increased health problems if the safety guidelines are not properly 
followed. 
 
In year 2000, Finns acquired 0.499 µg of chemical control substances per day from vegetables, fruits 
and cereals (National Food Agency 2001). The intake has been reduced by about 9-30% since 1992. 
The majority (91%) of residues were from imported fo
w
control substances was at most 1.1% of the ADI value (National Food Agency 2001). It seems that 
even with increased control substance usage the health impacts are likely to remain minor. In addition, 
estimating the health impacts of increased insecticide application might prove a daunting task. For 
these reasons, health impacts are ignored in the quantitative assessment. 
 
As for environmental costs, the CPB occupies a fairly empty niche in the agricultural ecosystem. The 
fact that it has no natural predators and parasites 
d
beetle has been suspected to spread some potato diseases, including Ralstonia solanacearum and Clavibacter 
michiganensis sepedonicus (EPPO 2005). However, as these also target the potato, there is no reason to 




ne of Europe’s lowest, with less than 0.6 kg of active substance use
A
instance in Belgium the figure was 12.5 kg per hectare in 1996 (MAF 2003c). In 2001, the sales of 
control substances in Finland were 0.44% and the sales of insecticides 0.13% of the EU15 sales 
(Eurostat). In 2003,
al amount sold were agricultural insecticides.  
 
Between 4% and 30% of control substances are lost through evaporation and leaching (Schepel 1996). 
In rainy and cold summers it is possible that up to 80% of the amount applied may be lost (SYKE 
1998). This is because the cold weather slows down the breakdown of the products, and rain inc
the amount of leaching. T  80(162)
conditions the CPB feeding and development rates slow down, and hence smaller amounts of control 
re needed. Nonetheless, if we apply the figure 4-30% to insecticides sold in year 2003, between 2.3 and 
17.3 tonnes of insecticides are currently lost in Finland a
 
t times when they are least 
 
currently used tributed over 
the entire agricultural area. Specifically in potato pr
ol 
te the ensuing 
sons, this cost 
antitative analysis. However, it is worth bearing in mind that primarily 





nnually through evaporation and leaching.  
 
These leaching substances eventually end up in lakes and seas affecting the aquatic ecosystems. The 
effects would be seen in the Baltic Sea, and particularly in the Gulf of Finland. If the CPB spread to the 
main potato production areas in Ostrobothnia, also the Gulf of Bothnia would be affected. These water 
bodies are already affected by pesticides and excessive nutrient loads, and recognised as one of the 
ost significant environmental problem facing Finland.   m
 
Organisms that have in the past suffered from pesticides include for instance the Baltic herring (Clupea 
harengus membras), grey seal (Halicoerus grypus), ringed seal (Pusa hispida) and the white-tailed sea eagle 
(Haliaeetus albicilla). However, many of the agricultural pesticides that were involved in endangering 
em (especially DDT) are nowadays illegal and the situation of the species has been improving (Haahti th
and Kangas 2003; Verta et al. 2004). Other organisms that potentially suffer from pesticides are bees 
and other pollinating insects. They do not necessarily die because of pesticides, but the sub-lethal 
effects can shorten their life-span and cause behavioural changes (Schepel 1996). The impacts can be 
duced by applying the control substances in a right manner, for instance a re
likely to affect pollinating insects. 
 
As with health impacts, it is relatively difficult to estimate how much harm the additional amount of 
insecticides (to control the CPB) may do to the environment. The actual amount of insecticides
 in Finland is very low, about 0.02 kg of insecticides per hectare when dis
oduction the use of insecticides is currently almost 
non-existent in Finland. The only insecticide used generally is paraffin oil, which is used in seed potato 
production in order to prevent certain diseases spread by aphids (Jussi Tuomisto, MTT Economic 
Research, verbal communication). For comparison, in the US about 3-5 kg of insecticides per hectare 
have been used to control the CPB (Ferro et al. 1983).  
 
It is thus possible that the current usage of insecticides increases perhaps substantially in the event of a 
PB invasion. However, it is difficult to predict how the future application of chemical contr C
substances might change, and even if this was known, it would be difficult to estima
nvironmental impacts and monetary costs of the additional pesticides. For these rea e
category is excluded from the qu
cost
which is excluded from the quantitati
 
Finally, other types of costs, including cultural impacts, are ignored. Such may occur if a large scale 
invasion affects for instance habitual production of potato, but any such impacts can be considered to 
be minor. Thus the impacts included in the quantitative assessment include control and production 
costs as well as the domestic market effects of those c
 
 
5.2 Cost structure in simulation 
 
In MATLAB simulation analysis the expressions derived for pre-emptive and reactive control costs in the 
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In this expression the total costs depend on the fixed costs F as well on three types of variable costs. 
 
The difference equation for the development of the total area invaded is 
 
These are the variable costs per inspection visit V1, variable costs per eradicated hectare V2 (control 
substances) and the variable costs per eradicated hectare V3 (work and compensation payments). 
 
1 1 1 1 − − − − t t t t INITt t t A w A A + = θ ω γ     (41) 
 
This is the same as expression (15) in the theoretical analysis. We assume that the area invaded and the 
area eradicated are identical. This is required by the protected zone legislation, but in principle if the 
protected zone was given up, a national policy could be built such that the area eradicated is some 
function of the area invaded. This option is not examined in this study.  
 
The area invaded / eradicated At depends on the probability of the invasion γt (0 ≤ γt ≤ 1) in a
ear multiplied by the invasion magnitude (i.e. the size of the invasion coming from outside the s
ny one 
ystem) 
A ). The area also depends on the invaded area of the protection system that is 
t-1 t-1 t-1 t-
 of invas mulation such that in a  
 no fects ency of invasions. For instance, if the 
ere ion every third year.  
hey simply depend multiplicatively on the area controlled 
rough the inspection visit multiplier g (with g ≥ 1). This relationship has been established on empirical 
rounds. Naturally, there is nothing to stop from treating this as a choice variable.
33
       (42) 
effect), and second, by the fact that there may be remnants of previous invasions 
y
in the present year ( INITt
be
 
ing carried over from the previous year ω  w  θ  A 1 due to failure of the protection system.  
The probability ion γ is modelled  t in the si
 af
ny given year there either is an
invasion or there is
probability is 0.33, th
 
t. The probability then
 is on average an invas
 the frequ






Altogether, the cost of pre-emptive control is thus affected by the invasion magnitude, the frequency of 
invasion years, and the extent of a possible failure in the previous year’s protection. The invasion 
frequency has an impact in two ways: first, by dictating whether there is an invasion or not in a 
particular year (direct 
gA I =
still existing in the network (indirect effect). The cost of the protection system thus varies in time 
depending on how often and to what extent preventative actions are needed. 
 
As for reactive control costs, in MATLAB simulation, expression (36) is approximated by 
 
[ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) )( ( ) ( t z x t t t x t t TOT x B TOT t z p x p D q p A x p q p A A x p q p A PS + − − − − − − − = ∆      
(43) 
 
In other words, change in producer surplus is the difference between what the aggregate profit would 
have been in the absence of the pest and what the aggregate profit is in the presence of it. This can be 
rearranged and simplified into two effects. The first effect is the damage and additional control costs 
inflicted on those producers whose farm is invaded. 
 
t t z t B A z p D qp ) ( +        (44) 
 
The second effect is the subsequent price increase enjoyed by all producers in the market, regardless of 
whether they have been subject to the invasion or not. Note that expression (45) is negative (i.e. it is 
                                                           
33 Inspection visits as a choice variable would seem to be more truthful than the empirically derived relationship used in this 
study. However, this would require more data on the relationship of inspection rate and found infestations. For simplicity, it 
is here this assumed that the rate of inspection is optimal, and as shown in expression (42).   82(162)
actually a benefit, provided that the price change is positive), because it measures the additional profit 
due to the increased price. 
 
[] ) 1 ( ) ( t t t TOT t D A A A p q − + − ∆ −      (45)
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The change in consumer surplus in the simulation can be found directly by applying expression (37). 
Hence, the aggregate costs of reactive control (expression 39) in the simulation becomes as follows.  
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urplus is due to the price increase (third term). All the costs are discounted at a discount rate r and 
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(46) 
 
Producer surplus change consists of damages and control costs incurred (first term in the numerator) 
and the additional income due to invasion induced price increase (second term). The loss of consumer
⎛ − + − ∆ − +
T A A A p A z p D p 1 ( ) (
E
s
summed over years 1 to T. Note that some of the terms in expression (46) actually cancel out. We have 
maintained the division between consumer and producer effects in the simulation analysis in order to 
analyse to whom the policy costs accrue. 
 
To summarise, the cost categories included in the quantitative analysis are presented in Table 7. 
 
Fixed  Variable  Fixed   Variable 
Authority’s fixed costs 
- inspection visits to fixed 
inspection points, postage, 
telephone, advertising, etc. 
- costs dependent on inspections 
- costs dependent on the area 
controlled and eradicated 
- compensation payments 
No expenses 
- production losses 
- control costs 
- invasion induced price changes 
Changes in consumer surplus 
- invasion induced price changes 
Authority’s variable costs:  Changes in producer surplus 
Table 7. Costs of pre-emptive and reactive control. 
 
 
5.3 Model variables and u tainty 
 through th riables used in the sents ues  efore g 
ssary to no t ther ts a large amount of uncertainty around the issue. Existing 
d Kriström (2002), 
amely scientific, impact and policy uncertainty. We highlight here the relationship of the CPB case 
ific uncertainty, which 
rises when a certain physical relationship is not known (Heal and Kriström 2002). 
 
                       
ncer
 
This section goes e va  analysis and e  pr  th al e v u B sed.   goin
further, it is nece te tha e exis
uncertainty can be categorised into three broad categories according to Heal an
n
study to uncertainty. 
 
First, we are uncertain of the invasion process and its pre-determinants in the points of origin in Russia. 
Certain weather patterns, including particular wind corridors, can be related to invasions, but the exact 
relationships of the various components are unknown. This can be seen as scient
a
                                     
34 Expressions (44) and (45) are expressed in these particular forms due to the intuitive interpretation that they provide. 
They are derived as follows.  Starting with expression (43), expanding the function and deleting terms that cancel out gives 
t z t t t t t TOT B TOT z p A qD p A q p A q p A + + − . Expressing (p – p ) in the first term as ∆p gives 
t z t t t t TOT t z p A qD p A qA p
t B t
+ + ∆ − . Expressing pt i n  t h e  m i d d l e  t e r m  a s  ( pB + ∆pt)  yields 
t z t t t t t B t TOT t z p A qD p A qD p A qA p + ∆ + + ∆ − . Expressing ATOT in the first term as (ATOT – At) + At gives 
() t z t t t t t B t t t t TOT t z p A qD p A qD p A qA p A A q p + ∆ + + ∆ − − ∆ − . Finally, rearranging and grouping the terms 
yields  () ( ) [] ( ) t t z t B t t t TOT t A z p D qp D A A A p q + + − + − ∆ − 1  which is equivalent to expressions (44) and (45).   83(162)
Secondly, it is unknown how the continued invasions would affect the production patterns in Finland. 
Production may be regionally rearranged and new more tolerant plant varieties may be introduced. In 
the shorter term, also the impact of the beetle on potato yield is somewhat uncertain depending for 
instance on timing of the invasion, weather conditions and producer counter-measures. These can be 
seen as impact uncertainty, where the impacts of natural phenomena on the various components of 
human societies are uncertain, even if the physical science behind them is known (Heal and Kriström 
2002). 
 
Finally, there certainty (Heal and 
riström 2002). It is related to questions such as: What type of policy should we undertake, and what 
terdependencies. This corresponds fairly closely to reality. For instance, invasion pressure 
it y the environmental, climatic and production conditions behind the 
order, which is independent of for instance the level of crop damage in Finland, because the external 
ear 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
 is a third type of uncertainty, which can be categorised as policy un
K
are the conditions that determine the optimal policy? Does the optimal choice change over time and are 
there irreversibilities involved? In such questions, we may know the physical structure of problems, and 
how those affect the human societies, but we are still uncertain about the impacts of our own corrective 
actions. For instance, there is uncertainty related to which policies are needed to address the problems, 
how those policies impact on the issue in question and what are the costs of undertaking the policy. 
The simulation analysis attempts to answer some of these questions. However, it is naturally restricted 
by how we choose to tackle scientific and impact uncertainty. 
 
o account for uncertainty, invasions are modelled as temporally random events and stochasticity in  T
key variables is built into the analysis. In addition, an extensive sensitivity analysis is carried out. Below, 
as each variable is presented, if the variable is stochastic also a probability density function (PDF) will 
be provided. For computational reasons the PDFs presented are based on 50,000 iterations, not the full 
300,000 that are used in the analysis. Despite this they present the distribution with sufficient accuracy. 
 
The stochastic variables in the analysis are assumed to be independent of each other – there are no 
in
(magn ude) is determined mainly b
b
conditions are different. Similarly, the level of winter survival depends on winter conditions and only to 
a minor extent on previous summer’s conditions that determine for instance crop damage. 
  
5.3.1  Costs of pre-emptive control 
 
The invasion magnitudes (farms inspected, inspection visits and the number of infestations discovered) 
as well as the actual costs incurred in maintaining the CPB protected zone in Finland in years 
1998−2004 were obtained from KTTK (Plant Production Inspection Centre, the relevant authority) 
and are reported in Table 8. The star in the table in year 2002 denotes a partial estimate. 
 
Y
Farms inspected  400  140  200  200  800  500  238 
Inspection visits  500  270  200  240  1485  773  309 
Infestations 149  1  0  2  324  6  29 
Total cost (euro)  N/A  78,712  19,005 45,747  576,371*  279,181  29,659 
Compensation (cases)  38  11  8  2  85  130  N/A 
Compensation  (euro)  9,340 3,110 3,100 1,850  25,264  31,090  N/A 
Table 8. Beetle observations, inspection visits and costs incurred in the protected zone 1998−2004. 
 
Table 8 thus provides the available dataset for estimating the costs of the protection system. Fixed costs 
of the protected zone (F) used in the assessment are calculated from costs incurred in years 1999 (1 
infestation), 2000 (0 infestations) and 2001 (2 infestations). The compensation payments (a variable 
cost) are subtracted from these costs. The calculation is conducted such that in the weighted average 
year 2000 with zero infestations is given double the weight of the other two years.  
 
1999: 78,712e - 3,110e = 75,602e  weight 1 
2000: 19,005e - 3,100e = 15,905e  weight 2  →  mean 37,827e 
2001: 45,747e - 1,850e = 43,897e  weight 1   84(162)
 
There are 60-70 fixed inspection sites (required by the protected zone status) that are visited 1-3 times a 
ear. Hence in the fixed costs we include 200 inspection visits per year as well as other fixed costs 
t ne, etc.).  
 recorded them in any way. Thus an assumption had 
 be made that an infested plot is the size of one hectare. This assumption is difficult to either support 
y
(adver ising, postage, telepho
 
As for the variable costs of protection (V1, V2t, V3), a simple model was built to estimate the inspection 
cost per visit, control substance cost per hectare and eradication cost (including compensation 
payment) per hectare. These were empirically derived from the data in Table 8. We do not have direct 
data on the hectares invaded, since KTTK has not
to
or deny on basis of available data, but discussions with experts confirm that an average potato plot size 
of one hectare is not an unreasonable assumption. Thus the number of infestations is equated with the 
number of hectares invaded. The estimated costs are as follows.
35
 
Inspection cost     256 euro / visit 
Control substance cost     20 euro / hectare infested 
Eradication cost (incl. compensation)   610 euro / hectare infested 
 
In addition, we include the possibility that the protection system may fail in any particular year. In this 
n addition, a trend (discussed in detail in Section 5.4) which will increase both of these parameters 
over time is included in the analysis. This trend is not a separate trend as such, but is included in all 
other trends that are analysed. This is because increasing winter survival, increasing invasion magnitude 
and increasing pesticide resistance (the three trends analysed) all imply that maintaining the protection 




5.3.2  Costs of reactive control 
 
If the beetle is not eradicated as a part of the protection policy, and the producers have to apply 
control, there will be reactive control costs. We assume that these consist of the cost of the chemical 
control substances used and of the cost of applying them. Alternative CPB control strategies (see 
Section 2.5.1) are not considered in this analysis. 
e timated to be on average about $300/ha in 
a  varied over the range $35-$412/ha, depending on the 
case the beetles survive eradication, and the area they have invaded will be added to the invasion area in 
the next year. In practice this will be modelled as a product of two variables. The first is the event of 
protection failure, which is either true or untrue – it either happens or it does not. If it has happened, 
then it will happen on a given percentage of the area invaded in that year. In the present analysis, the 
failure probability that we use is 0.30, meaning that every year there is a 30% chance that some beetles 
will be left unobserved. If there is a failure, then we assume that it will be on 20% of the invaded area. 




The ch mical control substance costs (pzzit) have been es
Michig n in 1991 (Grafius 1997). However, they
level of pesticide resistance. On Long Island the costs increased with increasing resistance to about 
$300-$700/ha (Raman and Radcliffe 1992). We are not aware of any cost estimates being readily 
available for Europe. 
 
                                                           
35 Note that any one of the figures may not be correct as such, but together they produce fairly reliable estimates of the costs 
ncurred in the peri i od 1998-2004. 
 Increasing winter survival increases the effective failure probability of the protection system, because relatively more of 
those who survive protection also survive the winter. Increasing invasion magnitude increases the effective failure 
probability because more beetles invading means that there is an increasing probability that some of them remain 
undetected. Increasing pesticide resistance increases the effective failure probability because fewer beetles are killed by the 
pre-emptive control actions. 
36  85(162)
In this analysis we apply a non-stochastic figure of 100 euro per hectare. The figure is lower than the 
costs in the US due to, for instance, lower level of pesticide resistance in northern Europe. On the 
other hand, the figure is higher than the cost of 20 euro per hectare used in estimating the costs of the 
protection system. This is for two reasons. First, the protection system cost does not include work 
input (which is included in eradication cost category). Second, the government agency may have better 
bargaining power than individual private producers in obtaining the control substances. 
 
However, we undertake a sensitivity analysis around this value in order to find out its impact on the 
results. Further, a trend (discussed in Section 5.4) is built into the cost of chemical control to account 
r increasing pesticide resistance. To anticipate the results, it seems that the impact of this variable on 
the aggregate policy choice is minor. 
  e is projected to invade, the statistical mean yield is thus reduced by a given 
ercentage. In the literature estimates for the crop damages include the estimate in Michigan, where 
konen 2002). In some EPPO 
ountries yield losses of up to 50% have been encountered (EPPO 2005). 
tically according to the PDF presented in Figure 17. The mean damage is 0.10, the 
aximum is 0.40 and the minimum is zero. In at least 5% of the iterations the crop damage is zero, and 
in 5% of the iterations it is greater than 0.22. The distribution is truncated such that values less than 




5.3.3  Production losses 
 
Crop damages (Dt) are modelled as a percentage reduction in the yield. This is a simplified yield-loss 
model, linking the pest individuals to the magnitude of yield loss. With sufficient ecological data it 
would be possible to incorporate a more complex yield-loss model into the study. Lacking such data, 
we adopt a simple proportional damage function. 
 
Within the area the beetl
p
losses were on average about 12% of the yield, except in badly hit areas where losses of 21% were 
encountered (Grafius 1997). Europe is lacking the natural enemies of the beetle, and hence the losses in 
Europe could in principle be higher. On the other hand, beetle feeding is temperature dependent as 
discussed earlier, and hence this factor in theory reduces the losses in Finland. In badly infested areas of 
Russia the losses have been reported to be 20-70% of the yield (Park
c
 
The estimate should be based on the damages that incur when we have adapted (in the short term) to 
the presence of the beetle.
37 In the cost-benefit analysis carried out in England (Mumford et al. 2000) it 
was assumed that fully controlled the beetle would impose no damages whatsoever, which we do not 
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Figure 17. Probability density function of the crop damage. 
                                                           
37 Note that long-term adaptation, for instance switch to more tolerant potato cultivars and biotechnology, has not been 
taken into account in the analysis.   86(162)
 
5.3.4  Invasion magnitude and probability 
ars, broadly 
onsistent with the existing invasion data. The variable is simulated such that in any given year a 
 variable. We use a mean of 400 ha for the variable, which is roughly 
ased on the estimated invasion magnitude in year 2002. This magnitude is important in two respects. 
about 170 hectares and in 5% it is above about 630 hectares. 
 
Invasions are modelled as a product of two variables. The first is the invasion event, which is either 
true or untrue – in effect either one or zero. There is a given probability (γt) associated with this. We 
use the figure 0.33, i.e. that there will be an invasion on average once every three ye
c
random number y (0 ≤ y ≤ 1) is drawn from a uniform distribution, and if this is smaller than the 
specified probability, the event is on. This variable is also allowed to increase with a trend, as discussed 
in Section 5.4.  
 
If the invasion is true, i.e. that it happens, it will be of a given size. The size, or magnitude, of the 
invasion (AINITt) is a stochastic
b
First, in calculation of the cost of the protection system, it is the area in which the authorities need to 
undertake eradication and pay compensation. Second, in calculating the costs of reactive control, it is 
the area on which the beetle produces crop losses, has to be controlled and begins its spread from. The 
PDF of the invasion magnitude, which is also allowed to increase with a trend, is presented in Figure 
18. The mean is 400 hectares, the maximum is 935 hectares and the minimum is zero. In 5% of the 
iterations the size is below 
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Figure 18. Probability density function of the invasion magnitude. 
 
Additionally, the invasion magnitude determines the number of inspection visits (It), as discussed in 
Section 5.2. Inspection visits are assumed to take place such that their number is g times the invasion 
magnitude (expression 42). The value of g that we use in the analysis is 4, which is broadly based on the 
KTTK data (Table 8) on the number of infestations and inspection visits, once the 200 inspection visits 
considered as a fixed cost element are subtracted. This is simply a functional relationship, which we 
need in order to estimate the costs, and thus it does not imply causality either way. 
 
5.3.5  Winter survival 
t ve control, where the protection system is 
t have any 
ard data on which to base this variable in Finnish conditions, and hence an educated guess is needed. 
The analysis here uses a value of 30% for the basic level of winter survival. Figure 19 shows the PDF of 
mean is 0.30, the maximum value is 0.87 and the 
minimum value is zero. In 5% of the iterations the value is below 0.07 and in 5% of the iterations it is 
above 0.53. 
 
inter survival (θ) affects the spread of the beetle in reacti W
abandoned and coexistence with the beetle becomes reality. It also affects the survival of the 
population under the protection system when protection has failed in some area. The analysis assumes 
that in these instances some proportion of the beetle population (or rather, of the area invaded) 
survives the winter and adds to the invasion area in the following year.  
 
In the Ukraine survival during hibernation was on average 70% (EPPO 2005). We do no
h




y den cti e  ur
portant, and perhaps one for 
hich reducing the uncertainty regarding its true value would be extremely valuable. An extensive 
 
ords, the controlled area is always somewhat smaller under co-ordinated authority driven protected 
an 1.00. The PDF is presented in Figure 20. The mean value is 1.5, the maximum is 2.5 
imum value is one. In 5% of the iterations the value is below 1.13 and in 5% of the 




sity fun on of th winter s vival. 
To anticipate the results, it turns out that this variable is extremely im
w
sensitivity analysis is conducted for this variable to account for the uncertainty involved. In addition, a 
trend is built into the variable to account for the fact that winter survival is likely to increase over time 
due to climatic changes (Jylhä et al. 2004; Knight and Wimshurst 2005; Walker and Steffen 1997). 
 
5.3.6  Spread variables 
 
In addition to new invasions and the winter survival of the existing populations, the spread of the 
beetle determines the extent to which it will be present in the country in the event of giving up the
rotection system. These variables are only related to reactive control. In the case of pre-emptive  p
control, it is assumed that the co-ordinated protection actions can curb any further spread. 
 
If authority driven protection is not undertaken (i.e. in reactive control), we assume that there will be 
some spread already in the first summer, determined by the initial year spread multiplier (sINITt). In other 
w
zone than under control based on actions of individual producers. In the latter case, the area controlled 
in the initial invasion year is sINITt times the initial invasion magnitude, i.e. on average sINITt x 400 ha 
(recall expressions 18 and 19). 
 
In the analysis the mean of sINITt is taken to be 1.5. What this means is that if the initial invasion size is 
400 ha, then under reactive control the area invaded during the first summer will be 600 ha, while under 
pre-emptive control it will be 400 ha. The distribution of sINITt is restricted such that it cannot take 
values less th
nd the min a
iterations it is above 1.87. 
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Figure 20. Probability density function of the initial spread multiplier. 
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In the first of our two reactive control scenarios, the spread of the beetle is logistic, as presented earlier 
in expression (18). The mean of the spread multiplier (st) is taken to be 1.8 in the analysis. This means 
that if all the beetles survive the winter, and there are no new invasions, then the invaded area becomes 
1.8-fold every year.
38 The distribution of the variable is restricted such that values of st less than 1.00 are 
ot allowed, as presented in Figure 21. The variance of the variable is assumed to be fairly large. The  n
mean value is 1.83, the maximum is 4.41 and the minimum value is one. In at least 5% of the iterations 
the value is one, and in 5% of the iterations it is above 2.84. 
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d the minimum is zero. In 5% of the 
erations the size is below 235 hectares and in 5% of the iterations it is above 564 hectares. 
Figure 21. Probability density function of the spread multiplier. 
 
Our second spread scenario assumes linear spread. This means that the beetle will invade a given area 
every year, regardless of the area it currently occupies (recall expression 19). This spread area (at) is 
assumed in the analysis to be on average the same size as the original invasion, i.e. 400 ha. This is, 
however modified by two factors. First, the spread area is stochastic. Its PDF is presented in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Probability density function of the linear spread area. 
 
In addition to stochasticity, the linear spread area is affected by stochastic winter survival. In other 
he producer price of potato in Finland 
in years 1995−2004 are shown in Table 9 (after TIKE 2006; FAOSTAT). 
 
                                                          
words, if the linear spread area is 400 ha, and the level of winter survival is 0.3, the true spread area will 
only be 120 ha. This is visible also from expression (19). 
 
5.3.7  Production, prices and discounting 
 
The production area of potato, the mean yield per hectare and t
 
38 However, remember that in a logistic spread equation spread is slower in the early and in the late stages of the spread.   89(162)
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Production (ha)  36,100 34,800 33,200 32,800 32,300 32,200 30,000 29,800 28,700 29,300 
Mean yield (kg/ha)  22,110 22,000 22,710 18,630 24,490 24,460 24,400 26,210 21,540 22,700 
Producer price (e/kg)  0.21 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.23 
Table 9. Potato production area, mean yield and producer price in Finland 1995−2004. 
 
he figures used in the simulation analysis are a total production area (ATOT) of 29,100 ha and a mean 
est impacts and the 
pacts of pest policies could in such a case be lost under the changes in the production environment. 
ing that a 10% reduction in domestic supply results in a 20% increase in the 
rice. The shock is assumed to stay for the duration of that year (Jalonoja and Pietola 2001).  
 
r 
ts from the change in producer  
he same, the change has to be equal in absolute terms. 
tance 
e discount rate (r). The discount rate m value of costs and benefits that take 
lace in the future. The British treasury recommends using a discount rate of 3.5% in public projects 
eitzman (2001) reports of a survey of 2,160 economists, who were asked which discount rate should 
warming. The mean of their answers was 4 percent and the 
of 4% 
 discounting long-term projects and policies, see for instance Karp (2005), 
Gollier (2002) a
It is not obvious how the timespan of the analysis (T) should be chosen. In some sense the analysis 
T
yield (q) of 24,400 kg/ha. These figures correspond to an approximate average of recent years.
39 There 
was some consideration of including the trends of increasing yields per hectare and decreasing 
production area into the analysis. This was not done mainly because other long-term adaptation 
measures and the impacts of agricultural policies were not included either. Hence the idea is to look at 
the question as if the current policy environment and thus also production conditions remain 
unchanged. Including such effects would naturally be more realistic, but the p
im
 
In this study 0.20 e/kg is used as the base food potato producer price (pB). As discussed earlier, it is 
assumed that there are invasion induced price increases and hence consumer effects. Yield effect on 
price (ε) of -2 is used, mean
p
We assume that the price change is fully transferred to consumers. The model calculates the produce
ffec  price, and consumer effects from the change in consumer price. e
Thus, although the two prices need not be t
Thus, it is assumed that e.g. 0.05e increase in producer price leads to 0.05e increase in consumer price. 
Producer prices are generally more volatile than retail prices (Jalonoja and Pietola 2001 citing Young II 
et al. 1997), and hence there may be some justification for this assumption. Again, it is worth bearing in 
mind that this assumption affects merely to whom the costs accrue – not the cost efficiency of policy 
lternatives.  a
 
In problems that deal with change the time horizon is often long or very long, implying the impor
of th easures the current 
p
with timeframe less than 30 years. Before 2003 the recommended rate was 6%, but this included factors 
such as optimism bias
40 that are now separated from the discount rate (Great Britain H.M. Treasury 
2003). We are not aware of the Finnish Ministry of Finance issuing any recommended discount rates 
for public projects. 
 
W
be used in problems related to global 
standard deviation 3 percent. On basis of the answers received, Weitzman (2001) calculated marginal 
discount rates for long-term projects and for the medium future (26-75 years forward) arrived at a 
marginal discount rate of 2%. Lacking recommendations from Finnish authorities, we adopt a constant 
discount rate of 2%.
41 We also undertake sensitivity analysis of the discount rate using the values 
and 0%. For a discussion on
nd Howarth (1996). 
 
could be conducted to eternity, in which case it would in practice be the discount rate that determines 
the length of the analysed period. However, changes in the policy environment are likely to be sizable 
                                                           
39 The fact that these figures and not some other figures are used has to do with the history of this research. 
40 Optimism bias refers to the fact that the costs of public projects are oft
corporated in the recommended discount rate. 
en underestimated. Accounting for this was earlier 
 This is not directly derived from Weitzman (2001), since he discusses marginal discount rates. According to his line of 
gument, although an individual correspondent believes in a constant discount rate, the wide range of the responses means 
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() t trend t θ θ θ ) 1 ( 1 − + =      (47) 
iable which takes different values 
epending on the strength of the trend (no, slow or rapid). Note that expression (47) (as all trend 
quations that follow) shows the deterministic development of the variable. However, in stochastic 
a nd which variation is allowed in a stochastic manner. The variance 
mains unaffected, however. We assume that, in slow change, winter survival increases in 50 years 
 
θ represents the baseline mean winter survival, and θtrend is a trend var
d
e
nalysis this represents the mean arou
re
from 30% to about 45%. In rapid change, the change is from 30% to about 60%. 
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We also assume that the protection system failure probability and area failing both increase, due to 
increasing invasion and establishment pressure. ω is the baseline failure probability of protection and 
trend is the trend variable. Similarly, w is the baseline mean failure area of protection and wtrend the 
ssociated trend variab
ω
a le.  
 
() trend t t ω ω ω ) 1 ( 1 − + =       ) 
nd   w t w w ) 1 ( 1 −
(48
() a trend t + =      (49) 
 
Trend 2: Regional change (invasion pressure) 
Due to regional climatic change, increased trade, modified production practices and advancement of 
the permanent beetle population towards north it is to be expected that invasions will become more 
frequent in the future. In the simulations, the probability of invasion as well as the average size of the 
invasion increase over time as follows. 
 
  () trend t t γ γ γ ) 1 ( 1 − + =      (50) 
nd  ( ) trend INIT INIT INITt A t A A ) 1 ( 1 − + = a      (51) 
 
γ is the baseline invasion probability and AINIT the baseline mean initial invaded area. γtrend and AINITtrend 
represent the trend variables. We assume that in 50 years the average size of an invasion increases from 
about 400 ha to about 600 ha in slow change and to about 800 ha in rapid change. The annual invasion 
probability increases from about 33% to about 50% in slow change and to about 65% in rapid change. 
In addition, expressions (48) and (49) are included in this trend. 
 
Trend 3: Increasing pesticide resistance 
he beetle is capable of quickly developing resistance T  towards different pesticides. Thus the 
effectiveness of pesticides decreases and the costs increase over time. In the analysis the impact of 
increasing pesticide resistance functions through increasing costs of reactive control as well as of the 
chemical control substance component of the variable costs of the protection system as follows. 
  
() trend t V t V V 2 2 2 ) 1 ( 1 − + =      (52) 
nd    (53) 
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 The total co ates d in the analysis are as presented in Table 10 and the 
r and variable values used in the analysis are su arised able 1
() trend z z t z z p t z p z p ) 1 ( 1 − + =   a
 
 V  pzz V2 is the baseline variable cost of protection and ea ontro
represent the tren ssum  th
about 40 e/ha in slo    5 n a e n c
increase f 200 e in slo
addition, expres ) are i ed in
 
 
5.5 Summary of the dat
 
The data and information used in the analysis have now b en intr ced. T two ta s below 
summarise the data. st  stim e  use
paramete mm  in T 1. 
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Cost  Estimate (e)  Source and notes 
Pre-emptive fixed costs 
(inspection, misc costs, etc.) 
37,827 e  Plant Production Inspection Centre (KTTK). Misc costs include costs of data 
processing, laboratory, postage, telephone, etc. Based on costs in 1999–2001. 
Pre-emptive variable costs:     
i) inspection  256 e / visit  KTTK. Based on costs of invasions in 1999−2004. 
ii) control substances  20 e / ha  KTTK. Based on costs of invasions in 1999−2004. 
iii) eradication  610 e / ha  KTTK. Based on costs of invasions in 1999−2004. 
Reactive control costs:     
i) production losses  10% of yield in  Elsewhere crop losses of 15-20% have been reported. We use a lower figure due 
) reactive cont
infected areas  to temperature dependent feeding rates and low level of resistance. 
rol costs  100 e / ha  Estimate, includes costs of control substances and labour costs.  ii
iii) domestic market effects  estimated   It is assumed that there are invasion induced price increases and consumer effects. 
Yield effect on price of -2 is used (Jalonoja and Pietola 2001). 
iv) international market effects  assumed zero  Finnish potato trade is presently only small scale activity. 
v) health, environmental and 
cultural costs 
assumed zero  If control substances are used in accordance with regulations there will be no 
health implications. The CPB invades an empty niche and there are no direct 
ecosystem impacts. Environmental impacts of control substances are not 
accounted for here. Beetle could threaten habitual potato farming, but such 
impacts are likely to be minor. 
Table 10. Cost estimates used in the analysis. 
 
ymbol  Parameters and Variables  (Mean) Va S lue  Variance (if any) 
AINITt Invasion magnitude (from outside) (ha)  400  20000 
AINITtrend Trend variable in invasion magnitude (slow/rapid
rea in linear spread (ha)  400  10000 
fecte varies > 0 
uct 29,10 0 
Crop damage  ), 0 ≤ Dt ≤ 1  0.10  0.005 
F  Fixed costs of ontrol (e)  37,827  0 
Inspection are 4  0 
It Annual variab its)  g At > 0 
0.20  0 
p + ∆pt > 0 
0.4 
  Terminal time period  50  0 
0.33  0 
Trend variable in invasion probability (slow/rapid)  0.01/0.02  0 
pt Invasion induced price increase (e)  -D pB ε At / ATOT > 0 
-2  0 
 survives winter (%), 0 ≤ θt ≤ 1  0.30  0.02 
Trend variable in winter survival (slow/rapid)  0.01/0.02  0 
bility of pre-emptive control (%), 0 ≤ ωt ≤ 1  0.30  0 
trend le in failure probability  0.05  0 




d area (ha)   
TOT Total prod
D
ion area (ha)  0 
t caused by the pest (%
 pre-emptive c
g  a multiplier 
le inspection visits (vis
pB Pre-invasion (base) producer price (e) 
pt
p
Modified potato producer price (e) 
zzt Control costs per hectare in reactive control (e)  100  0 
pzztrend Trend variable in pzzt (slow/rapid)  0.02/0.04  0 
q  Base production quantity per hectare (kg)  24,400  0 
r  Discount rate (%), 0 ≤ r  ≤ 1  0.02  0 
sINITt Spread multiplier in the first year  1.5  0.05 
st Spread multiplier in nonlinear spread  1.8 
T
V Variable costs, bought services per visit (e)  256  0 
V Variable costs, control substances per hectare (e)  20  0 
V Trend variable in V  (slow/rapid)  0.10/0.20  0 
V Variable costs, eradication costs and compensation per hectare (e)  610  0 
w Failure area of pre-emptive control (%), 0 ≤ w ≤ 1  0.20  0 
w Trend variable in failure area  0.05  0 










ε  Yield effect on price 
θ
θ




Table 11. Parameter and variable values used in the quantitative empirical analysis. 
 
 
5.6 Ex-post cost-benefit analysis 
 
To validate the model calculations of protection costs, we first calculated the estimated costs for the 
period 1998−2004 using the equations and invasion data presented in section 5.3.1. We then compared 
e estimated results to the true costs incurred in that period, as reported in Table 8. The results of this 
  1998 1999  2000 2001  2002  2003 2004  Total  1999-2004 
th
comparison are shown in Table 12. 
 
True cost (e)  N/A  78,712  19,005  45,747 576,371  279,181  29,659  1,028,675 
Model result (e)  208,497  66,617  38,940 49,327 571,597 220,279  93,029  1,039,790 
Table 12. True costs versus projected costs of the protected zone 1998−2004.   93(162)
 
The model results are fairly close to the actual results, although there are discrepancies in individual 
years (especially in year 2004). This is understandable due to data being available only for limited 
number of years, as well as due to the fact that the compensation payments can be spread out to the 
invasion year plus the next two years. Hence the magnitude of the invasion in this year affects the costs 
in this year as well as in the next two years. This cannot be taken into account in the model, since we do 
not have information on which year’s invasion compensations are being paid. Thus in the model all 
compensation payments are taken to be for that year’s invasion. Given the extent of uncertainty related 
to the issue and the relatively satisfactory estimates of the costs on average, we are fairly satisfied with 
the model and the overall estimation of protection costs that it produces.  
 
Further, also primarily for model validation purposes, an ex-post analysis of the CPB protection system 
in 1998−2004 was carried out. In other words, the actual protection costs were compared to costs that 
could have ensued had we abandoned protection system in 1998. Thus the true invasion magnitudes 
were taken as given, and spread was then assumed to take place according to the two scenarios 
described earlier. The projected spread in the two scenarios and the case with no winter survival 
(corresponding to the true observations) are presented in Figure 23. 
 













Scenario 1 Scenario 2 No winter survival
 
Figure 23. Projected spread of the Colorado potato beetle 1998−2004. 
 
The data on true invasion magnitudes (infestation and additional visits) and the results of the ex-post 
analysis by year are presented in Table 13. Additional visits row refers to the number of actual 
inspection visits less the 200 visits that have been assumed to be included in fixed costs of the 
protection system. Initial invaded area is, as discussed before, assumed to be equal to the number of 
plots infested (i.e. average invaded plot size is one hectare).  
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Year  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Additional visits (visits 3 0  1,285  573  109  )  00  70  40 
In s  (plots)  149 1  0  324 6  29 
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True protection cost (e)  N/A  78,712 19,005 45,747  576,371  279,181  29,659 
Projected protection cost (e)  208,497 66,617  38,940  49,327 571,597  220,279 93,029 
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Table 13. Ex-post analysis data and results by year 1998–2004. 
nly under Scenario 1 in years 1999 and 2000 the BCR is either above or below 
epending  n whether proje  protection c Third, in the case of no winter 
survival, protection in any individua s more   than g p (the BCR is always less 
than one). 
However, looking at the results of individual years serves primarily a validation purpose, not the 
purpose of anal ich policy ically  This is because the benefits of protection 
ded spr ly mater e comi Instead dual years we can look at 
the whole 7-year , as present le 14. T n titled tection costs’ displays the 
protection costs and the BCRs when the real-life pr costs h used. The true protection 
culated g the true  the pe −2004, ear 1998 – for which data 
are lacking – th cted cost is he co  ‘proje ection costs’ displays the 
d. 
 
The first observation is that Scenario 2 gives higher benefit-cost ratios (BCRs)
42 than Scenario 1. This is 
because at the early stages of spread, the linear spread model produces higher rates of spread than the 
logistic model. Hence also the benefit of protection (the avoided spread) is higher. Second, whether we 
use the real protection costs or the projected protection costs to calculate the BCRs, the results are 
ualitatively similar. O q
one, d o cted or true
l year i
osts are used. 
expensive iving it u
 
ysing wh  is econom sensible. 
(the avoi ead) main ialise in th ng years.   of indivi
 period ed in Tab he colum  ‘true pro
otection  ave been 
cost is cal  by takin  costs for riod 1999  and for y
e proje  added. T lumn titled cted prot
are use costs and the BCRs when the protection costs produced by our model 
 
Results for the period 1998−2004  True protection costs  Projected protection costs 
Total protection cost (e)  1,237,172  1,248,287 
- Scenario 1  843,505  843,505 
- Scenario 2  1,184,033  1,184,033  Projected reactive control 
costs (e)  - No winter survival  451,185  451,185 
- Scenario 1  0.68  0.68 
- Scenario 2  0.96  0.95  BCRs 
- No winter survival  0.36  0.36 
Table 14. Ex-post analysis results for the period 1998–2004. 
 
The first observation is that over this period it does not matter whether we use the projected protection 
osts or the true protection costs to compute the BCRs. The outcomes in both cases are very close to 
each other. The second observation is that even so, the BCR is in all cases less than one. In other 
 period 1998-2004. 
c
words, the protection system has not been economically sensible over the
 
                                                           
42 Benefit-cost ratios for pre-emptive control are produced by dividing the benefits of the protection system (i.e. avoided 
reactive control costs) by the costs of the protection system. It denotes by how much one of the policies is cheaper or more 
expensive than the other. Any ratio below one implies that protection is more expensive than reactive control.   95(162)
However, to produce results with more validity, we should look not just over the seven years, but 
further into the future in order to judge whether the protection system is a sound policy over a longer 
period of time. The main lesson from the ex-post analysis when looked from the perspective of this 
ntire study is that in this type of cases it is not sufficient to look at the costs over only a short period 
 
To illustrate the spread scenarios that drive the results, Figure 24 represents the mean annual invaded 
areas in Scenarios 1 and 2 under the three different levels of change. 
 
e
of time. Hence, we need to start simulating possible future scenarios. 
 
 
5.7 Ex-ante simulation analysis 
 
5.7.1  Basic results
 
The planning horizon in the ex-ante simulation is 50 years, during which time invasion events take 
place randomly. As mentioned, the length of the analysed period is chosen to demonstrate the impact 
of changes, giving them sufficient time to materialise. The analysis is conducted for 300,000 iterations 
in order to have a sufficient representation of various stochastic variable combinations. The main 
results are presented such that the three trends are simultaneously all off, all slow or all rapid. The 
impact of individual trends is discussed later in the section on sensitivity. 
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2  
igure 24. Mean annual invaded areas under different levels of change. 
 
As can be seen, the invaded areas on average are not very big. This is due to the assumed level of 30% 
winter survival (i.e. 70% winter mortality). In fact, under no change the area invaded remains on 
average at around the level of the current invasion years. Under rapid change, on average roughly 25% 
(Scenario 1) and 7% (Scenario 2) of the entire production area is invaded after 50 years. Under the base 
case of slow change, on average about 6% (Scenario 1) and 3% (Scenario 2) of the production area is 
F  96(162)
invaded after 50 years. However, it is worth remembering that these represent the means of the 
iterations, and much higher and lower areas are achieved within individual iterations. 
 
We will first discuss the number of cases preferring each policy, followed by a discussion on the mean, 
minimum and maximum costs involved. The section also introduces the different ways to present the 
results, which will subsequently be used later on in the analysis. Following the basic results, we shall 
discuss benefit-cost ratios before moving to sensitivity analysis. We finish the chapter by discussing to 
whom the costs accrue intertemporally and intratemporally.  
 
The number of least-cost cases 
Table 15 depicts the number of iterations (cases) in which one of the policies imposes lower costs than 
the other. For instance, under Scenario 1 and in the case of all trends set at ‘slow’, in 93.6% of the 
300,000 iterations pre-emptive control imposes lower costs than reactive control. In other words, on 
st policy choice.  average in 93.6% of different realisations of future, pre-emptive control is the least-co
 
Cases %  Scenario  Pre-emptive control  Reactive control 




















able 15. Proportion of iterations in which the policy imposes lower costs than the other policy. 
When all trends are off, reactive control is the least-cost policy choice in the majority of cases (62.5% 
under Scenario 1 and 52.7% under Scenario 2). Similarly, when all trends are either slow or rapid, pre-
emptive control is the least-cost policy choice in the majority of cases (93.6% and 100.0% under 
Scenario 1 and 67.6% and 93.1% under Scenario 2). The trends thus enhance the profitability of 
protection. Whenever there is some anticipated change, pre-emptive control is the cost minimising 
strategy in 68-100% of the cases. This result can also be looked from the other perspective. If we 
assume that there will be no changes in the future, or that the pests die for certain over the winter 
(results not shown in the table), it seems that it might be economically sensible to abandon the 
protection system. Under such assumptions reactive control would be the least-cost policy choice in 53-
63% of the possible realisations of future. 
 
Mean, median, minimum and maximum costs 
neutral and there was no  Looking at the mere number of cases would suffice if society was truly risk 
ncertainty regarding the distribution of the model variables. As this is not so, the results above have to  u
be supplemented by looking at the mean, median, minimum and maximum costs of the strategies, as 
depicted in Table 16.  
 
Reactive control  Costs    Pre-emptive 
control  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
Mean (e)  8,338,400  8,043,300  8,264,900 
Median (e)  8,284,200  7,868,200  8,184,800 
Min (e)  2,229,900  856,890  1,390,300 
No trend 
Max (e)  16,379,000  25,420,000  16,837,000 
Mean (e)  13,053,000  17,258,000  13,712,000 
Median (e)  13,011,000  16,809,000  13,616,000 
Min (e)  4,182,300  3,327,300  3,600,100 
Slow trend 
Max (e)  23,344,000  57,168,000  25,536,000 
Mean (e)  18,919,000  39,976,000  21,968,000 
Median (e)  18,903,000  38,679,000  21,851,000 
Min (e)  5,970,400  11,056,000  9,372,300 
Rapid trend 
Max (e)  32,116,000  120,750,000  37,745,000 
Table 16. The discounted present value costs under each policy, scenario and trend. 
 
The table displays the present value costs of the policies under pre-emptive control, under the two 
spread scenarios of reactive control and under the special case of reactive control in which there is no   97(162)
winter survival of the beetle. The costs are discounted at a rate of two percent. In all the cases the mean 
and median costs are very close to each other, indicating that the distribution of the costs is fairly 
symmetric. The differences in mean cost estimates under pre-emptive control and the two scenarios of 
active control are not very large in the context of no change (8.3, 8.0 and 8.3 million euro, 
respectively) and to some extent under slow change (13.1, 17.3 and 13.7 million euro). In the case of 
rapid change, however, the differences become larger (18.9, 40.0 and 22.0 million euro). The mean 














Protection Scen 1 Scen 2
All no All slow All rapid  
Figure 25. Mean present value costs of protection and reactive control (two scenarios). 
 
The trends unambiguously increase the mean, minimum and maximum costs of both policies, but 
increase the costs of reactive control relatively more. This is also evident from looking at the number of 
iterations in which pre-emptive control is cheaper in Table 15. There we already noticed that pre-
emptive control basically becomes more preferred the more change there is. This is because with the 
increasing trends the pest is able to spread to larger areas, survive the winters better and becomes more 
xpensive to control, increasing the costs also in the subsequ e
re
ent periods and hence resulting in 
ely larger costs of reactive contro
riabilit ost estimates, it is remarkable how the present value costs vary from the 
minimum cost of Scenario 1 under no change of less than 900,000 euro (or less than 400,000 euro in 
inte l as discusse er) to the maximum cost of Scenario 1 under rapid change 
of nearly 121 million euro over the 50 year period. The highest possible estimate is thus over 140 times 
greater than the low rtunate if we had no way of knowing which state is 
lise. 
owever, it is possible to look at the distribution of costs and make subjective evaluations as to how 
lativ
 
  l.  
As for the va y of the c
the case of no w r surviva d lat
est estimate. This would be unfo
likely to materia  
 
H
that impacts on policy considerations. Figure 26 through to Figure 28 depict the probability density 
functions of net benefits of protection under the two scenarios and different levels of change. Net 
benefits of protection are derived simply by subtracting the cost of pre-emptive control from the cost 
of reactive control in each iteration. Values below zero then indicate that on those occasions net 
benefits of protection are negative and the protection system is more expensive than giving it up.    98(162)
 













































Figure 26. Distribution of net benefits of protection under no change in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. 
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Figure 27. Distribution of net benefits of protection under slow change in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. 
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io 2. Further, note that ther  a fairly long tail to the right under Scenario 1, 
hat the maximum net benefits of pr ection (avoi sts) can be relatively large under 
he other hand, in Scenario 2 the t benefits are fairly evenly distributed on either side 
 (positive or negative) net benefits involved.  
Figure 28. Dist rap Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
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Figure 29. Cumulative distribution of net benefits of protection in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. 
 
Plotting the cumulative density functions (CDFs) instead of the probability density functions reveals 
teresting further information. Figure 29 plots the CDF of the net benefits of protection under 
e probabilities at which the net benefits of the 
rotection system are positive (greater than zero) under the two scenarios when subjected to different 
levels of change. These levels are the same as the percentages/probabilities reported in Table 15. The 
additional value of representing the net benefit distributions this way is to be able to take into account 
the level of risk we are willing to accept. For instance, we can see that under Scenario 1 there is a 62% 
probability that the net benefits of protection are negative (no change), less than ca. 5 million euro 
(slow change) or less than ca. 23 million euro (rapid change). Similar assessment can be done for all 
probabilities and the associated net benefits. 
 
The results can also be looked at through the maximum costs. Figure 30 depicts the maximum costs 
associated with the two policies. It is clearly visible from the diagram that the maximum costs under 
rapid change in Scenario 1 can be much higher than the maximum costs associated with pre-emptive 
control. Hence, if we are fairly certain that Scenario 1 is the more adequate description of the likely 
spread of the CPB, then should we choose to abandon protection, the risk from doing so would be 
very high indeed. However, if we consider Scenario 2 to be a more truthful description (or if we think 
that there will be no change in the future), there is not so much difference in the maximum risk 
associated with the two policy options. 
 
in
different levels of change in Scenario 1 (panel on the left) and Scenario 2 (panel on the right). 
 











Protection Scen 1 Scen 2
All no All slow All rapid
 
Figure 30. Maximum present value costs of protection and reactive control (two scenarios). 
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Benefit-cost ratios 
Another way to look at the results is to compute the benefit-cost ratios (BCRs).  Here the figures 
presented are benefit-cost ratios for pre-emptive control. As mentioned briefly earlier, the ratio is 
produced by dividing the benefits of the protection system (i.e. the avoided reactive control costs) by 
the costs of the protection system. The BCR denotes by how much one of the policies is cheaper or more 
expensive than the other. For instance, the mean ratio of 1.32:1 for slow change under Scenario 1 
mean
43
s that giving up pre-emptive control would on average be 1.32 times more expensive than 
ontinuing with it. Any ratio below one implies that protection is more expensive than reactive control. 
CRs are p sented for each d in Tab
 
 1  Scenario 
c
The B re  scenario and tren le 17.  
BCRs    Scenario 2 
Mean 0.96  1.00 
Mini
Maxi
mum 0.30  0.39  NO CHANGE 
mum  1.90 
n 1.32  1.06 
2.40 
Mea
Minimum 0.54  0.57  SLOW CHANGE 
mum  1.75 
n 2.12  1.17 
Maxi 3.77 
Mea
Minimum 0.86  0.67  RAPID CHANGE 
Maximum 7.04  1.90 
Table 17. The benefit-cost ratios of each strategy and scenario. 
an one, and hence by a 
imilar argument reactive control cannot be regarded as a least cost strategy. The mean BCRs are 
presented in Figure 31. 
 
 
The minimum BCRs are systematically – regardless of the Scenario and the level of change – below 
one. Hence protection cannot be automatically regarded as a least cost strategy in all possible states of 
the world. On the other hand, the maximum BCRs are systematically greater th
s





No change Slow change Rapid change
 
Figure 31. Mean benefit-cost ratios of the two scenarios at different levels of change. 
ted by the fact 
t policy. The mean BCRs can also be compared to the BCR of 7.5 that 
ford et al. (2000) for the British CPB protected zone.  
h no change). At the other extreme reactive 
                                                          
 
s can be seen from Figure 31 and Table 17, interpretation of results is further complica A
that the mean BCRs are at a range of 0.96:1 to 2.12:1, depending on the Scenario and the level of 
change. Hence the mean BCRs are fairly close to one and on either side of it, indicating that the 
variable values that have been used are such that it cannot be established for certain which policy is the 
least-cost policy choice. 
 
However, again it can be clearly seen that the trends strengthen the viability of the protection system. 
The more we expect the climate and the pest to change, the more likely the investment in the 
rotection system is the least-cos p
was estimated by Mum
 
In the current study, at the extreme the protection system is about three times more expensive than 
reactive control (BCR of 0.30:1 under Scenario 1 wit
 
43 This section presents largely the same information as the previous section, but perhaps in a more illustrative form.   101(162)
control is about seven times more expensive than protection (BCR of 7.04:1 under Scenario 1 with 
rapid change). The maximum BCRs for the policies are presented also in Figure 32. These results again 
raise the same arguments as those already mentioned when the maximum costs of the policies were 
discussed. Somewhat more interesting is the fact the BCR under Scenario 2 is hardly affected by the 
level of change, implying that the spread of the beetle is not promoted by change as much under 
Scenario 2 as is the case under Scenario 1, or that the cost increases in both protection and reactive 
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Figure 32. Maximum benefit-cost ratios of the two scenarios at different levels of change. 
 account for uncertainty, the 
ivity analysis are now reported. A standard sensitivity analysis with low/high values 
Symbol  Value(s) analysed relative to base 
 
5.7.2  Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis 
 
We have now discussed the basic results of the quantitative analysis. As discussed earlier, uncertainty 
is often a key factor in issues related to IAS. This case is no exception. To
results of a sensit
was carried out as indicated in Table 18.  
 
Target variable 
Initial year spread multiplier  sINITt ±10% / ±20% 
Spread rate  st ±10% / ±20% 
rop damage  Dt ±10% / ±20% / ±50% 
at ±50% 
pzzt ±50% / +100% 
C
Winter survival  θt ±10% / ±20% / [0.1; 1.0] 
Aggregate fixed costs of pre-emptive control  F  ±50% 
Aggregate variable costs of pre-emptive control  V1, V2t, V3 ±50% 
Initial invasion magnitude  AINITt ±50% 
Linear spread parameter 
ost of reactive control  C
Invasion probability  γt ±50% / +100% 
Discount rate  r  ±100% 
Yield effect on price  ε  -100% 
Table 18. Sensitivity analysis. 
 
The key variables analysed are now discussed separately one by one. In the analyses that follow, all 
trends are simultaneously set at slow change. 
 
Winter survival 
Figure 33 represents the impact of different levels of winter survival on the mean BCRs. Allowing, for 
 survival implies that the mean BCR is about 30:1 under Scenario 1 and about  instance, 100% winter
14:1 under Scenario 2, suggesting very high costs for giving up the protection system. 
   102(162)
Mean benefit cost ratios with different levels of winter survival




0,00 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
 
Figure 33. Mean benefit-cost ratios with different levels of winter survival. 
 
Whereas before the mean BCRs were close to one, it is now evident that if the level of winter survival 
is even moderately greater than assumed (say, 40% instead of 30%), the mean results are no longer 
ambiguous. At 40% winter survival the mean BCR is greater than one under both Scenarios, implying 
that protection is an economically viable choice. If the level is moderately lower (say, 20%), the mean 
BCRs under both Scenarios are less than one, implying that protection is more expensive than reactive 
ontrol. Furthermore, slightly greater changes in the survival level (assume, say, 60% survival) take the 
.  
ival naturally affects not only the BCRs but also the mean and maximum costs 
c
mean BCR to 14:1 under Scenario 1 and to about 3:1 under Scenario 2. Hence the importance of this 
variable is immense, and the implications of the analysis are very much dependent on the value of 
winter survival that is chosen
 
The level of winter surv
of the policies. Figure 34 presents the mean (left hand side panel) and maximum (right hand side panel) 
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Figure 34. Mean (LHS) and maximum policy (RHS) costs with different levels of winter survival. 
 
Remember that the present value mean costs under slow change were about 13-17 million euro, and the 
maximum costs about 23-57 million euro. The mean costs with higher levels of winter survival can 
become substantially greater than these values. For instance, assuming perfect (100%) winter survival, 
e mean present value cost of reactive control would be about 490 million euro under Scenario 1 and 
der Scenario 2. The cost of protection would remain at about 17 million euro.  
 
th
about 231 million euro un  103(162)
A similar phenomenon can be seen happening with the present value maximum costs, which under 
100% winter survival would be about 755 million euro under Scenario 1 and about 411 million euro 
under Scenario 2. Note that the increase in maximum costs under Scenario 1 when the level of winter 
urvival increases from 80% to 100% is not very big. This is due to the fact that already with 80% 
survival level the species can rapidly spread to the whole production area, and significant further 
damages are simply not possible.  
 
Because winter survival turned out to be the most important single variable affecting the results, we 
undertook the analysis also under the assumption that there is no winter survival. This analysis acts as a 
worst case scenario for pre-emptive control – after all, if the beetles die for certain every winter, is there 
any justification in investing resources in eradicating them every summer. The results, presented in 
Table 19, in fact suggest that there is not. The aggregate costs are unambiguously lower with reactive 
control than with pre-emptive control and apart from a single iteration, also the BCRs are all below 
one. 
 
Scenarios 1 and 2 
Min / Mean / Max BCR 
s
Costs    Pre-emptive control  Reactive control 
Mean (e)  8,213,700  3,825,700 
Min (e)  2,194,400  364,680  No trend 
Max (e)  16,100,000  9,724,600 
0.10 / 0.46 / 0.82 
Mean (e)  11,565,000  7,449,100 
Min (e)  3,547,500  1,659,400  Slow trend 
Max (e)  20,834,000  16,235,000 
0.33 / 0.64 / 1.02 
Mean (e)  15,795,000  8,926,300 
Min (e)  4,841,800  2,649,100  Rapid trend 
Max (e)  26,468,000  16,868,000 
0.29 / 0.56 / 0.87 
Table 19. The discounted present value costs and benefit-cost ratios in the case of no winter survival. 
 
Crop damage 
Figure 35 presents the impact of different levels of crop damage on mean BCRs. The baseline crop 
e figure presents the mean BCRs when that damage level is reduced  damage is 10% of the crop, and th
and increased by 10%, 20% and 50%. In other words, it is at a range 0.05-0.15. 
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Figure 35. Mean benefit-cost ratios with different levels of crop damage by the beetle. 
 
The first observation is that the results are not as drastic as with winter survival. Of course, winter 
survival was analysed for all possible levels, and here the maximum change is 50% of the original value. 
However, as is natural, greater level of damages increases the profitability of protection. On the other 
and, a 50% reduction in damages (thus assuming 5% yield reduction due to the CPB) would take the  h
mean BCR below one under both scenarios. Hence, if we can be certain that the beetle only results in   104(162)
5% of crop damages (and all other variables are as assumed), then it would be economically sensible to 
abandon the protection system. 
 
Invasion probability 
Figure 36 presents the impact of different levels of invasion probability on the mean costs (left hand 
side panel) and the mean BCRs (right hand side panel).  




































efit-cost ratios with differen ls of invasion probability. 
t on the mean BCRs is again relatively minor, largely due to the fact that more 
ts of both pr  
ecause in this e the more frequent invasions also mean that the 
e, hence resulting in ater costs. The im ct on the BCR of Scenario 2, 
 higher the invasion probability, the less economically viable 
rotection becomes. This is likely to be due to the fact that in this case, the spread is slower and the 
The impact of invasion probability on present value mean costs of the policies is in fact fairly sizable 
and approximately proportionate to the change in the invasion probability. Note also that even a 50% 
reduction in invasion probability (meaning that there would be an invasion on average every six years) 
still results in a BCR of about 1.2:1 under both scenarios. Hence the fact that invasions come very 
seldom is not automatically a valid argument for abandoning protection.  
 
Spread multiplier
Figure 36. Mean costs and ben t leve
 
Overall the impac
frequent invasions increase the cos
nner, b
e-emptive and reactive control. The BCR of Scenario 1
is affected in a positive ma  cas
beetle is able to spread mor  gre pa
however, is negative in the sense that the
p
impact on protection costs is thus greater than the impact on reactive control costs. 
 
 
Figure 37 presents the impact of different levels of logistic spread multiplier on the mean BCRs.  
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Figure 37. Mean benefit-cost ratios with different levels of logistic spread multiplier. 
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It is evident that even fairly small changes (10%) in the logistic spread rate can have a relatively large 
impact on the mean BCR in Scenario 1. Note that Scenario 2 is unaffected by changes in logistic 
spread, as it assumes linear spread. A 20% increase in the logistic spread rate already increases the BCR 
under Scenario 1 such that it is close to 2:1.  
 
Given that the eventual spread of the beetle is affected to a large extent by winter survival and (logistic) 
spread multiplier, and that both of these have now been found to be very important from the policy 
analysis point of view, it is worth asking to what extent we can rely on the current estimates of the 
variable values. The answer is, frankly, we do not know. We have very little, if any, data available on the 
levels of winter survival or spread rate in Finland for the beetle, and hence there is a great deal of 
uncertainty involved. The best approach in this case is probably to present the results with a range of 
outcomes and let the decision on how much risk w  are willing to accept be made by those who decide 
Reactive control cost
e
on the policy in the first place. 
 
 
Figure 38 presents the impact of different levels of reactive control cost on mean present value costs 
and mean BCRs. Note that the smallest unit of change is 50% in this case. Note also that the cost of 
pre-emptive control is naturally unaffected. 
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Figure 38. Mean costs and benefit-cost ratios with different levels of reactive control costs. 
nder Scenario 2 such that its value becomes less than one and reactive control becomes on average 
 
As can be seen from the figures, the resulting changes in either present value mean costs or mean BCRs 
are fairly insignificant, even when reactive control cost is increased by 100%. This is primarily due to 
reactive control cost representing fairly small proportion of total policy costs. Thus whether the 
reactive control cost is 50 euro per hectare or 200 euro per hectare has little relevance from the policy 
perspective.  
 
Having said that, it can be noted that a 50% reduction in reactive control cost reduces the mean BCR 
u
profitable under Scenario 2. 
 
Fixed protection costs 
Figure 39 presents the impact of a 50% change in the fixed costs of protection on mean present value 
costs and mean BCRs. Naturally the costs of reactive control under both Scenarios remain unchanged. 
   106(162)
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Figure 39. Mean costs and benefit-cost ratios with different levels of fixed protection costs. 
 
As can be seen, the impact of fixed protection costs on both the mean present value costs and the 
mean BCRs is practically insignificant. This is largely due to the fact that fixed costs do after all present 
only a very small fraction of the total costs. 
 
The implication is that even if the 38,000 euro or so that is annually spent on maintaining the 
rotection system is in some sense a significant amount of money, it makes no practical relevance for 
ce point of view 




the profitability of the protection system. It is the other types of costs involved that are much more 
significant. It also implies that by saving on the fixed costs it is not possible to change the optimal 
policy. Naturally the fixed costs should be efficiently used, but from the policy choi
th
 
Figure 40 presents the impact of a 50% change in the variable costs of protection on mean present 
value costs and mean BCRs. Again, the costs of reactive control under both Scenarios remain naturally 
unchanged.  
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Figure 40. Mean costs and benefit-cost ratios with different levels of variable protection costs. 
 
Although the change itself is also fairly large (50%), it is interesting to note that the mean BCRs are 
altered quite significantly with the change. For instance, both scenarios produce mean BCRs higher 
than 1.9:1 when the variable costs are increased by 50%, whereas both give ratios of less than 1:1 when 
the variable costs are decreased by 50%.  
 
The impact of variable protection costs on the present value mean costs of the policies is proportionate 
to the change in the costs, but the impact on the mean BCRs is clearly greater. Together with the 
results of the previous section on fixed costs, this implies clearly that it is the variable costs of the 
protection system rather than the fixed costs that are important from the point of view of economic 
viability of the policies. 
   107(162)
Overall sensitivity of the variables 
The sensitivity analysis was conducted for a wide range of values and only the main results were 
discussed above. For instance the sensitivity analysis of the linear spread rate and the initial year spread 
multiplier were not presented due to the fact that they were found to be insignificant. Other fairly 
insignificant variables include the reactive control cost and the fixed costs of the protection system. The 
variables that were found to be significant include winter survival, logistic spread rate and the variable 
ost of protection. The impacts of the seven variables discussed above are presented in Table 20.  
 











Mean cost           
Protection 0.00  0.13-0.15  0.91 0.00 0.00  0.09  0.91 
Scenario 1  0.64-0.72  1.32-2.57  0.94-0.98 1.13-2.18 0.23  0.00  0.00 
Scenario 2  0.64-0.72  0.80-1.00 0.69-0.73  0.00  0.23  0.00  0.00 
BCR              
Scenario 1  0.64-0.72  1.22-2.37 0.02-0.16  1.13-2.19  0.23 -0.09-0.10  -0.62-1.65 
Scenario 2  0.64-0.72  0.69-0.84 -0.12-0.34  0.00  0.23 -0.09-0.10  -0.62-1.65 
Table 20. The sensitivity analysis ‘elasticity’ values. 
 
The figures in Table 20 are a type of elasticities, indicating by how much the mean present value costs 
and the mean BCRs change given a change in the column variable. For instance, a figure of 1.32 means 
that a one per cent increase in winter survival will
ble changes the mean costs or the 
ean BCR in percentage terms by more than the change in the variable itself is. Thus the higher the 
he table confirms the visual observation that winter survival is an important variable especially under 
Scenario 1, in terms of both mean costs (elasticity 1.32-2.57) and the mean BCR (elasticity 1.22-2.37). 
Similarly logistic spread rate is important (elasticity 1.13-2.19) for both costs and the BCR. The impact 
of variable costs of protection is large on the mean BCR (maximum elasticity of -1.65) but somewhat 
smaller on the mean costs (0.91). In the other end, the insignificant values include the reactive control 
cost (maximum elasticity of 0.23) and the fixed cost of protection (maximum elasticity of 0.10). For 
instance, a 10% increase in the fixed costs of protection changes the mean cost of protection policy by 
0.9% and the mean BCR by a maximum of -1.0%. 
 
5.7.3  Change through trends 
 
In the basic results all the trends were simultaneously either off, slow or rapid. In the sensitivity section, 
resented in Table 
1. The four categories of change are i) domestic change; ii) regional change; iii) local and regional 
 increase the mean present value costs by 1.32%. A 
figure greater than one hence implies that change in the column varia
m
figure is, the greater is its impact on the outcome. The range of values given for some variables is due 
to different elasticities arising from changes of different sizes in the column variable. 
 
T
all the trends were set at slow. In this section the trends are analysed separately, as p
2
change; and iv) development of pesticide resistance. 
 






No trends  no  no  no 
All trends, slow (base)  slow  slow  slow 
All trends, rapid  rapid  rapid  rapid 
omestic climatic chan D
D
ge, slow  slow  no  no 
omestic climatic change, rapid  rapid  no  no 
Regional change, slow  no  slow  no 
Regional  change,  rapid  no rapid no 
Regional and domestic climatic change, slow  slow  slow  no 
Regional and domestic climatic change, rapid  rapid  rapid  no 
Increasing pesticide resistance, slow  no  no  slow 
Increasing pesticide resistance, rapid  no  no  rapid 
Table 21. Simulation runs of the different trends.  
 
The impacts of the different trends on the mean BCRs and the mean present value costs of the policies 
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All no Reg change, slow Reg change, rapid All no Reg change, slow Reg change, rapid
 








































Scen 1 Scen 2
All no Change, slow Change, rapid
Protection Scen 1 Scen 2
o
All no Change, slow Change, rapid
 










































Protection Scen 1 Scen 2
s
Scen 1 Scen 2
All no Pest res, slow Pest res, rapid
All no Pest res, slow Pest res, rapid  
Figure 44. Mean benefit-cost ratios and mean present value costs with increasing pesticide resistance. 
 
On basis of the above graphs, domestic change is the most important trend that has been specified 
here. It has a fairly substantial effect on the mean costs of reactive control as well as on the BCRs. This   109(162)
is consistent with the resu
urvival is the single most
lts of the standard sensitivity analysis, where it was found out that winter 
 important variable, and it is that same variable that is increasing in domestic 






well as on the mean present value costs. This of course may simply be due to the fact that the trend has 
bee eci
insignifican
earlier finding that the reactive control cost is fairly insignificant and can be increased by 50% without 
ny real influence on the results. Whether its value has been set too low in the analysis is a point of 
iscussion. 
 
inally, it must be emphasised that the functional form and the magnitude of the trends analysed are 
ble and likely in the future, but 
ntertemporal and intratemporal costs. 
n initially expected (Heal and 
s
change but not in any other separate trend.  
 
Regional change (the impact of increasing invasion probability and magnitude) plays a role in increasing 
the mean present value costs of both policies, but not so much on the relative profitability of different 
policies (BCRs). In fact, the BCR of protection is even decreased under Scenario 2 with regional 
hange. This is likely to be due to the c
the pest has not had an opportunity to spread yet under reactive control (winter survival remains 
unaffected at the fairly low level of 30%), the variable costs of protection are higher than the reactive 
control costs. Hence the protection strategy becomes more expensive in this case.  
 
The impact of domestic and regional change combined is similar to the impacts of domestic change, 
only that the magnitude of changes is somewhat increased because now also regional change takes 
place. In fact, under rapid change the mean costs and mean BCR are increased quite a lot compared to
es ange alone. This is because there are now two effects at play: there are more beetles comi t ng 
nnu  and more of them also survive the winter in proportional terms. 
reasin pesticide resistance is seen to play only a minor role, both in terms of impacts on BCRs as 
n sp fied to be too weak, but it is also plausible that the increase in control costs is relatively 




not based on hard and solid science. The trends themselves are plausi
the actual values they take are subject to much scientific uncertainty. 
 
5.7.4  Intertemporal and intratemporal issues 
 
It is finally worth spending a moment discussing the issue of to whom the policy costs accrue in the 
society. This section discusses both i
 
Intertemporal issues include questions such as how costs are distributed among years, what is the 
impact of the discount rate, and whether we should be concerned about large initial investment at the 
present time or large costs later on. There are two types of so-called option value impacts with 
contradictory implications involved (Heal and Kriström 2002). First, by waiting and not acting now, we 
could get more information about the true impacts of local or regional changes, for instance that they 
might be smaller than initially expected. Thus we could formulate better policy later on, instead of 
currently having to invest in expensive prevention. Second, by acting now in a precautionary way and 
preserving the current conditions we may avoid the irreversibilities that are associated with change in 
the future, for instance if it is possible that impacts will be greater tha
Kriström 2002). 
 
Intertemporal costs can be analysed by looking at the annual costs of the policy alternatives, either 
discounted or not discounted. We show in Figure 45 the annual net benefits of protection (cost of 
reactive control less the cost of protection) discounted at 2% and given slow change.    110(162)
 














Scenario 1 Scenario 2  
Figure 45. The annual net benefits of protection with slow change. 
 
rom the diagram it can be seen that the protected zone can be seen as an investment that may  F
produce negative net benefits in the early years, but given change and the spread of the beetle the 
discounted net benefits may increase rapidly over time. This is because the benefit of protection, i.e. 
preventing the spread of the pest, is assumed to take place mainly in later years. This result also helps to 
put into perspective and confirm the results of the ex-post analysis, which seemed to suggest that the 
protected zone is not the least-cost policy choice if only the first few years are analysed. 
 
However, the shape of the mean annual net benefit curve depends on out assumptions regarding 
ction thus materialise towards the later years of the analysis. 
change, as illustrated in Figure 46. In the event of no change, the net benefits barely become positive 
and continue hovering at around zero. This is not an inevitable characteristic of no change, but rather 
results from the fact that the mean invaded area (recall Figure 24) settles at only slightly above zero. 
This, in turn, is determined primarily by the level of winter survival and the magnitude of spread. Thus, 
again, the level of winter survival is important – should it be somewhat higher, also the no change area 
would begin to increase over time and so would the net benefits of protection. This is also consistent 
with the earlier finding that if there is no change, protection is barely the least-cost policy choice, with a 
BCR at around 1.00. Hence it is logical that the net benefits are around zero. In contrast, under rapid 
change the shape of the mean annual net benefit curves is similar to that under slow change, but the 
increase in the net benefits that ensue in the future is much greater. Under rapid change the larger net 
enefit of prote b
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2  
Figure 46. The annual net benefits of protection with no change and rapid change. 
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Another way to consider to whom the costs accrue intertemporally is to look at the impact of the 
discount rate on the results. Figure 47 depicts the impact of a ±100% change in the discount rate on 
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Figure 47. The impact of discount rate on mean benefit-cost ratios and maximum present value costs. 
 
he mean BCRs remain relatively unaffected. This is primarily due to the fact that th T e discount rate 
 impact on the policy costs, but at least in the current 
 system. It can naturally be the case that the producers have to contribute towards 
affects the costs in both policies in a fairly equal manner. Of course, if there are large costs later on, 
then increasing the discount rate makes the present value of these costs smaller, hence favouring 
reactive control in the present case. This can be seen from the mean BCRs in that increases in the 
discount rate reduce the BCR – in effect making protection less profitable. The changes, however, are 
relatively minor. 
 
The maximum present value costs are affected more than the BCRs, which is also expected. The 
present value maximum cost of Scenario 1 (with slow change) in the baseline case is about 57 million 
euro. With a 100% reduction in the discount rate (i.e. with no discounting) this cost is over 120 million 
euro. On the other hand, when discounted at 4%, it is less than 35 million euro. Over such long time 
cales discounting and the discount rate have a big s
case have little impact on the BCRs. For this the future generations are probably thankful. 
 
The strategy choice also has effects regarding to whom the costs accrue intratemporally. Possible 
invasion induced price increases unambiguously lead to losses in consumer surplus, and an invasion 
ould also impact the composition of producers to whom the profits accrue, as discussed earlier in  w
Section 3.1.3. In the case of reactive control, such effects depend on the area invaded (and hence crop 
losses) and on how the price responds to the invasion. The pre-emptive strategy too has to be funded 
by some means. If it is the taxpayers that end up paying the bill, they in essence are subsidising the 
producers.  
 
Further division is between those producers that have been subjected to the invasion and those who 
have not. Those unaffected may even benefit from the presence of the pest, if the prices increase. 
However, this benefit may be short-sighted, as also the risk of invasion to these production areas 
naturally increases. It has to be noted, too, that we have assumed the consumers to carry the full costs 
f the protection o
these costs in a way or another. To whom (producers versus consumers/taxpayers) the mean policy 
costs accrue is depicted in Figure 48.  
   112(162)
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igure 48. Who bears the policy costs intratemporally.  F
 
Figure 48 presents clearly that protection only results in consumer costs. The reactive control scenarios 
on the other hand result in both consumer costs and producer benefits (negative costs). These benefits 
accrue to producers on aggregate due to the price response. Of course, each individual producer may 
either benefit or suffer, depending on whether s/he has been subjected to the invasion and subsequent 
additional costs or not. In addition, the aggregate benefits of producers are in all cases smaller than the 
aggregate consumer costs and hence the overall impact is negative. The extent of benefits for the 
producers is naturally dependent on the price response that is assumed. It is fairly evident that the 
igher the price increase, the better off the p h roducers on aggregate are under reactive control, whereas 
eem 
odd at  rice 
increas t be 
interna ce increase, and the market structure has to be such 
at consumers are willing to pay more for the goods. The result obtained here is not too unusual: for 
esult was obtained 
(Burrel
 
Price changes thus affect the parties to whom the costs and benefits accrue substantially, but they do 
not have overall policy effects. It should be stressed that whatever the price response, the aggregate 
for the consumers the situation is the opposite.  
 
The fact that one group on average may benefit from the harmful organism being present may s
first sight, but is a fairly simple result that follows from the market conditions and the p
es. It is worth noting that it depends on two conditions in particular: there canno
tional competition that would prevent the pri
th
instance in the analysis of the classical swine fever in the Netherlands a similar r
l and Mangen 2001; Mangen et al. 2002). 
policy costs remain unaffected. Hence the overall conclusions in this study are not affected by the 
assumption regarding the price response for as long as an equal weight is placed on both producers and 
consumers. We have assumed equal weights for both groups, but in reality the case may be that one of 
the groups is given more weight in decision making for instance due to stronger lobbying. If this is the 
case, then the aggregation of policy costs as carried out in this study is no longer appropriate, and the 
conclusions regarding the optimal policy do not hold. However, hopefully any transfers of income are 
assigned separately, not as a part of invasive pest policies. The conclusion nonetheless is that whether 
there is an invasion or not is not the only issue to take into account. It is also important to consider 
how the market environment responds to the shock and how any counter-measures are to be financed.   113(162)
6. DISCUSSION 
 
This final section presents some conclusions on basis of the discussion and analysis carried out in this 
study. The main results and policy implications of the study are discussed first. That is followed by 
discussion on certain special themes, including i) prevention versus adaptation; ii) issues beyond 
conomic efficiency; and iii) uncertainty and irreversibility. The section concludes e  by making 
otected zone policy in Finland, explicitly accounting for 
suggestions towards future research. 
 
As has been seen, IAS are capable for causing significant economic impacts and their management is 
characterised by the public good properties involved. This thesis has discussed the economic impacts of 
IAS and the policies used in controlling their dispersal. The specific aim was to evaluate the economic 
esirability of continuing the CPB pr d
uncertainty and local change in the policy analysis. The answers to the four specific aims posed in the 
introduction will be summarised below in Section 6.1. These aims were to: 
i)  review and evaluate the scale, type and magnitude of impacts IAS are capable of causing; 
ii)  specify the policy problem in IAS management and review how the institutional framework 
in Finland addresses the issue; 
iii)  review existing cost-benefit studies on agricultural IAS and determine the components that 
such studies should include; 
iv)  undertake an economic risk assessment of the Colorado potato beetle in Finland and 
evaluate the conditions under which it is optimal to prevent a species from establishing in 
this particular case. 
 
 
6.1 The main findings of the study 
 
Topic 1: Scale, type and magnitude of impacts of invasive alien species 
Invasive alien species are a global phenomenon. They are found in most geographic locations, in most 
ategories of living organisms and in most ecosystem c  types. They thus present a threat to biological 
sia and Finland 





Ind al  ies under a range of conditions, accounting 
for  riet hese studies in an 
agr ral  the only country 
wh  fa al level 
(Pim l e  plant 
dise an S$120 
bill Res tors or species types, 
incl g A of the issue (Bertram, 
in Jay et al. 2003; Colautti et al. 2006; Martin 2003; Reinhardt et al. 2003). Aggregate cost estimates as 
diversity at all levels and have a negative impact on the goods and services provided by ecosystems 
(Vitousek et al. 1996). The potential costs caused by IAS are wide-ranging, but can be roughly divided 
into four categories: control costs, production losses, secondary market effects, and health, 
environmental, and cultural effects. 
 
The magnitude of the invasion threat can be exemplified by the magnitude of actions in some potential 
pathways. In Finland, in 2004, non-domestic civil aircraft from abroad carried about nine million 
assengers and over 120,000 tonnes of cargo and mail, international trains between Rus p
carried 252,000 passengers and 15 million tonnes of cargo, harbours received directly from abroad 53 
million tonnes of imported international cargo and over eight million passengers, and the internet 
pro es gl vid obal commercial possibilities for purchasing thousands of 
nis ivil Aviation Administration website; Finnish Maritime Administration website; McNeely 
1; V roup website). This anecdotal example from a relatively remote country illustrates the huge 
entia r species and diseases to be spread rapidly around the globe.  
ividu studies have been conducted for a range of spec
a a v y of different impacts and using different estimation techniques. Some of t
is still effectively icultu  setting were summarised in Table 5. The United States 
ere a irly thorough economic study on IAS damages has been conducted at the nation
ente t al. 1999; 2005). The study includes control costs, production losses to animal and
  estimating the annual costs as about U ases d pests, and costs of certain human diseases, 
  ion. ults from other countries where cost estimates exist for particular sec
udin ustralia, Canada, Germany and New Zealand, suggest a similar scope   114(162)
such do not provide guidance on individual management questions, but are useful for pointing out the 
scale of the issue.  
 
Topic 2: Policy problem in management and the institutional framework 
IAS control is a public good of the ‘weakest link’ type (Perrings et al. 2002) or of the ‘weaker link’ type 
(Burnett 2005). It is a public good because it is both non-excludable in production and non-rival in 
consumption. It is non-excludable because once protection against an invading species is provided, any 
ne member cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits. If the pest is prevented from invading, 
 appropriate regulatory regime; ii) an appropriate set of 
roperty rights with supporting institutions; iii) a compensation mechanism; and iv) a structure of 
o
nobody can be prevented from enjoying the protection service. Further, it is non-rival because any one 
member’s consumption of protection does not reduce the amount of protection enjoyed by others. 
Because of these two properties it is difficult to charge a price from consumers of the protection 
service, and hence public goods are typically under-provided by the free market. 
 
Moreover, protection against IAS is of the ‘weakest link’ type because its effectiveness depends on the 
weakest link in the protection chain. It does not matter how well other parts of the chain provide 
protection if the species gets into the country through the weakest control point. Instead of a weakest 
link issue, Burnett (2005) has described IAS protection as a weaker link public good. In this case the 
investment of those who invest more on protection is negatively affected by those who invest less, but 
those who invest more are still better protected against IAS than those who invest less (Burnett 2005). 
 
Nonetheless, the public good property partly explains the need for the involvement of the state in 
protection. To manage a weakest (or weaker) link problem related to IAS, Perrings et al. (2002; 2000) 
suggest the following policy responses: i) an
p
incentives and disincentives. Let us review how the legislation in force in Finland (as discussed in 
Section 2.3) performs given these four criteria. 
 
1. An appropriate regulatory regime: The regulatory regime consists primarily of Council Directives 
2000/29/EC and 92/43/EEC, Council Regulation 338/97, Act on the Protection of Plant Health, the 
Nature Conservation Act and their supporting institutions. The established authority dealing with plant 
ealth protection in Finland is the Plant Production Inspection Centre (KTTK). Its responsibilities and 
e health of natural ecosystems the system may not be sufficient. Council 
irective 92/43/EEC allows prevention of an introduction as an option if the member states consider 
h
rights are set out in a fairly specific manner in the Act on the Protection of Plant Health, including the 
right – in face of an immediate threat – to act without a prior permission by the Ministry, as well as the 
right for executive assistance in policy implementation. Systems using a list of prohibited species (black 
list) often suffer from the major weakness of such lists being too rigid to be updated effectively. The 
fact that legislation allows the authorities to target also species outside these lists is a welcome 
improvement. 
 
Provided that the weaknesses of using a black list system can be overcome to a satisfactory extent, the 
regime seems adequate for purposes of protecting health of productive plants. It also seems to function 
properly in Finland, at least in the potato sector (European Commission 2002). The recent actions 
against the CPB have in addition raised the knowledge capacity of the KTTK, and it seems that they 
are now better equipped also against other invasive plant pests.
44  
 
However, for protecting th
D
it necessary but does not require it in any way. The national Nature Conservation Act is more designed 
to deal with conservation of existing endangered species and habitats than with the threat posed by 
IAS. Moreover, it emphasises that there has to be cause or reasonable cause to suspect that a species 
may be harmful to native species. Plant introductions are still allowed in gardens and fields and for 
silvicultural purposes also outside these areas. Thus the implication is that nature can be protected 
provided that doing so does not compromise economic production possibilities. There is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with this principle, but the problem is that there is no system or resources for 
                                                           
44 Hannu Kukkonen, Head of the Plant Protection Department at KTTK, verbal communication.   115(162)
assessing whether such an introduction is economically viable when the possible impacts on ecosystem 
ions (control of airplanes, 
ains and ships). The result is that no single body is responsible for a coordinated response to manage 
health are properly accounted for. 
 
Another point to make is that although the powers and responsibilities for protecting the health of 
productive plants are clearly given to the KTTK under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the 
wider picture of IAS management and control is distributed in a vague manner among many different 
actors. These include, among other actors, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Ministry of the Interior (customs and border control), the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs (foreign commerce) and the Ministry of Transport and Communicat
tr
all the invasive alien species in all the invasion pathways that there exists. The same argument applies to 
the wider issue of managing biosecurity in general. 
 
2. An appropriate set of property rights with supporting institutions: If there existed property rights to 
pest-free production, the market might solve the IAS problem altogether. Given appropriate property 
ghts the neighbours of a producer with IAS on his fields could in theory be given the right to sue for 
ompensation if the species spread to their fields. There has been recent interest in for instance South 
Africa for applying such a property rights regime (Perrings et al. 2002).  
d be very difficult to implement under the conditions discussed 
ilities involved may however be so unknown that private sector insurers may not 




Despite this, such property rights woul
in this study (e.g. spread primarily through winds rather than with commercial activity). One system 
that has been suggested for species that spread through clear pathways is a special invasion fund or 
compulsory insurance that the firms associated with the risky sector or pathway need to invest in. In 
case of an invasion, the ensuing eradication costs would be paid from the fund or the collected 
insurance payments. If the parties involved make investments that would reduce the risk of an invasion 
through their activities, part of their investment could be returned or their insurance payments reduced. 
The risks and probab
b
setting up the system. 
 
Given the Finnish legislation with regard to productive plant health, there seems to be no immediate 
reason to implement such a system. In the case of the Colorado potato beetle that spreads mainly by 
natural means such a system would be, as mentioned, difficult to execute in practice. For species 
spreading primarily by means of tourism or trade the approach might be much more attractive. 
 
3. A compensation mechanism: Compensation from those who gain from the activity that spreads an 
IAS to those who lose as a result of the introduction is not applicable to the current case. This has 
again to do with the spread medium discussed above. As for other types of compensation, the Act on 
e Protection of Plant Health allows compensation to be paid to producers for costs incurred in 
onal compensation to be paid. 
owever, the condition of spread through commerce prevents Finland from applying for funding for 
th
eradication procedures. Such compensation makes the system more effective in that more agents are 
involved and committed to eradication. However, it is also worth remembering the point made by 
Butler and Maher (1986), who argued that if compensation is paid to the victims of an externality, it 
should not be based on uncorrected marginal damages, as this would induce the victims to undertake 
too little control. 
 
In the case of the Colorado potato beetle in Finland the state has covered the costs involved in 
counter-measures together with the value of the lost crop. Whether the system functions flawlessly in 
practice and all the losses are actually compensated for in a timely fashion is a matter that cannot be 
established on a theoretical basis. The compensation payments have so far been fairly small – a total of 
about 74,000e in the period 1998−2003, the vast majority of them incurring in 2002 and 2003. At the 
Community level, Council Directive 2000/29/EC allows also nati
H
the expenses incurred in fighting the Colorado potato beetle. In addition, there is no system to 
compensate individual actors (or for that matter anybody else) for actions taken against IAS that are 
harmful to the environment – it is only agents growing productive plants that are compensated.   116(162)
 
4. A structure of incentives and disincentives: The compensation mechanism discussed above is part of 
the incentive mechanism of the existing legislation. Another incentive that is executed is education. 
Compliance with law is promoted by informing the producers and the public about the threat 
resented by particular IAS and the benefits to different actors from co-operating with the appropriate 
eed to be followed by individual producers. This 
gain is strictly controlled only in the case of productive plants and their pests. Also the Nature 
ng legislation, even though their impact 
ay be much greater than that of directly production damaging IAS. A small but hopeful move is the 
rs limited protection from this menacing problem. Multiple federal laws and 
programs address invasive species in a fragmented manner and primarily focus on the impacts to our 
y framework, whereas the case is 
use mainly ecological damage. The case is all the more so now that the 
p
authorities. Again, this applies mainly to pests of plant production.  
 
On the disincentive side, there are penalties for not abiding by the regulations. First of all, the 
producers have an obligation to inform the authorities in case they find on their fields any of the 
quarantine pests that Finland has a protected zone for. Second, the eradication and other measures 
ordered by the Plant Production Inspection Centre n
a
Conservation Act carries penalties if it is breached, but the regulations are so loose for IAS that it may 
be doubted whether anyone will ever be held legally liable on their basis. 
 
Thus, overall it seems that the European Union and the Finnish systems perform satisfactorily 
according to these four criteria. However, this is primarily the case for species that threaten economic 
systems directly, i.e. through the production process of for instance food or timber. Species that may be 
harmful to ecosystem dynamics and impact on the economic systems indirectly through various 
interlinkages are much less regulated and controlled by the existi
m
new Act on the Protection of Plant Health, where a pest is defined as a species that may impact on 
productive plants either directly or indirectly.
45
 
Overall the case seems to be the same as in New Zealand (Jay et al. 2003)
46 and the United States, 
where according to a report by the Environmental Law Institute (Filbey et al. 2002): 
“[C]urrent federal law offe
natural resource-based industries, particularly agriculture; thus, they fail to adequately cover invasive species 
that cause widespread damage to our natural areas.” 
 
Tomminen (2000), of the Finnish Plant Production Inspection Centre, echoes this:  
“[T]he main objective of plant inspection is to prevent new harmful pests and diseases of plants in 
horticulture, agriculture and forestry from spreading into Finland … the problem, therefore, is approached 
almost purely from the economical and anthropocentric point of view. There is little attention paid to 
whether an accidentally or intentionally introduced new organism will replace a native one, for instance.” 
 
In conclusion, invasions by species that cause agri-, horti- or silvicultural damage – including the 
olorado potato beetle – seem to be fairly well covered by the polic C
not so for the species that ca
more powerful Act on the Protection of Plant Health has replaced the old Plant Protection Act. The 
future challenge lies in considering the whole issue of invasive alien species and diseases in a biosecurity 
framework. Within this framework, the issue would be managed in an integrated fashion from the point 
of view of multiple threats, multiple pathways, multiple parties involved and multiple methods and 
stages of control. In doing so, the potential negative impacts on international commerce need to be 
borne in mind. Transparency and scientific basis of the protective measures are important, and even 
then, as pointed out by Margolis et al. (2005), the information requirements to differentiate legitimate 
public good protection from disguised protection may be substantial. Therefore, many challenges lie 
ahead in planning a functioning institutional framework to deal with the issue. 
 
                                                           
45 For species that have the potential to cause harm to human health a different set of regulation applies. This aspect is left 
out from the scope of this study. It is worthwhile noting, however, that also these species and diseases are integrally related 
to the larger biosecurity framework in which matters should be considered. 
46 However, at this point it has to be noted that the procedures in New Zealand are almost from another planet when 
compared to the Finnish regulation. Despite the much stricter procedures, the main weaknesses seem to be the same.   117(162)
Topic 3: Economic studies on invasive alien species and their key components 
In Section 3.4 several cost-benefit studies on invasive species were reviewed. Let us summarise some 
ey points regarding these analyses of (agricultural) IAS. First of all, the policy alternatives evaluated are 
n this study we attempted to include 
ome of the uncertainty involved through stochastic analysis and through a fairly extensive sensitivity 
ountries issues related to development need 
 be included in the assessment. However, the main point is that once a proper assessment has been 
ses; and iv) uncertainty 
 insufficiently addressed. They conclude that most studies “focus on ex-post evaluation, on control 
nd on use values” (Born et al. 2005). Many of their points 
iii)  Describe in detail which costs and whose costs are included in the analysis and how they are 
alysis affect the results. 
vi ifferent agents. 
ix
x  measures. 
                                                        
k
often simply undertaking some policy versus not undertaking it. The most common analysis seems to 
be between the current protective policy versus abandoning it. Wider policy options are generally either 
not available or not analysed. This is the case also in the analysis conducted in this study.  
 
Second, it is often only the direct, easily monetised costs that are included in the quantitative analysis. 
Costs that are more difficult to analyse are often ignored altogether, even though in the cases where 
they are included they turn out to be extremely important. In this study, although we exclude some cost 
categories that are difficult to monetise, we discuss those impacts qualitatively and highlight the relative 
importance or non-importance of each.  
 
Third, sensitivity analyses are mostly very inadequate, if conducted at all. As discussed before, this is 
surprising considering the magnitude of uncertainties involved. I
s
analysis. Of course, undertaking such an analysis and interpreting the results takes some time and 
effort, but given the additional information that can be retrieved from a sensitivity analysis, we find it to 
be an integral part of any cost-benefit assessment. 
 
Two further observations from published cost-benefit assessments deal with their authors and their 
applicability. It is possible to replicate IAS cost-benefit analyses elsewhere in the world. Of course, the 
particular local circumstances and availability of data need to be taken into account, and the study 
modified accordingly. Further, in the case of developing c
to
undertaken, it may be used as a basis or valuable starting point for studies elsewhere. Finally, in many 
cases IAS cost-benefit studies are not written by economists or published in economic journals. It 




Born et al. (2005) review economic evaluations of invasions. Their main conclusions on studies that 
they reviewed are as follows: i) studies mostly have methodological shortcomings; ii) assessments are 
mostly ex-post rather than ex-ante; iii) prevention is hardly reflected in the analy
is
measures, on few countries, on agriculture, a
sound rather similar to the observations made above and elsewhere in this study, although the 23 
studies they discuss are primarily different from the studies reviewed in this paper.  
 
On basis of these considerations, we would suggest the following ten points to be taken into account 
when conducting economic policy evaluations of invasive alien species: 
i)  Choose a minimum of two realistic policy options to evaluate. 
ii)  Consider all the possible direct and indirect impacts, monetise the ones you can and take 
the others into account qualitatively. 
derived.  
iv)  If possible, formalise the basis of your analysis. 
v)  Undertake an ex-ante analysis to supplement an optional ex-post analysis. 
vi)  Carry out a sufficient sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. 
vii)  Consider how the impacts excluded from the quantitative an
ii)  Discuss to whom the costs and benefits accrue in time and between d
)  Make a (conditional) policy recommendation. 
)  Relate your findings to the wider framework of biosecurity
    
47 This is merely an observation, not a critique.   118(162)
 
Topic 4: Economic risk assessment of Colorado potato beetle in Finland 
The current study used a basic cost-benefit framework to assess the economic profitability of two 
alternative Colorado potato beetle management policies. The expected costs of prevention were 
compared to the expected costs that could ensue in an alternative policy strategy in which the species is 
llowed into the country. The primary focus was on ex-ante analysis and an ex-post assessment was 
rtant national food crop. Furthermore, 
e CPB provides a convenient case for studying the effects of invasions, uncertainty and local change 
s make 
e beetle difficult and expensive to control. 
nt determinants of the economic profitability, together with the subsequent spread of the beetle 
opulation in Finland. For instance, even a 50% reduction in the invasion probability (implying an 
vasion on average every six years) still results in a benefit-cost ratio of about 1.2:1 under both spread 
Scenarios. Hence the fact that invasions come very seldom is not automatically a valid argument for 
bandoning protection. Similarly, the amount of fixed costs spent annually on maintaining the 
iven different levels of risk that we are willing to take. 
a
conducted for purposes of model validation.  
 
The Colorado potato beetle is a typical wide-spread plant pest and a nuisance in North America, 
Europe and to an increasing extent in Asia, affecting productivity of an important food crop. Hence it 
is of general interest worldwide. In terms of the European Union, the case is of specific interest as 
protected zones are an EU-wide instrument that has been designed for protecting plant production. In 
Finland the case is of interest because potato is a relatively impo
th
in fairly manageable circumstances with some data on invasions available and relatively few externalities 
present. Given the life history characteristics of the CPB, there are five important factors to take into 
account from an economic point of view. First, the beetle has spread very rapidly across the continent, 
although its spread has slowed down as it has approached its ecological limits. Second, in propitious 
environmental conditions its population size can increase extremely rapidly. Third, it is capable of 
causing significant damage to potato plants. Fourth, cold summers and winters present an obstacle to 
its establishment, but it is assumed to be capable of establishing in at least some parts of Finland. 
Finally, lack of natural predators and ability to develop resistance to chemical control substance
th
 
This study has concentrated primarily on direct costs and benefits of protection versus reactive control. 
The main lesson from the ex-post cost-benefit analysis is that it is not sufficient to look at the costs 
over only a short period of time. Protection against invasive pests is to a large extent an investment for 
the future – an investment that may produce potentially very high revenues in terms of avoided costs in 
the future. Short-sighted analysis of the past few years does not provide a truthful description of the 
economic performance of such systems.  
 
The general results of the ex-ante cost-benefit analysis carried out in this study indicate that the current 
policy based on a protection system is economically viable, provided that there will be some future 





protection system makes no practical relevance for the profitability of the protection system. The other 
types of costs involved are much more significant. On the other hand, the impact of variable protection 
costs on the present value mean costs of the policies is proportionate to the change in the costs, but the 
impact on the mean benefit-cost ratios is clearly greater. Together these findings imply that it is the 
variable costs of the protection system rather than the fixed costs that are important from the policy 
profitability point of view. 
 
Altogether, under the conditions and assumptions of this study, we can give up the CPB protection 
system if we are certain that there is no future change, winter survival of the pest population stays 
permanently below about 20% or potato crop losses will not exceed 5% of the yield under any 
circumstances. If we cannot be certain that one of these three conditions materialises, we should be 
cautious regarding the possibility of abandoning protection. This is because the risk associated with 
giving up protection is much larger than that associated with protection. At the extreme, the cost of 
giving up protection may be nearly thirty times greater than continuing with it. The cumulative 
distribution functions of net benefits of protection presented in Figure 29 can be used for determining 
the optimal policies g  119(162)
 
It is also good to bear in mind the discussion on possible costs of the CPB that were not included in 
the quantitative assessment. On basis of these it can be concluded that because the health, 
environmental and cultural costs are all likely to be larger under the reactive control policy, the 
conclusions of the quantitative assessment remain unchanged in qualitative terms: in other words, 
because pre-emptive control is already the preferred policy from an economic point of view, excluding 
e health, environmental and cultural costs from the analysis does not change this conclusion. As for 
Fin , as  nd the 
var  co
these varia ate information regarding their true values would be most 
ben al. 







the secondary (international) market effects that were also excluded, it is difficult to say whether they 
would influence the results of the quantitative analysis in this particular case. 
 
ally the sensitivity analysis suggested that the winter survival, the logistic spread rate a
iable st of protection are the most important variables in determining economic profitability, it is 
bles that acquiring more accur
efici However, regardless of the uncertainty involved, the aggregate results of the study 
 suggest that the current policy of CPB 
 Issues to consider 
 prev tion versus reactive control 
least five factors that affect the relative effectiveness of p A priori, at  re-emptive versus reactive control 
in t res
future deve ly the species is to invade, establish and 
spr  




Third, whe onment or natural environment matters. For 
stance agricultural producers are used to regulations and relatively reliably undertake preventative 
The guiding principles of the Biodiversity Convention’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice emphasise that primary attention should be given to preventing IAS 
introductions (Perrault and Carroll Muffett 2001). In most economic assessments it has also been 
found to be the more cost-effective policy, although not without exceptions as discussed earlier in this 
study. Furthermore, there are trade-off situations in prevention in two respects. First, more resources 
spent on pre-emptive control means on one hand that protection becomes more preferable (as it 
becomes more effective), but on the other hand that it becomes less preferable (as it gets more 
expensive). Thus there is likely to be a point beyond which no more prevention should be provided. 
The second trade-off is that the more protection there is, the more better-off the society is in the sense 
that invasion and establishment are less likely, but the less well-off it is in the sense that international 
commerce and its benefits are restricted to a greater degree. Policies dealing with a public good issue 
such as the present one have to account for such trade-off problems.  
 
With limited resources it is very difficult to make any system perfect even if we wanted to. Surkov et al. 
(2005) suggest that in the face of resource limitations it would be economically sensible to switch 
resources from inspecting more pathways to inspecting fewer, specific, pathways. In the current case 
he p ent case can be distinguished. First, the existing environmental conditions and their likely 
lopment are important in determining how like
ead in all seasonal conditions. Second, the invasion pathways are important. If there are clear 
e wind is the primary means of dispersal, prevention of establishment rather than entry 
portant.  
ther the species threatens the production envir
in
measures as required. The case is different in natural ecosystems where such actors are difficult to 
identify, let alone mobilise. Also different legislation applies to the two environments. Fourth, the 
production structure matters. Professional producers can be expected to act according to regulations to 
protect their businesses, whereas habitual producers who produce only for enjoyment or possibly own 
consumption may be more difficult to educate and persuade to comply. Fifth, whether the actions are 
taken in a co-ordinated or decentralised manner affects their efficiency in reaching the desired targets. 
These five factors are likely to impact on pre-emptive and reactive control in an asymmetric fashion, 
and thus also affect the economic viability of the two policies. 
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this could be adapted to
pecial high-risk areas. E
 mean that resources should be switched to defining and concentrating on 
ven if the limited resources mean that the protection system might not succeed 
ce 
amages are reduced.  
reactive control when needed, 
in all circumstances. As argued by Smith et al. 
onstrated in the case study analysis, it is not impossible to find plausible variable 
t choice. 
trol appears to be the 
ay a rapid 
other despite the results of a quantitative cost-benefit 
estic production from 
s
in keeping the pest out of the country, it could still reduce the impact of the invasion by for instan
elaying it within the season such that the resulting d d
 
In practice, reactive control may be preferred over pre-emptive control because of uncertainty. The 
relationship between resources invested in pre-emptive control and benefits thus acquired is very 
ncertain. It may be tempting to avoid such expenditures and focus on  u
as reactive control actions often involve somewhat less uncertainty. Hence reactive control may appear 
as the less risky management strategy, even if it often is also the more expensive one (Finnoff et al. 
(2006), see also Shogren (2000) and Perrings (2005)). 
 
The main point argued here is that it is the circumstances that make one strategy preferred over another 
 not that some strategy is automatically preferred  –
(1999), under certain circumstances the society could be better off concentrating on controlling and 
eradicating casual and naturalised species rather than trying to predict the pest status at the import 
stage. As was dem
values that favour reactive control instead of protection in the case of CPB in Finland. Moreover, as 
argued by Sharov and Liebhold (1998) and Sharov (2004), policy switch from eradication to slowing the 




t is also possible that the protection system is preferred even when reactive con
ost-minimising strategy. As mentioned earlier, Olson and Roy (2002) point out that if the discounted 
expected invasion growth rate is greater than one, it is optimal to eradicate small invasions even if the 
marginal costs of control are large relative to the marginal damages. This is because this w
growth in costs in the future can be avoided. This once again highlights the fallacy of relying extensively 
on a limited ex-post analysis.  
 
One policy strategy may be preferred over an
analysis also when all the costs and benefits that matter are not included in the assessment. For 
instance, if environmental or health impacts are potentially sizable but difficult to monetise and hence 
excluded from the analysis, a policy decision opposite to the one favoured by the cost-benefit analysis 
may be taken. Similarly, one ‘benefit’ of the protection system that most probably would not be 
ncluded in any assessment is the (unjustified) enhanced protection of dom i
import competition. Nonetheless, such factors may still influence the policy making process. The key 
point here is that cost-benefit analysis is one tool that can be used to assess the economic viability of 
different policy alternatives. It is not an automated decision machine. 
 
Beyond economic efficiency 
The analysis undertaken in this study is primarily concerned with economic efficiency of the two 
alternative policies. Furthermore, the assessment concentrates on direct benefits, with some discussion 
us 
bution may not necessarily be through direct financial 
ety supported control can also be thought of as a means of distributing the economic impact 
on indirect effects and on to whom the costs and benefit accrue intertemporally and intratemporally. In 
a complete analysis indirect costs and benefits, effectiveness of institutions and social justice issues need 
more attention. For instance, there are likely to be differences between co-ordinated protection system 
where the state can plan the policy accurately and decentralised decision making by numero
independent farmers who have varying objective functions. The differences may materialise through 
indirect effects such as development of pesticide resistance in the target species or loss of export 
ossibilities in other markets.  p
 
Regardless of the policy chosen, it can be argued that because of the public good properties the state 
should be involved at some level. The contri
support, but could be for instance through education, expert advice and research and development. 
This way the state can impact on the effectiveness of reactive control without getting actively involved 
tself. Soci i  121(162)
of the pest from the producers to the society. This study has throughout dealt with unsupported 
reactive control. 
 
Barbier and Shogren (2004) pointed out that it is unlikely that a decentralised economy produces the 
socially optimal level of self-protection by households against IAS. The analysis conducted in this study 
annot completely differentiate whether it is the type of policy (pre-emptive control vs. reactive 
ever, in principle the 
ming of the policy (before or after the invasion) is independent of the execution (joint or 
t. Whether such effects need to be separated 
epends on the question we want to answer. In this study the aim has been to assess the economic 
ifferent constituents in more detail. 
 possible to design various kinds of 
ansfer mechanisms to compensate those who suffer or demand compensation from those who gain. 
ch policy to choose but also who 
ay the costs of the policy and who get to take part in making the policy. Also when in time those costs 
 final point to make here in relation to social issues is about the weight given in cost-benefit 
ne of the 
roups, economic efficiency would no longer be a separate issue from equity. Since under the current 
n), the equity issues would need to be considered much more thoroughly. However, we hope that 
ny transfers of income are assigned separately from the phytosanitary policies. 
c
control) or the exact form of management (organised joint protection vs. decentralised farm level 
control) that is the key factor in favouring one policy strategy over another. How
ti
decentralised). Hence the analysis conducted in this study is dependent on the exact policy environment 
as well as on the characteristics of the natural environmen
d
viability of the two policy strategies as they exist and thus their constituents are in this sense irrelevant. 
Should we wish to study how to improve the technical or economic performance of those policies, we 
would need to consider the d
 
In a similar fashion, the question of to whom the costs and benefits accrue is in principle independent 
of the economic efficiency of the policies. After all, it is always
tr
In this study one type of market structure and payment mechanism has been used, but this in no way 
implies that it is the one that is the most economic or most equal or most socially acceptable 
mechanism. It is a task of the policy makers to decide not only whi
p
incur and decisions are made is a matter of social justice.  
 
A
calculations to different groups. In this study an equal weight is given to both producers and 
consumers/taxpayers. However, if we for some reason wanted to give a greater weight to o
g
assumptions a market gain by one group is a market loss for the other group, the aggregate market 




Known unknowns and unknown unknowns 
Jensen (2002) argues that protection is optimal if and only if the cost of the invasion is large enough. 
on is that issues related to IAS are inherently uncertain. What 
appens to IAS in new environments usually cannot be inferred by observing them in their natural 
re is uncertainty regarding the impacts of the invasion 
n human societies and about the effects of our own management actions.  
nted out earlier that despite this inherent uncertainty, analysis of uncertainty related to IAS is 
adequate in many case studies that have been conducted. It has much more extensively been included 
er, inclusion of basic uncertainty in the analysis is not very difficult. Kann and Weyant (2000) 
uggest that consideration of uncertainty should include discussion on: 
iii)  effects of risk on optimal policies (measure of dispersion) 
He adds that in his analysis this conclusion holds regardless of whether that cost is known for certain 
or only in distribution. This is one reason for why consideration of uncertainty and the dispersion of 
costs are important. The second reas
h
habitats or under confined circumstances. Hence there are likely to be unknown elements surrounding 





in theoretical analysis of the issue, but these do not always translate easily into empirical assessments. 
Howev
s
i)  probability weighted net benefits of optimal policies (model outputs) 
ii)  optimal policies given uncertainty (optimal decisions) 
iv)  sensitivity of key parameters (value of input information) 
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These four points have all been addressed in the current fairly simplistic study, which more or less 
proves that they can be considered in most studies with relatively little effort. For instance, as pointed 
ut by Eiswerth and van Kooten (2002), decision-making under uncertainty can be properly analysed 
 by the invasive species in question. 
 model framework suggested by Moffitt et al. 
005) or the ignorance framework suggested by Horan et al. (2002). Nevertheless, some inclusion and 
k and uncertainty in a cost-
enefit analysis in this study. Instead, the interested reader is referred to consult for instance Kopp et 
ften 
asier to predict, quantify and monetise than costs incurred in an invasion by species that threaten for 
s not 
vaded. The scale of the costs avoided may simply be unknown, but potentially very large. Further, in 
recautionary principle should be applied.  
n and 
ubsequent establishment are irreversible, acceptability of intentional introductions in the first place 
autionary approach may be warranted. Horan et al. 
002) point out that in ignorance framework the extreme low-probability outcomes are weighted more 
rsibility and reasonable knowledge of the distribution of costs, precautionary 
pproach may still be justified if there is a small but positive probability that the ensuing costs are 
be used as a reason for postponing 
easures to avoid or minimize” a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity (CBD 
 Conclusions and suggestions for further study 
ility of two alternative policy strategies under change and 
ncertainty. The main conclusion and policy recommendation from the study is that the current 
ignificant crop losses in Finland. In light of the current information, these qualifications do not seem 
 possible alternative policy that could be assessed in later work is the use of a “local protected zone”. 
oosing. Within this area, actions similar to those under the current protected zone are 
arried out, but in addition there remains a leftover area that is left for the individual private producers 
 a 
pe of “withdrawing the pest border” –approach, which may be worth considering in a case where the 
o
even when hard data are missing, if the framework is complemented with experts providing verbal 
descriptors of the growth and damages caused
 
If uncertainty is too severe to be studied in the conventional way (for instance if there are unknown 
unknowns), one can try for instance the hybrid info-gap
(2
assessment of uncertainty and ignorance related to the issue is clearly required in all empirical studies. 
There is no space to discuss the various methods available for handling ris
b
al. (1997), Mumford et al. (2000), Nairn (1996) or Renn (2005). 
 
The costs of an invasion by species threatening some anthropogenic production process are o
e
instance natural ecosystems. For these latter species it is difficult to compare the financial costs 
incurred in prevention with the often intangible costs avoided when a particular ecosystem i
in
the production environment the species may often be feasibly controlled at least to an extent, whereas 
in natural ecosystems the case may not be so. Thus, in cases where unknown but potentially large 
impacts may occur it is worth considering whether a p
 
There are basically three reasons for using a precautionary approach. First, if the invasio
s
should be questioned (Smith et al. 1999) and a precautionary approach should be applied more 
generally. Second, under extreme ignorance prec
(2
heavily than in the expected-utility framework, hence implying a precautionary approach. Third, even if 
there is some reve
a
catastrophically large. Finally, it is worth recalling that the preamble of the Convention on Biological 







This study assessed the economic viab
u
protected zone policy is economically sensible, unless we can be fairly certain that there will be no 
future change, the beetle cannot properly over-winter in Finland or that the beetle will not result in 
s
likely and hence the current policy should be continued. 
 
A
In a local protected zone, instead of the entire invaded area the society only applies eradication in an 
area of its own ch
c
to take care of. Thus reactive control would be applied in this area. As before, reactive control does not 
aim at eradicating the pest, and hence it can continue spread within and from this area. This would be
ty
invasion pressure increases to such an extent that the state authorities have insufficient resources to 
deal with the issue.    123(162)
 
Note that this approach would not fit within the classification of a protected zone, because in such a 
case Finland would be likely to lose the protected zone status and all the trade related restrictions in 
ccordance with the rules of the Community legislation. However, such a spatial combination is a 
nger can cope with eradication. 
enefits discussed in this study and natural science data to resolve some scientific uncertainty, the 
hat are the impacts of possible nonlinearities in costs of pre-emptive control and reactive 
control on the optimal policy? 
measures that 
could be adopted in order to adapt to the establishment of the CPB? 
fessional and habitual potato 
producers, whose objectives may differ from each other? 
re, what is the optimal timing for such a 
switch? 
measures given limited resources by the state? 
aking process the scale and dimensions 
f the issue is therefore crucial. In addition, the performance of alternative (long-term) policy responses 
ns that remain to be pondered – the current 
tudy has after all been limited to fairly specific circumstances. Much has been achieved in both 
a
possible national policy strategy – an alternative to the current protection policy in circumstances under 
which the authorities no lo
 
In the course of the study, a need for more information has surfaced. In addition to standard costs and 
b
following issues could be of interest from both scientific and policy decision-making viewpoints:  
i)  Who pays for the policies and when in time do the costs of different policies ensue? 
ii)  W
iii)  What are the impacts of the different policies on international commerce in the form of 
restrictions, sanctions and reputation? 
iv)  What are the cost efficiencies of the actual available on-farm and state-level 
v)  What are the implications from the fact that one of the policies (giving up protection) is 
irreversible, whereas the other one is not? 
vi)  What are the implications from the fact that there are both pro
vii)  What are the implications from the fact that the protected zone acts as a buffer zone 
protecting potentially also Sweden and Norway? 
viii)  If protection is given up at some point in the futu
ix)  What are the implications and lessons learned from the case of the CPB for a more general 
assessment of invasive plant pest policy in Finland? 
x)  What is the role of the CPB protection policy in the wider framework of biosecurity 
 
It is probable that issues related to biosecurity, including invasions by IAS, continue to be a major 
factor threatening the production systems, ecological systems and human health in the modern 
societies. Understanding and taking into account in the policy-m
o
should be evaluated in order to ascertain that the societies are capable of dealing with the challenge. 
The ten points listed above are only a subset of questio
s
ecological and economic research on IAS in the last decade or so. Much remains to be achieved. 
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APPENDIX 1 – LEGISLATIVE TEXTS 
 
 
A1.1 International legislation 
 
A1.1.1 WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are defined as
48: 
Any measure applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from the entry, 
stablishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; … 
 by animals, 
sk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety. 
e
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried
f pests; or  plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread o
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests. 
 
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, 
inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; 
quarantine treatments including relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the 
materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and 
methods of ri
 
The basic idea behind the SPS agreement is that preventative measures are acceptable tools and can 
lso be trade restricting, provided that the case can be scientifically proved, the measures are not 
enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
a
discriminating between similar countries and the measures are not more trade-restricting than 
necessary. This basic idea is stated in the preamble to SPS agreement in that: 
… no Member should be prevented from adopting or 
or health, subject to the requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
ternational trade; …  in
 
This principle is stated in the actual agreement in Article 2 on Basic Rights and Obligations as: 
1. Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, 
except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5. 
3. Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail … 
 
Article 5 explains the concept of scientific evidence as well as clarifies (in paragraph 7) the exception 
pointed at above in Article 2: 
embers shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures a 1. M re based on an assessment, as appropriate to the 
circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organizations. 
2. In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes and 
production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence 
of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. 
. In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and determining the measure to be applied for achi 3
ap
eving the 
propriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection from such risk, Members shall take into account as relevant 
e erms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or 
read of a pest or disease; the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the relative 
s. 
. Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, take into account the 
nomic feasibility. 
conomic factors: the potential damage in t
sp
cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risk
4
objective of minimizing negative trade effects. 
… 
6. … Members shall ensure that … measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level 
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and eco
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7. In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis of available pertinent information … In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time. 
 
Risk assessment should be based on scientific evidence (par. 2), and the cost-effectiveness of alternative 
miting risk (par. 3, 6) should be taken into account. The Article urges to take into account 
negative trade effects (par. 4) when choosing the level of protection. If 
S, unless adequate scientific evidence is available or 
stem is justified on basis of Article 6: 
strategies to li
the objective of minimising 
there is a measure that achieves the appropriate level of protection but is less trade-restricting than the 
current measure, then the current measure is seen as more trade-restrictive than required. Adopting a 
precautionary approach is unacceptable under SP
research into the issue is initiated (par. 7). What constitutes sufficient scientific evidence for different 
Members is likely to vary, as is understanding of what is meant by ‘a reasonable period of time’ within 
which the precautionary measure should be reviewed. 
 
The European Union protected zone sy
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are adapted to the sanitary or phytosanitary 
characteristics of the area … from which the product originated and to which the product is destined. 
. Members shall, in particular, recognize the concepts of pest- or disease-free area 2
p
s and areas of low pest or disease 
 areas shall be based on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological 
e likely to remain, pest-or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease prevalence, 
revalence. Determination of such
surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary or phytosanitary controls. 
3. Exporting Members claiming that areas within their territories are pest- or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or 
disease prevalence shall provide the necessary evidence thereof in order to objectively demonstrate to the importing 
Member that such areas are, and ar
respectively.  
 
A1.1.2 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
The relevant part is Article 8 on In-situ Conservation, which simply states that (CBD 1992): 
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: … 
 (h) Prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species 
 
A1.2.1 Other International Agreements 
 
The Bern Convention (Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats) 
ng four African states. Its objective is to “conserve wild flora and fauna and their natural 
y undertakes:  
was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1982. The Convention has 45 contracting parties, 
ludi inc
habitats; to promote co-operation between states; and to give particular emphasis to endangered and 
vulnerable species, including endangered and vulnerable migratory species”. The relevant part regarding 
IAS in the Convention is Article 11, which states that (Bern Convention 1979): 
Each Contracting Part
  a  to encourage the reintroduction of native species of wild flora and fauna … 
  b  to strictly control the introduction of non-native species. 
 
In addition to the above agreements, there are several other international agreements that touch upon 
ir own sectors. These agreements include the following (after the Swedish  the issue of IAS in the
Clearing House Mechanism website).   144(162)
 
Binding international conventions and agreements: 
•  Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, 1995. 
•  Cartegena protocol on Biosafety to the CBD, 2000. 
•  Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 1973. 
ses of International Watercourses (ILC), 1994. 
  Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl habitat. Parties to the RAMSAR 
•  Convention on the Law of Non-navigational U
•  Convention on Migratory Species of Wild animals (CMS, Bonn convention), 1979. 
•  International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). 
•  International Watercourses Convention. 
•  The Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal Biodiversity - Alien Species. 
•  Office International des Epizootes (OIE) - International Animal Health Code for Mammals, Birds and Bees. 
•
convention on Wetlands, 1971. 
•  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982. 
 
Non-binding international agreements: 
•  European Inland Fisheries Advisory Commission (EIFAC). 
•  Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) - Code of Conduct for the Import and Release of 
 Transfers 
. 
tions (IMO) - Guidelines for the Control and Management of 
nd Pathogens. 
Exotic Biological Control Agents. 
•  Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) - Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 1995. 
•  International Civil Aviation Organisation - Resolution A-32-9: Preventing the introduction of invasive alien species, 
1998. 
  International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) - ICES Code of Pratice on the Introduction and •
of Marine Organisms, 1994
•  International Maritime Organization of the United Na
Ships Ballast Water to Minimize the Transfer of Harmful Aquatic Organisms a
•  World Conservation Union IUCN Species Survival Commission (SSC) - IUCN Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Biodiversity Loss Caused By Alien Invasive Species. 
 
 
A1.2 Community legislation 
 
A1.2.2 Council Directives 77/93/EEC and 2000/29/EC 
 
A directive that deals with harmful organisms and introduces the concept of protected zones is Council 
Directive 77/93/EEC of 21 December 1976, on protective measures against the introduction into the 
ommunity of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the 
en replaced by Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000.  
 Instead of 
) Plant production is very important to the Community. 
C
Community. It has subsequently be
 
The directive defines harmful organisms as “pests of plants or of plant products, which belong to the 
animal or plant kingdoms, or which are viruses, mycoplasmas or other pathogens.”
reproducing the entire directive here, the preamble of the directive is used as it notes the basic issues 
dealt with in the directive, including
49: 
(2
(3) Plant production yields are consistently reduced through the effects of harmful organisms. 
(4) The protection of plants against such organisms is absolutely necessary not only to avoid reduced yields but also to 
increase agricultural productivity. 
(5) Action aimed at the systematic eradication of harmful organisms within the Community, established by the plant health 
gime applicable in the Community as an area without internal frontiers, would have only limited effect if protective 
h is of worldwide interest. 
) One of the most important measures consists in listing the particularly dangerous harmful organisms whose introduction 
to the Community must be prohibited and also the harmful organisms whose introduction into the Member States when 
arried by certain plants or plant products must also be prohibited. 
re
measures against their introduction into the Community were not applied at the same time. 
(6) The need for such measures has long been recognised and they have formed the subject of many national regulations 
and international conventions, including the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) of 6 December 1951 
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(8) The presence of some of these harmful organisms, when plants or plant products are introduced from countries in 
which these organisms occur, cannot be effectively checked. It is therefore necessary to make minimum provision for bans 
ountries the authorities responsible in such 
r the IPPC. It could be desirable to establish 
e made to the Annexes to this Directive should be 
unity should benefit from the same degree of protection against harmful organisms. 
sed to particular plant health risks should be defined and should be 
corded special protection under conditions compatible with the internal market. 
ommunity as an area without internal frontiers, and the 
tween requirements applicable to Community products 
the one hand and those applicable to imports from third countries on the other, and to identify harmful organisms 
rwise present there, and to the growing medium used there. For the 
fficient operation of such a system of checks, all producers should be officially registered. 
re more effective application of the Community plant-health regime in the internal market, it must be possible 
to use, for the purpose of plant-health checks, available official manpower other than that of Member States' official plant-
protection services, whose training should be coordinated and supported financially by the Community. 
(28) If the results of the checks are satisfactory, instead of the phytosanitary certificate used in international trade, 
Community products will bear an agreed mark (plant passport), adapted to the type of product, in order to ensure its free 
movement throughout the Community or those parts thereof for which it is valid. 
(29) The official measures to be taken when the results of the checks are not satisfactory should be specified. 
(30) To ensure compliance with the Community plant-health regime in the context of the internal market, a system of 
official checks during marketing should be established. This system should be as reliable and uniform as possible throughout 
the Community but should exclude specific controls at borders between Member States. 
(31) In the framework of the internal market, products originating in third countries should in principle be subjected to 
plant-health checks on first introduction into the Community. If the results of the checks are satisfactory, third country 
products should be issued with a plant passport ensuring free movement in the same way as Community products. 
(32) In order to confront the situation created by the completion of the internal market with the necessary guarantees, it is 
essential to reinforce the plant-health inspection infrastructure at national and Community level at the Community's external 
frontiers, paying particular attention to those Member States which, by reason of their geographical situation, are points of 
entry to the Community. The Commission will propose the inclusion in the General Budget of the European Union of the 
necessary appropriations for that purpose. … 
(34) It is no longer possible for Member States to adopt any special plant-health provisions on the introduction into their 
territory of plants or plant products originating in other Member States. All provisions on plant-health requirements for 
plants and plant products should be established at Community level. 
(35) It is necessary to establish a system of Community financial contributions to share at Community level the burden of 
possible risks which might remain in trade under the Community plant-health regime. 
(36) In order to prevent infections by harmful organisms introduced from third countries, there should be a Community 
financial contribution aimed at reinforcing the plant health inspection infrastructure at the Community's external frontiers. 
(37) The regime should also provide for adequate contributions to certain expenses for specific measures, which Member 
States have adopted to control and, where applicable, eradicate infections by harmful organisms introduced from third 
countries or from other areas in the Community, and, where possible, to repair the damage caused. … 
on the introduction of certain plants and plant products, or to provide for special checks to be made in the producer 
countries. … 
(11) Temporary safeguard measures not laid down in this Directive should normally be adopted by the Member State where 
the problem originates in the case of imminent danger of the introduction or spread of harmful organisms. The 
Commission should be informed of all events which require the adoption of safeguard measures. … 
 (17) In the case of importations of plants or plant products from third c
ountries for issuing certificates should be, in principle, those empowered unde c
lists of these authorities for the non-contracting third countries. 
(18) The procedure applicable to certain types of amendments to b
simplified. … 
 (21) It is appropriate to provide in certain cases that the official inspection of plants, plant products and other objects 
coming from third countries should be carried out by the Commission in the third country of origin. … 
(23) The scope of the regime should no longer be restricted to trade between Member States and third countries, but should 
also be extended to marketing within single Member States. 
(24) In principle, all parts of the Comm
However, differences in ecological conditions and in the distribution of certain harmful organisms must be taken into 
account. In consequence, "protected zones" expo
ac
(25) The application of the Community plant health regime to the C
introduction of protected zones make it necessary to distinguish be
on 
relevant for protected zones. 
(26) The most appropriate place for carrying out plant-health checks is the place of production. In respect of Community 
products, these checks must therefore be made mandatory at the place of production and should extend to all relevant 
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A1.2.3 Council Directive 92/43/EEC 
 
The threat presented by IAS to natural ecosystem
ay 1992, on the conservation o
s is covered in Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 




1. The aim of this Directive shall be to contribute towards ensuring bio-diversity through the conservation of natural 
habitats and of wild fauna and flora in the European territory of the Member States to which the Treaty applies. 
2. Measures taken pursuant to this Directive shall be designed to maintain or restore, at favourable conservation status, 
natural habitats and species of wild fauna and flora of Community interest. 
3. Measu
d local 
res taken pursuant to this Directive shall take account of economic, social and cultural requirements and regional 
characteristics.  an
 
The relevant part regarding IAS is Article 22 on supplementary provisions, which states that: 
In implementing the provisions of this Directive, Member States shall: 
(a) study the desirability of re-introducing species … that are native to their territory where this might contribute to their 
conservation …; 
(b) ensure that the deliberate introduction into the wild of any species which is not native to their territory is regulated so as 
not to prejudice natural habitats within their natural range or th e wild n ative fauna an d flora and, if they consi der it 
necessary, prohibit such introduction. The results of the assessment undertaken shall be forwarded to the committee for 
information; 
 
A1.2.4 Council Regulation 338/97 
 
Trade aspects of IAS that threaten ecological systems are considered in Council Regulation 338/97 of 9 
December 1996, on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein. Its 
objective is set in Article 1 as:
51
The object of this Regulation is to protect species of wild fauna and flora and to guarantee their conservation by regulating 
trade therein in accordance with the following Articles. 
 
IAS are to be included in Annex B as defined in Article 3 on ‘Scope’, which determines that: 
2. Annex B shall contain: …  
(d) species in relation to which it has been established that the introduction of live specimens into the natural habitat of the 
Community would constitute an ecological threat to wild species of fauna and flora indigenous to the Community. 
 
Whereas Council Directive 2000/29/EC allows trade restrictions in relation to species that threaten 
plant production, Council Regulation 338/97 does the same for species that threaten natural 
environment. Again, the approach is based on a blacklist (Annex B). Article 4 on ‘Introduction into the 
ommunity’ sets conditions for species import in Annex B:  C
2. The introduction into the Community of specimens of the species listed in Annex B shall be subject to completion of the 
necessary checks and the prior presentation, at the border customs office at the point of introduction, of an import permit 
issued by a management authority of the Member State of destination.  
… 
6. In consultation with the countries of origin concerned … and taking account of any opinion from the Scientific Review 
Group, the Commission may establish general restrictions, or restrictions relating to certain countries of origin, on the 
introduction into the Community: … 
(d) of live specimens of species for which it has been established that their introduction into the natural environment of the 
Community presents an ecological threat to wild species of fauna and flora indigenous to the Community. 
 
A1.3 Finnish national legislation 
 
A1.3.1 Act on the Protection of Plant Health 
 
The Act on the Protection of Plant Health of 2004 replaced the Plant Protection Act of 1994. The new 
Act is essentially similar to the old one, but it identifies in greater detail responsibilities of the 
authorities. The relevant parts of the Act are discussed below.
52
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2 § Scope of application 
This Act applies to procedures that are used to maintain a favourable state of plant health and that can be undertaken to 
 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry issues a regulation defining the plant pests that the procedures set out in 
counter plant pests and to prevent their spread. … 
…
moment 1 can apply to. The Act can also be applied to counter and prevent the spread of plant pests and other organisms 
that are new or whose impacts are unpredictable, and that cause immediate threat to plant health.  
 
3 § Definitions 
For the purposes of this Act:  …  
3) a plant pest is defined as any detrimental organism of animal or plant kingdom., fungus, bacterium, phytoplasm, virus or 
other disease agent which can cause direct or indirect damage to cultivated plants, natural plants or products derived from 
them, and which can be found in plants or plant products. 
 
The Act explicitly states that in addition to the species in the blacklist, it can be applied to species 
outside that list if they pose a threat to plant health. It is also stated that it may also be applied to those 
pests that may cause direct or indirect damage to natural plants or plant products. Further relevant 
parts of the Act include the following: 
7 § Importation and exportation 
Certain plants, plant products and other material with which the plant pest can easily spread, may be imported only when 
accompanied by a plant health certificate or other certificate indicating plant health. … 
 
10 § Obligation of notification 
Any person who knows or suspects that a plant pest … exists on property, part of property, plantation, store, transport 
vehicle or building owned or operated by that person, is obliged without delay to inform the local TE-Centre or the Plant 
Production Inspection Centre. …  
ns and restrictions regarding cultivation, transport or trade in plants; 
) issue orders regarding essential procedures to be performed in cultivation, harvest and trade in plants; 
d exportation of plants, plant products, plant pests, 
 § Officials 
xecution and monitoring of the compliance with this Act … are to be carried out by the Plant Production Inspection 
Centre, which is to be assisted in monitoring by the rural departments of the TE-Centres. … 
3 § Executive assistance 
s, frontier guard and police and rescue services to 
 
 § Countering plant pests  11
To counter the plant pests or to prevent their spread, it is possible to:  
1) order the land owner, producer or the owner or operator of the property or part of the property to perform essential 
procedures deemed necessary in order to eradicate the plant pest present on the property;  
2) order an essential clean-up or disinfection and the method of essential clean-up and disinfection of a building, work or 
transportation vehicle or any other object contaminated by the plant pest;  
3) order an essential clean up, disinfection or disposal of plants or packages or packaging material of plant origin, and to 
order the essential method of clean up, disinfection or disposal or to set essential restraints as to how plants or packages or 
packaging material of plant origin can be used; 
4) issue essential bans, conditio
5
6) issue essential bans or conditions regarding marketing, importation an
and other objects in which the plant pest can easily spread; and  
7) oblige the actor to follow any other essential restrictions, bans and procedures to counter plant pests or prevent their 
spread. 
… 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry can also permit the Plant Production Inspection Centre to carry out procedures … 
for plant pests that are not named in a regulation ... If such a plant pest causes immediate threat to plant health and the 
matter is urgent, the Plant Production Inspection Centre can also undertake essential counter procedures … before a 






The monitoring officials are entitled to executive assistance from custom
carry out the procedures required by this Act and the regulations and obligations based on this Act.  
 
11§ points out that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry may permit actions regarding pests that 
have not (yet) been included in the appropriate annex of Directive 2000/29/EC. Further, the Plant 
Production Inspection Centre (i.e. the relevant authority) may take such action even when not ordered 
by the Ministry, if they see that the threat is imminent. The authority responsible is also specifically 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
52 Source for all the following excerpts from this Act is Government of Finland (2003). There is no official translation of the 
Act. The translation is done by the author and is probably inaccurate in legal terms.   148(162)
named in the Act. In addition, the fact that plant protection authorities are now entitled to assistance 
from the customs, border control, police and rescue officials is new to the Act.  
 
As for penal provisions and compensation payments, the Act states the following: 
29 § Penal provisions 
Any person who intentionally or due to negligence 
1) without the registration required in 4 § markets, imports for marketing, stores or imports plants, plant products or other 
objects in which the plant pest can easily spread, … 
6) fails the obligation of notification of the presence of the plant pest as set in 10 §,  
7) breaches the orders, bans, conditions or restrictions as set in 11 § … 
is to be sentenced, if the deed does not carry a heavier penalty on basis of another Act, to pay fines for endangering plant 
health.  
 
30 § Compensation for damages and expenditure caused by plant pest counter decision  
The expenditure and damages to a producer caused by a d sion to counter a plant pest new to Finland (plant pests to be 
can be paid for the expenditure and damages 
 a producer caused by a decision to counter and prevent the spread of a plant pest that already exists in Finland and causes 
irect or indirect damage, but that cannot be eradicated (plant pests to be controlled/countered). A pre-requisite for 
...  
o the
end ntentionally or due to gross negligence by failing to follow good 
duction practice.  
eci
eradicated) are compensated for by the State. In addition, partial compensation 
to
d
receiving compensation is that the plant … has been in production 
Expenditure and damages that are compensated … include:  
1) disinfection, counter and eradication expenditure directly caused by performing an issued order, and the value of the 
articles disposed of or damaged due to the counter procedure;  
2) the economic damage or expenditure caused by prohibition of sale, transfer, transport or use, or by a comparable 
restriction based on an issued order; and  
3) the economic damage or expenditure caused by interruption of plant production based on an issued order. … 
 
31 § Denial of compensation 
The compensation as set in 30 § will not however be paid:  
1) for damage and expenditure caused by defects that are due t  plant pest; … 
) for exp iture or damages that the actor has caused i 4
pro
 
The penal provisions and the compensation procedure state that compensation is primarily paid for 
nother piece of national legislation dealing with invasions is the Nature Conservation Act 
(  in Section 43 on ‘Preventing the spread of non-native species’ states: 
on-native species falling outside the purview of the Hunting Act of Fishing Act are not to be released into the wild if there 
pests that are to be eradicated, as opposed to those that are merely controlled. As is evident by 
comparing the above with Council Directive 2000/29/EC, the Directive is executed by means of this 
Act. Its main points are that it obligates individual farmers to inform the authorities of quarantine pest 
observations, as well as to follow any orders regarding eradication. It also sets out the punishments for 
not following the instructions. It also sets out the right of the producer to get compensation for the 
control and eradication costs as well as for the value of the lost crop. 
 






is cause to suspect that the species may become established permanently. 
 
Non-native plant species without an established range in the Finnish wild are not to be planted or sown outside a garden, 
field or other site designated for special purposes, nor in natural waters, in so far as there is cause to suspect that the species 
may become established permanently. This shall not apply, however, to the planting or sowing of trees for the purpose of 
forestry. 
 
If a non-native plant or animal species is known to spread rapidly in the wild, and there is reasonable cause to suspect that it 
might constitute a health hazard or have a detrimental effect on an indigenous Finnish species, the Ministry of the 
Environment may issue any regulations as prove necessary for preventing the spread of such a species. Measures for 




                                                           
53 Source for the excerpt: Government of Finland (1996). Translation obtained from the Ministry of the Environment.   149(162)
A1.3.3 Other legislation 
 
Three other pieces of national legislation that deal with IAS from their own perspectives are the Animal 
iseases Act (e.g. Article 13), Hunting Act and Fishing Act (Government of Finland 1980; 1982; 1993; 
 origin 
D
Nummi 2000). These in principle dictate that species of foreign origin cannot be imported to Finland 
or released in the wild without permission from the appropriate Ministry. The relevant translated 
sections of the Hunting Act and Fishing Act are provided below. 
 
Hunting Act – Article 42 (Government of Finland 1982): 
Section 42 – The import and release of animals of foreign
(1) It is forbidden to import or release bird or mammal species of foreign origin as well as game strains of foreign origin 
without the permission of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Statement on permit application must be requested 
from the Ministry of the Environment. Permission must be refused if significant harm will be caused by the measure to the 
natural environment or to naturally occurring fauna. Provisions on how importing and releasing are to be carried out may be 
laid down in the permit. (1268/1993) 
(2) The provisions of subsection 1 also apply to the bringing of an animal from Åland to some other area of Finland and to 
the release of that animal into the area in question. 
 
Fishing Act – Article 94 (Government of Finland 1993): 
… 
(2) The import of a fish or crayfish species not occurring naturally in Finland or of their stock or gametes is allowed only by 
permission of the Ministry concerned and on the terms and conditions specified by it. Permission must be denied if the 
measure may cause significant harm to nature or wild animals. Provisions on fish or crayfish species that can be imported 
freely, shall be given by decree as necessary (252/1998) 
 APPENDIX 2 – MARKET AND TRADE EFFECTS 
 
A2.1 Domestic market effects 
 
  150(162)
Market effects are possible if the invasion results in damages to a production process. In such a case, 
hift of the domestic supply 
curve. 
 
Depending on the market structure, some share of these additional costs is passed on to consumers. 
The same effect takes place if the invasion results in production losses to such an extent that the prices 
increase because of the diminished quantity supplied. As the product prices increase, the consumers 
suffer a loss of consumer surplus, because they have to pay more for the product. Also producers may 
suffer losses due to the increased production costs. What in the end happens depends on the market 
structure. The impact of increased costs on producers and consumers is presented below under 
different types of market structure. To start with, Figure A49 presents the situation in which there is no 
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Figure A49. Elastic demand and elastic supply with and without 
 
The supply (demand) curve depicts the quantity supplie  
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supplied as production costs have increased. The su n 
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If supply is perfectly inelastic (vertical supply curv
Perfectly inelastic supply means that there is a fixed qua
a case shift of the supply curve results in   just j. 
Supply change thus results in the consumers losing   
consumers unambiguously lose in the case of 
ambiguous. 
more inputs are typically needed to produce the same quantity of outputs. These inputs (for instance 
control substances as well as additional labour and machinery) are costly, and thus the general 
implication is that the costs of production increase. This translates into a s
the pest invasion. 
d (demanded) at each price level of the affected
t in the supply curve: at each price level less
pply curve thus shifts from the normal pre-invasio
) position. If neither the supply nor the de
shift in the supply results in consumer surplus being 
. Supply change thus results in the consumers losing b + c
y lose in the case of an invasion. Part of th
all welfare loss. The overall impact on producers is
 too restrictive an assumption for as long as t
e), the situation is as presented in Figure A50. 
ntity of the good that can be produced. In such 
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However, we have so far assumed that there is no foreign trade. Let us n w add foreign trade to the 
diagrams. The effective worl  denotes 
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assumed horizontal (an as 
the standard  
There are three possible cases regarding the relationship of domestic and world prices. Each is 
presented briefly below. 
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Dinv post-invasion domestic supply. World price is 
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is assumed to include the tran
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The case where the world price is  ice at the domestic market equilibrium is 
presented in Figure A52. In such a case, the  q
W is 
provided at the price   the quantity supplied by domestic producers. The impact of the 
invasion is that the mar et equilibrium remains the 
reduced from q
Dnorm . The consumers are thus not affected, but the domestic producers will 
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52. below dom at domestic market equilibrium. 
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producers. The consumers would lose the trapezoidal area bordered by p
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Dnorm and the demand curve 
in consumer surplus, but since the world price acts as a maximum price, the impact is not as large as in 
the first case above. The domestic producers on the other hand would lose the triangular area bordered 
by the pre- and post-invasion supply curves and p
Dnorm in producer surplus, but gain the area bordered 
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estic market equilibrium. 
 about the domestic market effects is that in cases with no foreign trade, they are 
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arket effects may not count as a cost as such. If we are concerned about 
specific country in question. 
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e means for a better livelihood. If 
ects of free trade, including invasions by exotic organisms, become large relative to 
vasion may reflect on 
y free 
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us section here. From purely supply and 
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A2.2 Trade effects 
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ronmental health. Thus from biosecurity point of view the 
f the protection system can be considered to be a risk 
 protect ourselves from the threat posed by invasive species. 
ift in the domestic supply curve by preventing the additional 
om materialising. In such a case the domestic producers would gain a double 
 would not face the increasing costs implied by the upward shift in the domestic 
ond, they would enjoy the benefits of increasing world price, which would increase 
omestic production. If the increase in import price is large enough, it is even 
ossible that the domestic producers end up producing the entire amount demanded.  
at different. The analysis above 
h increased domestic production costs result in loss of 
ly to result in losses to domestic producers. For consumers 
y decrease if the 
in this case consumers are not 
ly, there may be effects t e loss of 
 caused by in de the impacts of 
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ce restricted in products that may harbour and spread the 
 has been illustrated by for instance the BSE in the United Kingdom or more 
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price increase caused by the introduction o
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production costs fr
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From the point of view of an exporting country the situation is somewh
can be extended to consider a case in whic
market share in world markets. This is like
the result is ambiguous as it depends on what happens to domestic prices – they ma
supply is diverted from exports to domestic consumption. However, 
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This concludes the brief discussion S trade impacts. It is perhaps worth emphasising t
analysis of trade impacts is excluded from this study because the case study does not require it. In many
other cases, trade impacts are likeAPPENDIX 3 – THE ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
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Yes, pestic general are not production enhancing. 
The two policy strategies have 
no external costs or benefits 
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Entire prevention costs can be 
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International price transfers may 
be imperfect, i.e. prices are 
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ictiv hat t rice trans to be imperfect. 
uite justified.  is a f p pr nsport 
expe Central E o Fi fairly n sugge  
that the price would nee uble  d to  mports
profitable. As we are pro price s of  00%, th
assumption seems valid.  , Fin to ca n as a 
different product than im  pot the d y well 




















































































The demand curve is linear over 
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 that this again  156(162) 
 
Control costs are linear. 
The assumption of linear costs makes the analysis easier and the results 
linearities would n
more stochastic ele
The resources available to both plant protection authorities and individual 
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The pest is host-specific and 
causes no external health, 
cultural, ecological or food safety 
damage 
The external costs of the two str
assumption rules out any enviro
have. If one of the strategies im
other that it is not, then in calcu er
the pest is present, all relevant c is 
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good, but also on all other matte rs 











































































































































































 APPENDIX 4 – MATLAB C
########################## 
: 
tes the analysis 
################################################ 
0;      % number of iterations 
r of years (note: change this also in set_parameters file). 
_vec; dCS2_vec = ZP_vec; dPS1_vec = ZP_vec; dPS2_vec = ZP_vec; 
1_vec(:,i), H2_vec(:,i)] = CPB_analysis; 
skettu'), datestr(now,13) 
ettu'), datestr(now,13) 





_of_Adaptation = [mean(adapTot1) mean(adapTot2)] 
Cost_of_Protection = [mean(ZPTot)] 
ian(adapTot2)] 
ection = [median(ZPTot)] 
n_Cost_of_Adaptation = [min(adapTot1) min(adapTo )] 
Max_Cost_of_Adaptation = [max(adapTot1) max(adapTot2)] 
 
Min_Cost_of_Protection = [min(ZPTot)] 
Max_Cost_of_Protection = [max(ZPTot)] 
 
%disp('BR-ratios') 
Mean_BC_Ratio = [mean(S1) mean(S2)] 
Median_BC_Ratio = [median(S1) median(S2)] 
Min_BC_Ratio = [min(S1) min(S2)] 











 BEETLE PROTECTION SYSTEM % COLORADO POTATO
% ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES OVER TIME 
% Jaakko Heikkilä, MTT Economic Research 
 April 4, 2005.  %
% This script execu
% ##################
 
clear variables; clc; 
 
tic 
 = 30000 n
y = 50;          % numbe
 
% CREATE THE EMPTY MATRICES 
 
os(y,n); H1_vec = ZP_vec; H2_vec = ZP_vec;  ZP_vec = zer
CS1_vec = ZP d
 
% EXECUTE ANALYSIS 
 
for i = 1:n 
[ZP_vec(:,i),  ... 
...  dCS1_vec(:,i), dCS2_vec(:,i), 
dPS1_vec(:,i), dPS2_vec(:,i), H
 
          if i==n/4; disp('25% la
          end 
          if i==n/2; disp('50% lask
          end 
 if i==n          
          end 
end 
 





S1 = adapTot1./ZPTot; S2 = adapTot2./ZPTot; 
S1b(S1<1)=1; choiceS2a(S2>=1)=1; choiceS2b(S2< choiceS1a(S1>=1)=1; choice
 
% REPORT THE RESULTS 
 
format short g  
format compact 
   
%disp('Cases') 
  
rotection = [sum(ch P















);   Annual_Mean_Cost_of_Protection = mean(ZP_vec'
S1_ Annual_Mean_Cost_of_Adaptation1 = mean(dC
mean(dCS2_vec'+dPS2_vec'); 
vec'+dPS1_vec'); Annual_Mean_Cost_of_Adaptation2 = 
Cost_of_Adaptation2 = 
');  




vec) - ZP_vec; 
it1); 
fit2); 
ar variables   % clears the Workspace 
parameters  % run m-file that determines the basic parameters 
ine_trends  % run m-file that creates the trends 
eate_variables           % run m-file that creates the variables 
kkaa               % run m-file that frees up some memory 
CREATE EMPTY MATRICES FOR THE VARIABLES 
= years; i = runs; 
 = zeros(t,i); H2 = zeros(t,i);  
1 = zeros(t,i); dp2 = zeros(t,i);  
P = zeros(t,i); df = zeros(t,i); Z = zeros(t,
S1 = zeros(t,i); dPS2 = zeros(t,i);  
 zeros(t,i);  
D FAILURE MATRIX IS CREATED 
% all the following is carried out for time defined by 
ars 
        for i=1:runs  % as well as iterations defined by runs 
 
        inv_rand(t,i) = rand;     % random, uniformly distributed matrix inv_rand 
        if inv_rand(t,i)<invprob(t);  
            inv(t,i)=1;  % if it is less than invprob, invasion is 1 (true) 
        else inv(t,i)=0; end;           % and zero otherwise 
         
        fail_rand(t,i) = rand;     % random, uniformly distributed matrix fail_rand 
        if fail_rand(t,i)<failprob(t);  % if fail < failprob, failure is 1 (true) and 0 otherwise 
        fail(t,i) = 1; 
        else fail(t,i) = 0; end 
         
    end 
end 
 
Annual_Min_Cost_of_Protection = min(ZP_vec');  
Annual_Min_Cost_of_Adaptation1 = min(dCS1_vec'+dPS1_vec'); Annual_Min_
n(dCS2_vec'+dPS2_vec');  mi
 










Net_Benefit1 = (dCS1_vec + dPS1_
Net_Benefit2 = (dCS2_vec + dPS2_vec) - ZP_vec; 
 
Annual_Net_Benefit1 = mean(Net_Benefit1'); 
Annual_Net_Benefit2 = mean(Net_Benefit2'); 
 
Total_Net_Benefit1 = sum(Net_Benef
tal_Net_Benefit2 = sum(Net_Bene To
 










% COLORADO POTATO BEETLE PROTECTION SYSTEM: 
% ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES OVER TIME 
% Jaakko Heikkilä, MTT Economic Research 
% April 4, 2005. 
This script undertakes the analysis, as guided by ajotiedosto  % 
% ################################################################## 
 















dCS1 = zeros(t,i); dCS2 =
 
% RANDOM INVASION AN
 





% THE INVASION SCENARIOS ARE CREATED 
 
H1 = inv .* initc .* s;       % set the initial conditions for hectarages in Scens 1 and2 
H2 = H1;               % i.e. this much comes in every year 
 
for t=2:years  % all the following is carried out for time defined by 
years 
        for i=1:runs  % as well as iterations defined by runs 
       
% SCENARIO 1 
 
H1(t,i) = H1(t,i) .* (1 - (H1(t-1,i) .* wintsurv(t-1,i) / Htot)) ... 
    + (H1(t-1,i) .* wintsurv(t-1,i) .* spread(t-1,i) ... 
    / (1 + ((spread(t-1,i) - 1) .* H1(t-1,i) .* wintsurv(t-1,i) / Htot))); 
 
% SCENARIO 2 
 
H2(t,i) = H2(t,i) .* (1 - (H2(t-1,i) .* wintsurv(t-1,i) / Htot))... 
    + H2(t-1,i) .* wintsurv(t-1,i) + linspread(t-1,i) .* wintsurv(t-1,i) .* (H2(t-1,i)/(H2(t-
1,i)+o)); 
  
        end 
end 
     
pakkaa 
 
% DETERMINE THE INVASION INDUCED PRICE CHANGES 
       
        dp1 = -D .* p .* elast .* (H1/Htot); 
        dp2 = -D .* p .* elast .* (H2/Htot); 
 
% CREATE DISCOUNT FACTOR 
        
for t=1:years   
    for i=1:runs  
        df(t,i) = 1 / ((1+r)^((t)-1)); 
    end 
end 
 
      
% CALCULATE ADAPTATION COSTS 
 
dPS1 = (q .* D * p .* H1 + pzzi .* H1-((Htot-H1) * q .* dp1)-(H1 * q .* (1-D) .* dp1)) .* df; 
dPS2 = (q .* D * p .* H2 + pzzi .* H2-((Htot-H2) * q .* dp2)-(H2 * q .* (1-D) .* dp2)) .* df; 
 
dCS1 = (dp1 * Htot * q .* D .*(H1/Htot)/2 + (dp1 .* (Htot * q .* (1-D .* H1/Htot)))) .* df; 




% CALCULATE PROTECTION COSTS 
  
Z = inv .* initc;       % set the initial conditions for hectarages  
  
for t=2:years 
        for i=1:runs       
         Z(t,i) = Z(t,i) + fail(t-1,i) .* fail_area(t-1) .* Z(t-1,i) .* wintsurv(t-1,i);  
        end 
end 
  






















% COLORADO POTATO BEETLE PROTECTION SYSTEM: 
% ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES OVER TIME 
% Jaakko Heikkilä, MTT Economic Research 
% March 4, 2005. 
% This script is used to define the parameter values 
% ################################################################## 
 
% DEFINE THE VALUES FOR THE FOLLOWING CONSTANT PARAMETERS 
runs = 1;     % how many iterations are made 
years = 50;          % how many years are included 
pzzi_base = 100;  % reactive control costs 100 e/ha 
p = 0.20;  % pre-invasion producer price 0.20 e/kg 
elast = -2;  % yield effect on price -2 
q = 24400;  % quantity produced 24400 kg/ha 
r = 0.02;  % discount rate 2% 
F1 = 36222;  % fixed costs (labour + bought services) 36222 e/yr 
F2 = 1605;  % fixed costs (misc costs) 1605 e/yr 
V1 = 256.00;       % variable costs (inspection visits) 256 e/visit 
V2_base = 20.00;  % variable costs (control substances) 20 e/ha 
V3 = 610.00;  % variable costs (eradication and compensation) 610 e/ha 
Htot = 29100;  % total production area 29100 ha 
g = 4;               % inspection visits = controlled area * g 
invprob_base = 0.33;     % invasion probability 33% 
failprob_base = 0.30;   % protection system failure probability 30% 
failarea_base = 0.20;  % protection system failure area, 20% of infected area 
o = 0000000000000000000000000000000000.1;   % something small 
 
% DEFINE THE TREND AS 0 = NO TREND, 1 = SLOW OR 2 = RAPID TREND 
invasion_probability = 1; 
invasion_magnitude = 1; 
winter_survival = 1; 
variable_prevention_costs = 1; 
variable_reactive_costs = 1; 
 
% THE FOLLOWING SET THE TRENDS IN PROTECTION FAILURE 
trend_failprob = 0.05;  %failure probability increases over time (note, not when trend = 0) 
trend_failarea = 0.05;   %failure area increases over time (note, not when trend = 0) 
 
% DEFINE THE MEANS FOR THE VARIABLES THAT ARE ALLOWED TO FLUCTUATE 
D_mean = 0.10;  % mean damage 10% of crop 
initc_mean = 400;  % initial control magnitude 400 ha 
s_mean = 1.5;  % spread in the initial year from the initial magnitude if no action taken 
spread_mean = 1.8;  % spread rate in logistic spread scenario  
linspread_mean = 400;  % in linear spread scenario mean annual spread 400 ha 
wintsurv_mean = 0.30;  % determines proportion of population (area) that survives the winter  
  
% DEFINE THE VARIANCES FOR THE VARIABLES THAT ARE ALLOWED TO FLUCTUATE 
D_var = 0.005; 
initc_var = 20000; 
s_var = 0.05; 
spread_var = 0.4; 
linspread_var = 10000; 






























% COLORADO POTATO BEETLE PROTECTION SYSTEM: 
% ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES OVER TIME 
% Jaakko Heikkilä, MTT Economic Research 
% March 4, 2005. 
% This script creates the variables needed 
% ################################################################## 
 
for t = 1:years   
    for i = 1:runs 
            resist_trend_AVx(t,i) = (1+(t-1)*resist_trend_AV); 
            resist_trend_pzzix(t,i) = (1+(t-1)*resist_trend_pzzi); 
        end 
    end 
 
    for t = 1:years    
            inv_trendx(t) = (1+(t-1)*inv_trend); 
            trend_failprobx(t) = (1+(t-1)*trend_failprob); 
            trend_failareax(t) = (1+(t-1)*trend_failarea); 
        end 
 
        invprob = invprob_base.*inv_trendx'; 
        failprob = failprob_base.*trend_failprobx'; 
        fail_area = failarea_base.*trend_failareax'; 
        V2 = V2_base.*resist_trend_AVx; 
        pzzi = pzzi_base.*resist_trend_pzzix; 
        invprob(invprob<0)=0; 
        invprob(invprob>1)=1; 
        failprob(failprob<0)=0; 
        failprob(failprob>1)=1; 
        fail_area(fail_area<0)=0; 
        fail_area(fail_area>1)=1; 
                
% DAMAGE 
D = D_mean + sqrt(D_var) .* randn(years,runs); 
D(D<0)=0; 
 
% INITIAL YEAR SPREAD MULTIPLIED 
s = s_mean + sqrt(s_var) .* randn(years,runs); 
s(s<1)=1; 
 
% LINEAR SPREAD AREA 
linspread = linspread_mean + sqrt(linspread_var) .* randn(years,runs); 
linspread(linspread<0)=0; 
 
% LOGISTIC SPREAD RATE 
 
spread = spread_mean + sqrt(spread_var) .* randn(years,runs); 
spread(spread<1)=1;  
 
for t = 1:years   
    for i = 1:runs 
 
wintsurv(t,i) = wintsurv_mean*(1+(t-1)*wintsurv_trend) + sqrt(wintsurv_var) .* randn(1,1); 
initc(t,i) = initc_mean*(1+(t-1)*initc_trend) + sqrt(initc_var) * randn(1,1); 
 



























% COLORADO POTATO BEETLE PROTECTION SYSTEM: 
% ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES OVER TIME 
% Jaakko Heikkilä, MTT Economic Research 
% March 4, 2005. 
% This script is used to create the trends 
% ################################################################## 
 
% SET TREND LEVELS FOR NO, SLOW AND RAPID 
 
% TREND IN INVASION PROBABILITY AND MAGNITUDE 
inv_trend_no = 0.00;  initc_trend_no = 0.00;       
inv_trend_slow = 0.01; initc_trend_slow = 0.01;       
inv_trend_rapid = 0.02; initc_trend_rapid = 0.02;       
 
% TREND IN WINTER SURVIVAL 
wintsurv_trend_no = 0.00;  
wintsurv_trend_slow = 0.01;  
wintsurv_trend_rapid = 0.02;  
 
% TREND IN PESTICIDE RESISTANCE 
resist_trend_AV_no = 0.00; resist_trend_pzzi_no = 0.00; 
resist_trend_AV_slow = 0.02; resist_trend_pzzi_slow = 0.02;  
resist_trend_AV_rapid = 0.03; resist_trend_pzzi_rapid = 0.03;  
 
% DETERMINES THE TREND VARIABLES 
 
if invasion_probability == 0; inv_trend = inv_trend_no; 
elseif invasion_probability == 1; inv_trend = inv_trend_slow; 
elseif invasion_probability == 2; inv_trend = inv_trend_rapid; end 
 
if invasion_magnitude == 0; initc_trend = initc_trend_no; 
elseif invasion_magnitude == 1; initc_trend = initc_trend_slow; 
elseif invasion_magnitude == 2; initc_trend = initc_trend_rapid; end 
 
if winter_survival == 0; wintsurv_trend = wintsurv_trend_no; 
elseif winter_survival == 1; wintsurv_trend = wintsurv_trend_slow; 
elseif winter_survival == 2; wintsurv_trend = wintsurv_trend_rapid; end 
 
if variable_prevention_costs == 0; resist_trend_AV = resist_trend_AV_no; 
elseif variable_prevention_costs == 1; resist_trend_AV = resist_trend_AV_slow; 
elseif variable_prevention_costs == 2; resist_trend_AV = resist_trend_AV_rapid; end 
 
if variable_reactive_costs == 0; resist_trend_pzzi = resist_trend_pzzi_no; 
elseif variable_reactive_costs == 1; resist_trend_pzzi = resist_trend_pzzi_slow; 
elseif variable_reactive_costs == 2; resist_trend_pzzi = resist_trend_pzzi_rapid; end 
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